


LAW AND GOSPEL
AND THEIR
RELATIONSHIP
IN THE
THEOLOGY OF LUTHER

by

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The spelling throughout is American according to Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, Fifth Edition.

Introduction

A recent writer on Luther and the German Reformation has pointed out that it is impossible to understand a man out of the context of his times. This an important warning to the scholar seeking to understand the thought, personality and work, not only of Luther, but of any historical personage. In the case of Luther, however, it is also true that his age cannot properly be understood apart from the man. In a peculiar way, Luther became the center of the complex movements which culminated in the German Reformation at the beginning of the sixteenth century and in many ways his character left an indelible impression both on the immediate scene of his activities and on the whole later history of Western Europe.

As a result of his prominence Luther has been the subject of bitter controversy concerning his place in the generation and later development of the German Reformation. Some have said that the German Reformation was only one revolution within a set of revolutions, in which Luther was only an incidental and non-decisive personality. Others have said that without Luther there would have been no Reformation at all. It seems to me there is an element of truth in both sides of the argument, but that standing alone they are apt to be misleading.

It is true that there were forces already at work in Germany and elsewhere leading either toward reform, or definite cleavage of the Church. One may see these forces in such things

as the cultural and intellectual ferment of the day, with the growing interest in classical learning, the renewed study of the Scriptures in the original tongues, and the revival of scientific and literary disciplines. Then too, there was the religious unrest, expressed by the mystics and the strict orders within the Church and the small sects without, characterized by the appeal to Biblical precedents and the spirit and organization of the primitive Church. Finally, there was the vast political movement which was centered in the struggle between the papacy and the empire and the growing national states, and which was complicated by the gradual deterioration of the feudal structure of society.

It was in this incredibly complex environment--religious, intellectual, social, economic and political--that Luther lived out his life. The remarkable thing is that Luther--whether intentionally or not--drew all these elements into what was to become a comparatively unified movement. He caught the imagination not only of the German prince, but also of the pious peasant, or the intellectual University scholar like Melanchthon. These diverse elements all went into the makeup of the German Reformation and it cannot be understood without taking these factors into consideration.

But what of the man who was the center of so much of this? Did he only happen to become the center of the revolution? Chance undoubtedly did play a part in the career of Luther; had not the

forces already mentioned been at work he might well have been unknown to history, at least in the role which we now know to be his. On the other hand, without the force of Luther's personality the Reformation would likely have taken a different form than it did. It is therefore necessary to gain an understanding of Luther if one wishes to understand the Reformation which has had such an impressive influence on later history.

Few would deny that Luther is an important figure in history, even though some might dispute the claim that his contribution was a beneficial one and others might not wish to commit themselves as to whether he was a good or bad man. Most important of all, Luther is not merely a historical figure who is irrelevant to the modern scene. Today one may read books by Niebuhr, Dawson, Maritain, or even papal encyclicals, to discover that Luther's thought is real and alive, and that he still remains a worthy opponent--or ally, as the case may be--for contemporary political theorists, theologians, philosophers and ecclesiastics. Both for friend and foe, then, Luther is an important personality of history, who cannot safely be ignored.

To understand Luther, however, is far from a simple task. In the first place, the complex forces which were at work generally, were also at work within Luther himself; it could be said that Luther was in part a mystic, a humanist-scholar, a scholastic-theologian, a Church-man, a German patriot and even a peasant. To disentangle these threads in his personality is

practically an impossible task, and yet each of them had an influence on his thought and actions throughout his life. Luther himself was not always certain as to what underlying motives were pushing him and he often complained, for instance, that the doctrinal "oil" of Scholasticism had crept into his very bones, from where he could never completely drive it out. In the second place, Luther is particularly difficult to study because he wrote so voluminously and over such a wide range of subjects. Few persons have matched his literary output; the immense Weimar edition of his works, consisting of over eighty large volumes, is testimony to this obstacle in getting a first-hand knowledge of his thought. In the third place, Luther lived a long and full life and his views changed during his career. He often said that he did not become a mature theologian overnight; when he put an introduction on a new edition of one of his writings produced many years earlier, he left the text as it was--to bear testimony, as he said, to how his teaching had developed during that time. Finally, Luther was not a "systematic" theologian; he did not put down his views in concise and methodical form. Luther said that controversies were a stimulant to his spiritual and mental powers and it is true that we often find some of his most deep and original insights in the middle of his most violent controversial writings. To draw out those insights from the polemical shell in which they are cast is a delicate operation. Furthermore, when Luther is "systematic" in such

writings as his Catechisms, he is sometimes so concise that he becomes ambiguous by his very simplification. All these then, among others, are the obstacles which stand in the path of one who attempts to understand Luther--his thought, his work, his personality.

Various scholars have found different ways of overcoming these obstacles, and, indeed, the amount written about Luther is in fair proportion to his own immense production. A general survey of his life and teaching is one approach which is legitimate, though it has its serious limitations. In this paper another method is used, namely, examining in some detail one of the doctrines which he propounded. This again has its limitations, for it cannot give the general context in which the doctrine is set. Nevertheless, it does enable one to go deeper than a superficial survey is able. In this way, as a narrow pipe is sunk into the ground to get a sample of the geological stratification of a certain place, so a study of this concept may give a small sample of the theological "stratification" of Luther, and enable us to understand, in part at least, some of the strains, motivations and insights which made up his thought.

Law and Gospel in Luther's Theology

One of the most notable trends in contemporary theology has been the revival of interest in and the renewed study of the theology of Luther. This has not been limited to the traditionally Lutheran countries but has been apparent in other confessional traditions as well. For instance, in Britain two of the best recent studies on Luther's thought have been done by G. S. Hendry, a Scottish Presbyterian, in a series of lectures called God the Creator,¹ and by P. S. Watson, an English Methodist, in a book entitled Let God Be God.² Luther has never been entirely unfamiliar to English-speaking readers but most of the previous books in English were primarily biographical in character, emphasizing the personality of the man, as for instance Brian Lunn's Martin Luther.³ The new studies, however, are significant because they reveal Luther as a creative and reforming theologian, not merely as an ecclesiastical innovator or a corrector of moral abuses in the medieval church life as some of the earlier treatments had done.

The introduction of Luther "as a constructive thinker, whose breadth and consistency of outlook and depth of insight entitle him to rank among the greatest theologians"⁴ is one that is strange to our ears. The word "consistency" may seem especially strange to us for we have been accustomed to think of Luther as essentially the religious genius, who is a theologian by accident and only so in a very fragmentary and unsystematic way.⁵ Luther's great handicap, we have been told, is that he failed to

make his theology a suitable vehicle to convey his admittedly great and creative religious insights. One recent scholar would go so far as to say that the "Theology of Luther" is a phrase without meaning;⁶ another has called him "The amateur theologian--for so, by any standard, Luther must surely be judged."⁷

Watson, however, has shown that Luther has every right to be considered an eminent theologian, pointing out that Luther himself considered that his most important reforming work was in the field of doctrine rather than in that of "life" (as had been characteristic of the earlier reformers).⁸ Even a cursory reading of Luther's life should indicate the large amount of academic training which he received. Furthermore, his pride in his title of "Doctor of Theology" and the deep sense of responsibility with which he bore the degree and carried on his work as a university lecturer also help to show the intellectual and theological context in which his "reforming" work began.⁹ Or one may examine his prolific literary output, finding in it a high percentage of theological works: lectures, academic theses and their elaborate defence, philosophical debates, and commentaries and further revealing the high importance of theological and doctrinal factors, not only in his own development, but as materials with which he articulated his opposition to the whole Roman Catholic system.¹⁰

When, for example, he attacks monasticism he sees it not only as an outward abuse which should be corrected, but even more as the fruit of a theological system that holds that salvation depends upon works; he therefore advises Melanchthon that the

vows must be rescinded "a priori" and not "a posteriori."¹¹

They must apply themselves to the root of the matter, not to its fruit and result; most vows have been taken because of a legalistic view of the Christian life and a dependence on righteousness by works of the law. This binds a free evangelical conscience and must be condemned.¹² If, however, one takes a vow in an evangelical spirit without depending upon works but upon Christ only for salvation (as he believed St. Bernhard and other had done), then a vow may be taken or an old one retained in a new spirit.¹³ Luther attacks monasticism, therefore, as the fruit of a perverted theological system and his attack is at the root of that system. The problem is not vows or no vows, but a theology which bases salvation on the law versus one which bases it on the gospel.¹⁴

But if Luther be admitted as a theologian who has an important and creative role in theological history, how may this theology of Luther best be studied and understood? This has never really been given a fully satisfactory answer. His amazingly prolific literary production, the extreme complexity of the revolutionary historical setting of his work, the lack of rigid systematization in his treatment of theological questions, all help to make the honest representation of Luther's thought an unusually difficult task. The host of rival judgments and views on Luther by scholars down through the years since his death bears testimony to this fact. There are, however, certain aspects of his theological thought which most scholars, whether friendly or hostile, agree are of basic importance if we are to understand him. One of these points is

certainly the question of the relation of law and gospel. Various critics have noted the centrality of this conception in Luther's thinking and Luther himself testified to its importance in his theology.

Loofs, who shows a close knowledge of Luther's thought in his Dogmengeschichte says: "Luther hat die Frage nach dem Unterschied von Gesetz und Euangelium als die Kardinalfrage der Theologie angesehen."¹⁵ Adolph Harnack, who is less sympathetic towards Luther's position, also stresses the importance of this distinction and traces it back through Augustine to Paul: "he attached himself so closely to Paul that it does not seem necessary to state his view in detail."¹⁶ Grisar, the German Jesuit critic of Luther, also gives a considerable amount of space in his volumes on Luther to the distinction between law and gospel; he admits that it is a ground-principle of Luther's thought and quotes without disagreement the statement of Loofs that this marks a decisive difference between Lutheran and Roman theology.¹⁷ Sasse in his Was heisst lutherisch? carries this a step further by defending the thesis that it is also the theological point at which Lutherans and Calvinists must part company.¹⁸

Luther himself gives ample evidence of the high regard he has for this distinction. Works which must take their place in the first rank of his theological writings are: Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen (1520)¹⁹, De servo arbitrio (1525)²⁰, Der grosse Katechismus (1529)²¹, and In epistolam S. Pauli ad Galatas Commentarius (1535)²². In all of them he stresses the importance

of the true interpretation of the relation between law and gospel.

In Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen he points out that the whole of Scripture is divided into two parts--law and promise: "die gantze heylige schrift, wirt yn zweyerley wort geteyllet, wilche seyn: Gebot oder gesetz gottis, und vorheyschen oder zusagunge." The commands teach and demand good works, telling us what we ought and ought not to do; but they give no power to fulfil the demand: "Die gebott, leren und schreyben uns fur, mancherley gutte werck aber damit seyn sie noch nit geschehen. Sie weysen wol, sie helffen aber nit; leren was man thun soll, geben aber keyn sterck dartzu." The real purpose of the law is to make us realize that we are unable to do good and thereby teach us not to put confidence in ourselves: "lerne an yhm selbs vortzweyffeln." We then find that the promise gives what the law demands and fulfils what the law calls for: "Also geben die zusagung gottis, was die gepott erfoddern, und volnbringen, was die gepott heyssen." God, therefore, both gives the law and ultimately fulfils it: "es allis gottis eygen sey. Gepot und erfullung, er heisset allein, er erfullet auch alleyn." Both the law and the promise are God's Word but they have different purposes. The law is given to convict sinners of their sin and drive them in fear to repentance and conversion; the promise, or the gospel, is to come to those convicted of their sin and teach them faith and forgiveness.²³

In De servo arbitrio he brings out the necessity of distinguishing between law and gospel in a more polemic style, as be-

fitting the work, castigating Erasmus for not properly observing the distinction. He says that no one can understand theology or the Scriptures unless the distinction is made:

"Obsecro autem te, quid ille in re Theologica vel sacris literis efficiat, qui nondum eo pervenit, ut, quid Lex, quid Evangelion sit, norit, aut, si norit, contemnat tamen observare? Is omnia misceat oportet, coelum, infernum, vitam, mortem, ac prorsus nihil de Christo scire laborabit."²⁴ Throughout the work he makes ample use of the distinction to build up his case against Erasmus: "In his locis Diatribe nostra prorsus nihil discernit inter voces legis et Evangelii, tam scilicet caeca et ignara est, ut quid lex, quid Evangelion sit, non videat... Sed Diatribe nostra iterum nihil inter legis et promissionis verba distinguens."²⁵ The third main section of De servo arbitrio contains most of his argument on the proper "office" of the law:²⁶ the law is given, not to prove the freedom of the will, but to reveal sin. It is the gospel which comes to reveal the true remedy for our sin and bondage which the law has disclosed: "Respondet hic Paulus: per legem cognitio peccati...Non (ait) probatur liberum arbitrium per legem...Lex non iuvat, multo minus ipse se iuvare potest. Alia vero luce opus est, quae ostendat remedium. Haec est vox Evangelij ostendens Christum liberatorem ab istis omnibus."²⁷

Luther's catechetical writings, of which the chief is Der grosse Katechismus, are the nearest approach we have to a systematic presentation of his theology. In them Luther follows the

simple form of the catechisms for family instruction which he had known in his youth; these generally contained the Creed, the Lord's Prayer, the Ten Commandments and perhaps one or two Psalms.²⁸ The interpretation that Luther gives these constituent elements and the order in which he places them, however, are absolutely consistent with the general structure of his theology, and with his interpretation of law and gospel in particular. He says that the Ten Commandments are a perfect summary of the law; they contain everything that is demanded of us to make our life pleasing to God: "So haben wir nu die zehen gepot, ein ausbund Gottlicher lere, was wir thuen sollen, das unser gantzes leben Gotte gefalle."²⁹ But because our human efforts are far too weak and ineffective to keep the law, the Ten Commandments are properly followed in order by the Creed, which tells us what we are to receive from God and from where we are to receive strength to fulfil the demands of the law: "Bisher haben wir gehoret das erste stuck Christlicher lere, und darynne gesehen alles was Gott von uns wil gethan und gelassen haben. Darauff folgt nu billich der Glaube, der uns furlegt, alles was wir von Got gewarten und empfangen müssen....Darumb ist dis stuck ia so notig als ihenes zu lernen, das man wisse, wi man dazu kome, woher und wo durch solche krafft zu nemen sey."³⁰ The third part of the Catechism is the Lord's Prayer, which is the model by which we pray to God for help and strength to enable us to have faith in the Creed and to fulfil the Ten Commandments in the sanctified life: "das er den glauben und erfullung der zehen gepot uns gebe, erhalte und mehre."³¹

In contrast to the Heidelberg Catechism, for instance, Luther places the Ten Commandments first in order; for, he says, if we were able to keep the law, which the true teaching of the Ten Commandments shows is impossible, we would have no need of the Creed or the Lord's Prayer: "Den so wir kundten aus eigenen krefftten die zehen gepot halten, wie sie zuhalten sind, durfften wir nichts weiter, widder glauben noch vater unser."³² Luther here remains faithful to his teaching that the law must come before the gospel, preparing the way for it by convicting men of sin and driving them from self-confidence to humble penitence. The Ten Commandments should not lead us to pride and dependence on our own efforts but they should lead us ultimately to God to find what He has done and promises to do for us.³³ This is found in the Creed. The Apostles' Creed, therefore, takes the central position in the Catechism "not only standing midway in the natural order, but occupying also by virtue of its contents the central position."³⁴ As a bee goes from flower to flower collecting honey, so in the Creed is collected from the Bible the essence of the gospel;³⁵ in fact, "Totum Evangelium est in Symbolo."³⁶

The Creed especially stresses, according to Luther, the forgiveness of sins through God's mighty acts.³⁷ This is a very different lesson from that of the Commandments; they teach us what we have to do, while the Creed announces what God has done for us and given to us: "Aus dem sihestu nu, das der Glaube gar viel ein andere lere ist, denn die zehen gepot. Denn ihene leret wol, was wir thuen sollen; diese aber sagt, was uns Gott thue und

³⁸
 gebe." Luther finds such great comfort in the Creed because in it he finds the promise, the gospel, that God will and does give him the whole power and resources of the Trinity to fulfil the demands of the law. It is an insight into Luther's radical reading of the law that he felt nothing less than this would be sufficient to meet its requirements! "Denn durch diese erkenntnis, kriegen wir lust und liebe zu allen gepoten Gottes, weil wir hie sehen, wie sich Gott gantz und gar, mit allem das er hat und vermag, uns gibt, zu hulfte und stewart die zehen gepot zuhalten: Der vater, alle creaturen; Christus, alle sein werck; der Heilige geist, alle seine gaben."³⁹

At yet a later period in his life and in the form of a Biblical commentary Luther centers almost his whole attention on the distinction between law and gospel. This is his In epistolam S. Pauli ad Galatas Commentarius which many consider his most mature and profound theological work.⁴⁰ Again and again he stresses the importance of the distinction. One is a real theologian who can make this distinction properly: "Qui igitur bene novit discernere Evangelium a lege, is gratias agat Deo et sciat se esse Theologum. Ego certe in tentatione nondum novi, ut deberem."⁴¹
 The whole of Christian doctrine is summarized in this distinction: "Is locus de discrimine legis et Evangelii scitu maxime necessarius est, quia continet summam totius Christianae doctrinae."⁴²
 An intellectual division and comprehension of the distinction is not enough because one is dealing here with the inner-most realities of Christian life and experience: "Itaque si volumus esse

praedicatores et doctores aliorum, oportet nos habere maximam curam harum rerum, et probe tenere hanc distinctionem Iustitiae legis et Christi. Est quidem dictu facilis, sed experientia et usu est omnium difficillima, etiamsi diligentissime eam acuas et exerceas, Quia in hora mortis vel alliis agonibus conscientiae proprius concurrunt hae duae iustitiae, quam tu optes aut velis.⁴³"

Luther admitted that he himself was not always able to make this division rightly. The confusion of law and gospel was the foundation of all the Roman errors.⁴⁴ Even the apostles were not always clear here. Peter, for instance, had to be corrected on this point by Paul. Because Paul understood this doctrine so deeply, more so than any other apostle indeed, Luther thinks that he was called as an elect vessel and given a special gift by God⁴⁵ to lay the right foundations for the doctrine of justification.

Luther describes his discovery of the "new" theology in these terms as well. It was not merely the discovery of justification by faith as found in Rom. 1: 17. The real discovery lay in making the proper distinction between law and gospel. The passage in the Tischreden illustrates this: "Ich war lang irre, wuste nicht, wie ich drinnen war. Ich wuste wol etwas, oder wuste doch nichts, was es ware, bis so lang das ich uber den locum ad Rom. 1. kam: Iustus ex fide vivet. Der halff mir. Da sah ich, von welcher iustitia Paulus redet. Da stand zuuor im text iustitia, da reumet ich das abstractum und concretum zusammen und wurde meiner sachen gewiss, lernet inter iustitiam legis und euangelii discernirn. Zuuor mangelt mir nichts, denn das

ich kein discrimen inter legem et euangelium machet, hielt es
alles vor eines et dicebam Christum a Mose non differre nisi
tempore et perfectione. Aber do ich das discrimen fande, quod
aliud esset lex, aliud euangelium, da riss ich her durch.⁴⁶" The
remarkable thing is that this doctrine on which Luther laid such
great emphasis should have almost disappeared in the later his-
tory of Protestant dogmatics.⁴⁷ Its recovery and reinterpretation
is one of the unfinished tasks of the contemporary generation of
theologians.

I. The Law: The Preparation for the Gospel

Luther separates the law and the gospel as completely as possible; one is earthly, the other heavenly--one is darkness and night, the other light and day. If it were possible he would even further separate them: "atque utinam adhuc longius eas discernere possemus."⁴⁸ The sharpness of Luther's distinction is not unexpected in the light of what has already been said. What is surprising, however, are some of the apparently contradictory statements which he makes about the law. At some times he cannot praise it too highly and yet at other times he seems to say that it comes from the devil and is one of the most malignant enemies of mankind. For instance, in Der grosse Katechismus he says that the Ten Commandments are to be prized by men "als den hohisten schatz von Gott gegeben."⁴⁹ On the other hand, in the Commentary on Galatians he speaks of Moses with the law as a heretic, excommunicated, and worse than the pope and the devil themselves! "Hic simpliciter sit tibi suspectus ut haereticus excommunicatus, damnatus, deterior Papa et diabolo."⁵⁰ Or in the Heidelberg Disputation he speaks derogatorily of the law in one thesis and in the next one praises it highly;⁵¹ the same is true in Disputatio contra scholasticam theologiam (1517), where in thesis 79 he says: "Maledicti sunt omnes, qui operantur opera legis" and in thesis 87: "lex sit bona."⁵² Luther says that one who reads Paul closely must be impressed by derogatory terms which he applies to the law, which he elsewhere calls a divine gift revealed from heaven.⁵³ We then ask "How can this be so?" and it is a question which must be asked of Luther as well.

Luther's contradictory remarks about the law are not to be simply resolved by distinguishing between the law in the Old Testament and that of the New Testament; for him the law is not to be identified (even though related) with the Old Testament, nor⁵⁴ is the gospel the exclusive content of any one part of Scripture. Luther's appeal to the writings of Paul as substantiation for his own position is a more positive clue to what he is intending to say; it indicates that the contradiction is either only apparent, or intentional, or both. Luther claimed to be a faithful interpreter of Paul and it is from Paul that he draws his own ideas of the proper Christian interpretation of law. Whether his analysis of Paul's thought is correct is a question which must be decided⁵⁵ by the Pauline scholar.

Luther says that the view of the law as both good and evil is neither a contradiction nor even a paradox if it is seen in the right perspective--that is, from within Christ. Luther says that Paul's answer (and the correct one) is that the law is truly both good and evil but it is so in divers respects: "respondet Paulus Legem utrumque esse, et sanctam, iustam, bonam etc. et administrationem peccati ac mortis, sed respectu diversorum."⁵⁶ The distinction can best be brought out, it seems to me, by distinguishing between the nature, function, and effect of the law.

The nature of the law is absolutely good and Luther says that it is the most excellent of all things in the world: "quae quanquam est summum omnium quae sunt in mundo."⁵⁷ This is his primary view of the law's essential nature. Whenever he speaks deroga-

gatorily of the law, calling it a prison or a thief or a robber for instance, he is speaking not of the nature of the law but of its office: "erat hoc legis officium, ut ea conclusi custodiremur, tanquam in carcere."⁵⁸ And, indeed, how could the law be of an evil nature since it is the expression of God's most holy and pure will.⁵⁹ Or when Luther seems to imply that the law is an organ of the devil or when he includes it among those "tyrants" which Christ has overcome, it is such only in reference to the sinful nature of man and its effect upon that sinful nature, not in reference to its divine origin.⁶⁰ He makes the comparison to the action of water on lime, in which the water is pure and blameless but stimulates the dormant qualities of the lime; so the law is pure and holy but it aggravates our sinful nature and will.⁶¹ Thus the law, though of God, works evil and becomes, as it were, "of the devil": "Debemus extra conscientiam, facere ex ea Deum, in conscientia vero est vere diabolus."⁶²

(A) The Nature of the Law

The most convenient summary of the law is in the Decalogue.

According to Luther there are no good works except those which God has commanded nor are there any sins except those which God has forbidden.⁶³ The Ten Commandments are to be used, therefore, as a means of self-examination before making one's confession, as he suggests in the Smaller Catechism.⁶⁴ Without doubt all sins are forbidden somewhere in these precepts of God.⁶⁵ The view of the Roman theologians that there are counsels of perfection which stand above the commandments and which, though not obligatory for all, represent a more perfect expression of God's will than the Decalogue,⁶⁶ Luther strongly opposes. The basis of his opposition lies in the fact that he interprets the commandments in the widest possible sense, to show that they demand not only outward observances but a state of inward perfection as well.⁶⁷ The Ten Commandments set a standard so high that one who could live up to them would no longer be a real man but a heavenly creature! "die den gehen geboten gleich sind, weil sie so hoch sind, das sie niemand durch menschen krafft erlangen kan, und wer sie erlanget, ist ein hymlich Engelson mensch, weit uber alle heiligkeit der welt."⁶⁸

There is no essential difference between Christ's exposition of the law and its Old Testament form. When one reduces the whole of the Old Testament legislation into its most concise form it falls into two parts, corresponding to the two tables of the Decalogue. The first table deals with our relations with God and the second with our relations with our neighbors: "Bis her haben

wir die ersten drey gepot gelernet die da gegen Gott gerichtet sind...Folgen nu die andern siebene gegen unserm nehisten."⁶⁹ When Christ, therefore, summarizes the law he uses an Old Testament quotation to do so.

The First Commandment is the summary, not only of the first table of the law, but of the whole law. The command that we would have complete faith and trust in God is the basic law of our lives.⁷⁰ Luther is absolutely confident (and this is the heart of his whole ethical teaching) that a right relation with God will insure that all the rest of our life will be right as well: "wo das hertz wol mit Got dran ist, und dis gepot gehalten wird, so gehen die andern alle hernach."⁷¹ This First Commandment is the beginning and end of all other laws in general and of the other commandments of the Decalogue in particular: "Also sihestu wie das erste gepot das heubt und quell born ist, so durch die andern alle gehet, und widderumb alle sich zuruck ziehen und hangen ynn diesem, das end und anfang alles ynn einander geknupfft und gebunden ist."⁷² As one can see this is really a restatement of his doctrine of justification by faith alone. Because all the demands of the law are included in this First Commandment, so the response may be summarized as one of faith for that is essentially what this⁷³ commandment asks for.

The other table of the law which deals with our relation with our neighbor may be briefly summarized as the command of love. What is then the relation of the faith demanded by the

first table and the love demanded by the second table of the law?

In the Commentary on Galatians Luther says that love and faith are contrary to one another: "Quid autem est Lex? An non est etiam charitatis praeceptum? Imo Lex nihil aliud praecipit quam charitatem...Si ergo Lex praecipiens charitatem pugnat cum fide; Ergo et charitas non est ex fide."⁷⁴ Here Luther is in reaction

against the Scholastic teaching that faith formed by love ("fides caritate formata") is the complete faith demanded by the law.⁷⁵ Love interpreted in the sense of morally good works

would introduce a legalistic element into the doctrine of justification;⁷⁶ as Luther points out to Erasmus in De servo arbi-

trio the law of love does not infer our ability to fulfil it but shows us what we are unable to attain, as do all other parts of the law: "Scilicet, quod diligendi verbo ostenditur forma legis, quid debeamus, non autem vis voluntatis aut quid possimus, imo quid non possimus."⁷⁷

Acts of love, therefore, do not fulfil the law, in contrast to faith which does. But, on the other hand, a real faith freely bears as its fruit a life of love and service:

"Unnd gegen meynem nehsten auch werden ein Christen, wie Christus mir worden ist, und nichts mehr thun, denn was ich nur sehe, yhm nott, nutzlich und seliglich sey, die weyl ich doch, durch meynenn glauben, allis dings yn Christo gnug habe. Sih also fleusset auss dem glauben die liebe un lust zu gott, und auss der liebe, ein frey, willig, frolich leben dem nehsten zu diene umbsonst."⁷⁸ As

with good works, Luther does not condemn love but he rejects the idea that by meritorious acts of love one may fulfil the law. This

intimate relation between faith which alone fulfils the law, and love which is the fruit of true faith, Luther has beautifully expounded in such works as Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen⁷⁹ or Vorrede auf die Epistel St. Pauli an die Romer. For Luther, love is not a standard by which to judge moralistic achievement but is one of the free gifts of God of which we are entirely unworthy; as he says of Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians: "Im 12. und 13. handelt er, wie mancherley Gaben Gottes sind,⁸⁰ unter welchen doch die Liebe das beste sey."

Another question is raised in discussing Luther's teaching of the second table of the Decalogue. That question is: to what extent is Mosaic law binding on Christians? Two different answers had been given in Luther's time. First, the Roman Catholic theologians had held that the moral law was still binding even though the judicial and ceremonial legislation was no longer valid. Second, some of the sectarians had reintroduced Old Testament practices into their Christian communities. Luther dissented from both views and his teaching is developed in contrast to these two opposing interpretations. Against the Roman theologians Luther holds that the whole law is abrogated by the gospel and not only the judicial and ceremonial law: "Quare lex accipitur hic universaliter ut plane diversa et distincta ab Evangelio. Non tantum autem lex ceremoniarum distincta est ab Evangelio, sed etiam decalogus.⁸¹ Ergo de universa lege Paulus hic agit." It is in fact, he says, chiefly the moral law which Christ does away with because the moral law, which aggravates and becomes tyrannical over the

conscience, is that which most hinders Christian liberty: "Nam cum Paulus ait nos per Christum a maledicto legis liberatos esse, certe de tota lege loquitur, ac praecipue de morali, quae vel sola accusat, maledicit et condemnat conscientias, non item reliquae duae species."⁸² Here, as usual, Luther is striking at any attempt to introduce law, whatever its form, to a determinative position in the work of justification.

But though Luther refused to give law a place in justifying a man or aiding him in the attainment of salvation, he did not hold that the law is to be abolished completely. The law, he says, has its limits and its legitimate uses even though they may not be in the work of justification: "quod lex in Christiano non debeat excedere limites suos, sed tantum habere dominum."⁸³ What this dominion may be will be discussed later. The question here raised is in what form may the law be introduced for its legitimate functions? Luther had said that the ceremonial law had been as categorically commanded by God as the Ten Commandments: "Nam Lex ceremonialis aequae fuit Lex divina ac leges morum; Ut Circumcisio, institutio Sacerdotii, cultus et ritus aequae erant praecepti divinitus ut decalogus."⁸⁴ If this is so, must not the law then be reintroduced as a whole? Some of the sectarians had gone in this direction by appealing to Old Testament legislation for justification of many of their exotic practices, climaxed by the New Jerusalem at Munster with its polygamy and other abuses.⁸⁵

Luther, however, refused to recognize that the rigid appeal to the Old Testament by Munzer and Carlstadt was the logical outcome of his principles. Against the "Rottengeister" and

"Schwermeri" Luther wrote Ein Unterrichtung, wie sich die Christen
⁸⁶
in Mose sollen schicken. He deals with the whole question of how

Moses and his law are to be taken by Christians. As strongly as he is able, Luther says that Moses is a law-giver for the Jews only and that his law is binding on them alone: "Moses ist ein mitler und ein gesetzgeber gewesen des Iudischen volcks allein, denen hat er das gesetz geben...Die Heyden sind dem Mose nicht schuldig gehorsam zu seyn. Moses ist der Juden Sachssenspiegel."⁸⁷

This applies to the whole of the Mosaic legislation, including for instance the law of Sabbath observance. If, says Luther, we accept even one commandment of Moses' as binding then we must take the whole Mosaic law and be circumcized, wash our clothes according to Jewish precepts, and eat and drink as the Jews are⁸⁸ commanded to do. Once again Luther is emphasizing, as he did against the Romanists, that the Mosaic legislation must stand⁸⁹ or fall as a whole.

Nevertheless, he continues, there is a sense in which the Mosaic law is valid: it is valid insofar as it conforms to the law of nature written on the hearts of all men: "Ich hab gesagt, das alle Christen und ynn sonderheit die ander leute leren wollen und das wort Gottes handeln, das die sich wol fursehen sollen und den Mosen recht lernen; Also, wo er gepot gibt, das wir yhn darynne nicht weiter annemen, denn so ferne er sich mit dem natur-⁹⁰lichen gesetz reymet." The proper meaning of Moses to the Christian is as a teacher and example, not as a law-giver: "Mosen wollen wir halten fur einen lerer, aber fur unsern gesetzgeber wollen wir

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 yhn nicht halten." Moses is valuable in three ways, says Luther:
 first, his outward commandments, though not binding, are good ex-
 amples for secular rulers; second, we find prophecies and promises
 of Christ in his writings; third, Moses is an admirable example
 of a life of faith and love as are the other ancient Fathers of
 the Old Testament. 92
 As a law-giver, however, Moses is only rele-
 vant to us Gentile Christians insofar as his law conforms to its
 exposition in the New Testament and in the natural law of man's
 heart: "Es sey denn (unsern gesetzgeber) das er gleich stymme
 mit dem newen Testament und dem naturlichen gesetze." 93

Luther's appeal to a natural law may come as a surprise to
 those who believe that such conceptions have no place in Protest-
 ant theology. A reporter of a recent ecumenical meeting asks,
 for instance: "Had the concept of natural law crept into certain
 Lutheran interpretations?" 94
 As far as Luther is concerned it is
 not a case of the idea having "crept into" his teaching. One
 might expect to find it in some of his earlier writings such as
Vorlesung über Römerbrief, when he was still under the strong
 influence of general Scholastic presuppositions. 95
 But Luther con-
 tinued to appeal to a natural law written in the hearts of all
 men in some of his most mature and deliberate writings much lat-
 er in his life. In his Commentary on Genesis (1535-45) he points
 out that the Decalogue is not something peculiarly Mosaic; it is
 something which Moses had in common with the other Old Testament
 Fathers. That which is specifically "Mosaic" are the ceremonial
 and judicial precepts which applied to a certain people, a cer-

tain time and a certain place.⁹⁶ Furthermore, the Decalogue is not the exclusive possession of the Jews. They had it in written form but all other men have the Ten Commandments in their hearts; as he says in Der grosse Katechismus: "Die zehen gepot sind auch sonst ynn aller menschen hertzen geschrieben."⁹⁷ In his Predigten über das 2. Buch Mose (Sept. 24, 1525) his view is identical: "Was nu Moses geschrieben hat ynn den Zehen gepoten, das fulen wir natürlich ynn unserm gewissen Rom. 2."⁹⁸

When Luther describes the content of the natural law he simply repeats the Decalogue, commandment by commandment.⁹⁹ The Decalogue is important to Christians, not because it was given by Moses, but because it is a convenient summary of the law of nature: "es klerer durch Mosen gegeben ist."¹⁰⁰ As such it is extremely helpful for teaching purposes, such as in the Catechisms. But law does not find its ultimate expression even in the Decalogue; Christ has done this in the New Testament in the Golden Rule (Matt. 7: 12), which puts it all in a little bundle: "ynn ein klein bundlein...Also gehe durch alle gepot der andern tafel, so findestu das dis sey die rechte summa aller predigt die man thun kan."¹⁰¹ This summary is also found in men's hearts; as Luther says in Von weltlicher Oberkeit (1523): "Denn die natur leret, wie die liebe thut, das ich thun soll, was ich myr wollet gethan haben."¹⁰² He makes the same statement in Ob Kriegsleute auch in seligem Stande sein Konnen (1526): "hie zu stymmet auch das naturliche recht, Das Christus Matth. 7. leret: Was yhr wollet das euch die leute thun, das thut yhr yhn."¹⁰³

It is to be seen, therefore, that Luther deliberately maintained a consistent and articulate doctrine of natural law; Melancthon's view is a faithful reflection of Luther's teaching at this point, even though not in some of the legalistic conclusions he drew from it.¹⁰⁴ Luther is not the obscurantist that some make him out to be.¹⁰⁵ He was not a complete sceptic about the natural powers of reason and conscience. The conscience is amazingly sensitive: "Conscientia enim res est tenerrima."¹⁰⁶ Reason and understanding are part of the blessings which God's goodness leads Him to give to His children: "was meynestu mit dem wort: Ich gleube an Got Vater almechtige Schepffer etc.? Antwort. Das meine und gleube ich, das ich Gottes geschepffe bin, das ist, das er mir geben hat und on unterlas erhelt, leib, seele und leben, geliedmasse¹⁰⁷ klein und gros, alle synne, vernunft und verstand." The weakness of reason, conscience and law lies not in their intrinsic natures but in the fact that they are incapable of putting a man into right relation with his God: "Evangelium autem talis doctrina est quae quiddam sublimius docet, quam est mundi sapientia, iustitia, religio etc. Relinquit quidem illa in suo gradu esse quod sunt, et ut bonas Dei creaturas commendat. Sed mundus anteponit has creaturas Creatori, Denique per eas vult abolere peccata, liberari a morte et mereri vitam aeternam. Hoc damnat Evangelium."¹⁰⁸

Brunner has pointed out that the relation between the natural law and the Biblical law is one of the most diffi-

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cult and obscure points in the thought of the Reformers. In the
case of Luther this is especially evident; in recent years there
has been almost a continual theological controversy over the ex-
act nature of his teaching. Troeltsch in his Soziallehren holds
that Luther stood in the general stream of medieval thought on
the subject and that his view is not markedly different from
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that of Aquinas. Holl, however, has attacked Troeltsch's thesis
and has sought to demonstrate that Luther breaks with the Stoic-
humanistic teaching of natural law as the naturally immanent
reason in the world; for Luther, says Holl, natural law is not
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the "Seienden" but the "Seinsollenden" confronting human nature.
Holl, in turn, has been criticized by Nygren, who accuses him
112
of being unduly Kantian in his interpretation, and by Arnold, a
German Roman Catholic, who in a sympathetic study has sought to
demonstrate the close similarity between the views of Luther
113
and Aquinas on natural law.

It seems fairly evident that part of this wide diversity
of opinion is due to the failure to take Luther's distinction
between law and gospel sufficiently seriously. In discussing
law Luther is not primarily concerned with the relation of Bib-
lical and natural law, but rather with the relation of law and
gospel. The first distinction is a philosophic one: the latter
lies at the heart of real religion and is therefore the crucial
114
issue. For Luther law was essentially a religious concept. At
the center of religious faith and at the center of the Biblical
message is found the tension between law and gospel. When Luther

discussed law, therefore, he did so against the background of the gospel and undergirded by his personal religious experience. The same is true of his teaching on natural law; he does not contrast it with other laws in a philosophic way but he simply sets it up against the gospel: "find ich ynn Mose wilchs ich aus der natur nicht hab: Das sind nu die verheys-¹¹⁵sungen und zusagungen Gottes von Christo."

Luther's definition of the law does not show any particular desire on his part to be rigidly systematic. The important thing for him was so to define the law that no one might escape its claims; as he says in Vorrede auf die Epistel St. Pauli an die Romer: "Das Wortlein Gesetz musst du hier nicht verstehen menschlicher Weise, dass es eine Lehre sey, was fur Wercke zu thun oder zu lassen sind, wie es mit Menschenengesetzen zugehet, da man dem Gesetz mit Wercken genug thut, obs Hertz schon nicht da ist. Gott richtet nach des Hertzens Grund, darum fordert auch sein Gesetz des Hertzens Grund, und lasset ihm an Wercken nicht begnugen, sondern strafet vielmehr die Wercke, ohne Hertzens Grund gethan, als Heucheley und Lugen. Daher alle Menschen Lugner heissen, Ps. 116, 11., darum, dass keiner aus Hertzens Grund Gottes Gesetz halt, noch halten¹¹⁶kann." For Luther the law has meaning and relevance because it has to do with the problem of justification. Here, as elsewhere, Luther abhorred abstract speculations. It seemed to him the height of folly to discuss law in a philosophic context; that robbed it of all its vitality and meaning. The pri-

mary fact for Luther was that a righteous God was confronting man and making a demand upon him. The fact that this demand is being made, and not how it is made (whether through the Decalogue, or the natural conscience) is the primary thing. By becoming unduly concerned in a speculative way over the "how" of the law, rather than in its "thou" one misses its most important meaning, and its consequent judgment.

One must, for this reason, be careful to see the distinction between the nature and the function of the law. The nature of the law is perfectly good and holy, reflecting God's nature and will. But one cannot discuss the nature of the law, nor study it, as though it were a dead and impersonal thing. If we seek to understand the fulness of the law we are falling into that speculation on God's majesty against which Luther warns us in such strong language: "Nihil enim est periculosius, cum agendum est in agone contra legem, peccatum et mortem cum Deo, quam nos vagari nostris speculationibus in coelo et considerare Deum ipsum in su incompraehensibili potentia, sapientia, et maiestate, Quomodo creaverit et gubernet mundum."¹¹⁷ Luther does in fact specifically include the divine law as one of those things to be avoided in our cogitations: "Quare cum voles cogitare et agere de salute tua, tum omissis speculationibus Maiestatis, omissis omnibus cogitationibus operum, traditionum, philosophiae et legis divinae rapias te in praesepe et gremium matris et apprehendas istum infantem."¹¹⁸ Speculation on the nature of the law is futile, not because of the law, which is

holy, just and good: "Non enim dubium est, quin Lex sit
sancta, iusta, bona;"¹¹⁹ but because of the nature of man.

It is not an impersonal machine which is dealing with the law; though a man may be a philosopher he is first of all a man, or in other words a sinner. Because we are sinners--a category which cuts across all human distinctions--our relations with the law are anything but abstract or philosophical; we are in "agone contra legem".

Our only real knowledge of the law, therefore, is not in reference to its nature but in reference to its nature in-so far as that is revealed in its office. Through our experience of the work of the law, and even more through our experience of the work of God's grace in the gospel, we come to discover the nature of the law: "Opus ergo legis accipe simpliciter per Antithesim contra gratiam: Quidquid non est gratia, Lex est, sive sit Iudicialis, Ceremonialis, sive Decalogus."¹²⁰

The nature of the law, then, can never become the object of our human speculations. It is only when we become a subject of its demand upon us, and even more as we are delivered from its dominion, that we know what the law really is. "Nemo enim, sive sit homo sive Angelus, est supra legem, praeter solum Deum... Quia animalis homo non potest iudicare de lege Dei. Hic deficit Philosophorum, Iuristarum et omnium hominum. Lex enim dominatur homini. Ergo iudicat hominem, non homo legem. Solus Christianus iudicat legem. Quo modo? Quod non iustificet."^{120a}

(B) The Uses of the Law

The relation between sin and law is a very intimate one in Luther's thought. As has been mentioned, the law is the expression of the holy and eternal will of God. It is, nevertheless, because of sin that the law reigns in the world; were there no sin there would be no need of the law. As he puts it in his Commentary on Romans: "Peccatum et ira est per legem. Ergo legi nullus moritur, nisi qui peccato moritur, et quicunque peccato moritur, etiam legi moritur. Et quam primum fit liber a peccato, etiam a lege liber est. Et Ubi fit feruus peccati, etiam feruus fit legi, et ita dum peccatum dominatur¹²¹ et regnat, etiam lex dominatur et regnat." In his last great Biblical commentary, his exposition of Genesis, he brings out the same thought that it is through sin that the law becomes effective in the world.¹²² The presupposition of Luther's understanding of the uses of the law is, therefore, the fact of sin. Because sin is universal, so also the dominion of law is universal.¹²³ As shall be seen, one of the functions of the law is to reveal sin; in so doing the law establishes the legitimacy of its reign, for by showing the universality of sin it establishes the universality of its dominion.¹²⁴

The law, according to Luther, has properly two functions or uses; the first is civil and the second is spiritual. The first use of the law is to maintain civil order and obedience; the second use is to reveal sin, death and the wrath of God: "Sic lex civiliter et Theologice carcer est. Primum enim civiliter cohibet et concludit impios, ne pro libidine su praecipi-

tes ferri possint in omnia scelera. Deinde Spiritualiter ostendit nobis peccatum, perterrefacit et humiliat nos, ut sic pavefacti agnoscamus miseriam et damnationem nostram."¹²⁵

Alec Vidler, an Anglican theologian, has entitled these two uses of the law, respectively: "God's Law as Means of Preservation" and "God's Law as Summons to Repentance".¹²⁶

Following the Lutheran Formula of Concord, Vidler proposes a third use ("tertius usus") of the law: "God's Law as Guidance for the Church".¹²⁷ Luther, however, recognized no work of the law beyond the two uses which he has laid down. This is in contrast to Calvin who not only teaches a third use of the law but also calls it the principle use: "Tertius usus, quid et praecipuus est, et in proprium Legis finem proprius spectat, ergo fideles locum habet, quorum in cordibus iam viget ac regnat Dei Spiritus."¹²⁸ For Luther, however, the law can only bring an outward conformity to what is righteous; under the law one does good against one's will and real desires, as it were, and this is the root of all hypocrisy.¹²⁹ He distinguishes, therefore, between the "works of the law" and the "fulfilling the law"; the former is brought by constraint but the latter can only come through uncoerced love, which is a gift of the Holy Spirit: "So gewohne dich nun der Rede, dass viel ein ander Ding ist, des Gesetzes Werck thun, denn, das Gesetz erfullen...das Gesetz erfullen, ist, mit Lust und Liebe sein Werck thun, und frey, ohne des Gesetzes Zwang, gottlich und wohl leben, als ware kein Gesetze oder Strafe. Solche Lust aber freyer Liebe gibt der Heilige Geist ins Hertz."¹³⁰ Even after his controversy

with the Antinomians Luther still refused to admit a positive third use of the law in the sanctified life; as he summarized his case against them in Von den Konziliis und Kirchen (1539), it was not that they had abolished law from the sanctified life but that they had failed to do justice to the gift of the Holy Spirit through which we are cleansed of sin: "Aber unser Antinomi sehen nicht, das sie Christum predigen on und wider den Heiligen Geist."¹³¹ To continue the metaphor which he uses in reference to the first two uses of the law, Luther says that the imprisonment which we suffer under the law must continue only until faith comes, through which we are released: "Atque is verus et proprius legis usus est, modo non sit perpetuus, Quia ista conclusio et custodia sub lege diutius durare non debet quam in futuram fidem, quae si venerit, desinere debet Theologicus ille legis carcer."¹³² This rejection by Luther of a "tertius usus" of the law, as against some of his closest fellow-workers such as Melanchthon,¹³³ is an extremely important fact; not only is it the key to his interpretation of Christian ethics but also a symbol of his radically new conception of the whole Christian faith. It is the point which marks him off from both his sworn theological opponents and from those who often claimed, or now claim, to be his faithful interpreters and followers.¹³⁴

The first use of the law is to maintain civil order and the general structure of society. It was Luther's opinion that some men were so evil that unless they were restrained by harsh laws and suitable punishment they would run wild in the world:

"Interim tamen hoc commodi habet lex, ut maxime corda maneant
impia, ut primum externe et civiliter coerceat aliquo modo
fures, homicidas et palam improbos." In order, therefore,
to punish evil-doers and keep them in bounds to protect the
righteous, God has instituted civil government to use the law
in this way: "Also das gewiss und klar gnug ist, wie es Got-
tis will ist, das weltlich schwerd und recht handhaben zur
straff der bossen und zu schutz der frumen."

The second use of the law, however, is its most import-
ant and essential function. That function is to reveal sin.
One of the characteristics of Luther's religious life was the
tremendous depth of his sense of sin. In some of his earliest
recorded lectures his concern for the problem of sin is clearly
revealed. The remarkable thing about Luther's understanding of
sin is its divergence from most of the current trends of thought
of his day. Medieval Roman theology as Luther knew it was never
free from the Hellenistic idea that sin is bound up with the
flesh, the Pauline $\sigma\alpha\rho\varsigma$ being interpreted in a physical sense.
"Concupiscentia", therefore, the key word of the Roman theologians
in speaking of the seat of sin, has, as Loofs has pointed out, a
physical connotation about it. The ascetic and mystic streams
of Catholic thought, while showing some divergences from the
orthodox theology, reinforced these tendencies by teaching that
"creatureliness" is the main source of sin and that one's re-
demption consists in being brought up and out of the world of
sense and matter into a spiritual realm where one has uninter-
rupted communion with the divine.

Luther was unquestionably influenced by these current views of sin. For instance, one cannot doubt that the dreadful seriousness with which he looked at sin was to some degree imparted to him through the mystical tradition from which he drew so heavily.¹⁴² He constantly emphasizes that no matter how small the sin, it separates us from God and makes us deserving of damnation: "sso were kein sund sso kleyn, sie vordammet unss."¹⁴³ This was said in 1519 but in 1535 his strict view had not been relaxed: "Peccata nostra tam magna, infinita et invicta esse,¹⁴⁴ ut impossibile sit toti mundo pro uno satisfacere." Furthermore, the official theological line of the Roman church, as reflected in the Councils from Orange to Trent, had affirmed the belief in the universality of the effects of original sin: "If any one asserts that the disobedience of Adam injured only himself and not his off-spring...let him be anathema."¹⁴⁵

Nevertheless, when Luther uses these traditional doctrines and currents of thought he often transforms their meaning in a way which makes them peculiarly his own. He occasionally refers to "concupiscentia" as the source of sin but he restores the word to the Pauline connotation of the whole man--body and soul--turning himself from God.¹⁴⁶ The New Testament $\alpha\rho\iota\varsigma$ is also reinterpreted in the Hebrew sense of relating not merely to physical nature but the entire man and his attributes, material and spiritual;¹⁴⁷ flesh, says Luther in De servo arbitrio, is that which has not been renewed through faith: "qui non est renatus per fiden,¹⁴⁸ esse carnem." Niebuhr has admirably shown how the factors of self-love, disobedience, anxiety and pride must all be included

in Luther's full teaching on sin, revealing the complexity¹⁴⁹ and richness of his thought on the subject. Niebuhr, however, has not purposed to give a systematic survey of Luther's doctrine of sin; as a result the impression may be given that Luther's teaching on sin is a series of brilliant but unrelated insights without any central unifying principle.

As has been previously mentioned, sin and law are closely related in Luther's thought. This is the unifying principle for Luther's teaching on sin. The principle function of the law is to show what sin really is.¹⁵⁰ This work of the law is so necessary because Luther has no confidence in the ability of man with his natural powers to understand what the most malignant sins are.¹⁵¹ He bitterly attacks the Roman casuistic distinctions between mortal and venial sins.¹⁵² He also condemns the commonly held view that the outward actions are the real sins and that the inward affections are only secondary.¹⁵³ For example, he says that it is not merely that concupiscence is the source of sin but concupiscence is itself a sin irrespective of the positive actions it ultimately produces.¹⁵⁴ In the final analysis, Luther is so impatient with all these attempts to mitigate the seriousness of sin and the depth of its hold upon man because he feels that all such attempts are really means by which a man seeks to protect his pride and prevent himself from being classed as a sinner. As Niebuhr says: "Luther rightly insisted that the unwillingness of the sinner to be regarded as a sinner was the final form of sin."¹⁵⁵

Luther sees the glory of the law to be in its work of cutting through all of our pretensions and rationalizations and bringing us to our knees in terror and repentance at our sinfulness. The law passes over the outward, obvious, flagrant sins which it sees to be only the evil fruits of an evil tree. The real source of sin is the heart¹⁵⁶ and the primal sin of which the heart is guilty is that of unbelief or lack of faith. All sins--outward or inward--can ultimately be traced back to this basic sin; as Luther says in Vorrede auf die Epistel St. Pauli an die Romer: "sonderlich sihet die Schrifft ins hertz, und auff die wurtzel und heubtquelle aller sunde, welche ist der Unglaube im grunde des hertzen...Darumb auch, ehe denn gute oder bose werck geschehen, als die guten oder bosen Fruchte, mus zuuor im hertzen da sein Glaube oder Unglaube, als die wurtzel safft und heubtkrafft aller sunde."¹⁵⁷ In a sermon in the Hauspostille (1532-34) he comes to the same conclusion, rejecting the notion that "de fide formata per caritatem" is the divine requirement asked by the law, and saying that the essential demand upon us from God is for simple faith: "Darumb ist der ungloub die rechte haubt sünde und die quelle, da her alle sünd fleusset."¹⁵⁸

In summary, Luther held that all the divine requirements are included in the Decalogue, which in turn is epitomized in the First Commandment with its demand for faith and trust in God. So, conversely, he held that sin is all that does not conform to the law of God, in short, all that does not conform to the primary commandment of faith.¹⁵⁹ This reduction of the moral

and religious life to the simple alternative of faith or sin is a daring simplification. While it successfully evades the pitfalls of medieval Catholic legalism with its intricate, hierarchical morality and subtle casuistic distinctions, it is always in danger of falling into the opposite pitfall of giving insufficient importance to the relative moral discrimination with which normal life is so full. Luther was not entirely unaware of the alternatives which he faced. The Antinomian controversy is probably the best place to see how successful he was in steering a middle course between the two extremes.

(C) The Effect of the Law

The law's work of revealing sin has a startling and radical effect on human nature according to Luther. When the law has clearly and effectively spoken to us and showed us the dimensions of our sin we are driven into the depths of despair and anguish: "Deinde lex etiam in summo suo usu et vi nihil potest quam accusare, terrere, condemnare et occidere...Sic revelato peccato per radios quos lex in cor spargit, nihil est homini odiosius et intolerabilius lege. Ibi tum mortem potius eligeret, quam quod perferre deberet vel brevissimum tempus istos terrores legis." This effect of the law, says Luther, is nothing new for the law has always had the same potency; at Sinai, when the law was first revealed, it came with lightning and thunder and smoke and the Israelites were shaken and terrified beyond measure. The events at Sinai are a true picture of the effective use of the law. Though the Jews prepared themselves carefully for the great event by every kind of ceremonial purification, this "holiness" was nothing before the blinding glory and majesty of God which brought them to a deathly desperation at their sinful misery.

The power of the law must be so great in order to break down presumptuous human pride and self-righteousness. Luther calls this presumption a horrible and obstinate monster, so rebellious a beast that it was necessary for God to send the law as a Hercules to overthrow and destroy it. To mix the metaphors, Luther calls the law the hammer of death, the thundering

of hell and the thunderbolt of God's wrath: "quae malleus est
¹⁶⁵
mortis, tonitru inferni et fulmen irae divinae." One cannot
preach the free forgiveness of sins to one whose secure and
comfortable heart is encased in a rock of self-righteousness;
the mighty hammer of the law is needed to break through this:
"Magna res opinio iustitiae. Ideo hat unser herr gott ein gros
¹⁶⁶
hamer da widder gestelt, scilicet lex." This mighty working of
the law is to continue until the sinner is brought to the very
¹⁶⁷
brink of desperation: "desperationi proximus"; when this has
been accomplished the work of the law is done: "Hicque resistit
¹⁶⁸
Lex."

Luther has a characteristic word which he applies to this
frightful state of tribulation and desperation to which we are
driven by the law. The word is "Anfectung", or in the Latin
"Tentatio". There is really no satisfactory English synonym for
it, at least in the sense in which Luther uses it. A spiritual
trial or tribulation conveys something of its connotation, but
ultimately, only when it is seen in the context of Luther's theo-
logical thought and his personal religious experience can it be
¹⁶⁹
fully understood. There has been some question as to the origin
of the concept. Some have suggested that Luther took it over
from the medieval mystics of the German school, such as Gerson,
Jacob von Jüterbog, Günther Zainer, Johann Geilers, etc. as seen
¹⁷⁰
in their meditations on death: "Ars moriendi" or "Sterbebuchlein".
Others have claimed that his sense of "Anfectung" is merely a
psychological aberration, another example of his fundamental men-
¹⁷¹
tal derangement!

Upon closer examination, whatever the origins of it may have been, it will be seen that "Anfechtung" is a religious term which springs from the fulness of Luther's devotional life and is in complete harmony with his mature theological formulations. It is true that when Luther describes the content of this "Anfechtung" he does so in the intimate and vivid terms of his own personal experience--the sense of the presence of the devil, the wrath of God, the nearness of hell, the heart filled with terrible voices: "Imo putamus, praesertim durante tentatione, diabolum horribiliter contra nos rugire, coelum mugire, terram tremere, omnia collapsura esse, omnes creaturas minari malum, infernum aperiri ac velle nos deglutire. Hic sensus est in corde nostro, has horribiles, hanc terrificam faciem nos audimus et videmus."¹⁷² Luther, however, did not feel that this experience was peculiar to himself; one of the most important meanings to him of the phrase that Christ was "under the law" was that Christ had experienced fully this "Anfechtung". His agony during the passion reveals that he felt this anguish of spirit as no man had before nor will again;¹⁷³ therefore, by experiencing and overcoming this "Anfechtung" Christ is also able to redeem us from its oppression.¹⁷⁴ The spiritual agony of Christ in Gethsemane and on the Cross is perhaps the best definition of what "Anfechtung" meant to Luther, again emphasizing its basic religious frame of reference.

The relation between "Anfechtung" and the rest of Luther's theology is readily understood in this way. As the conflict with the law was one integral part of Christ's own spiritual tribul-

ation so this conflict rages in our own hearts.¹⁷⁵ The law is the chief agent by which "Anfectung" comes and our conscience is the channel through which it comes.¹⁷⁶ It has been shown what an important place the First Commandment must be given as a summary of the law and it is significant that Luther should find that commandment to be one of the main sources of his "Anfectung".¹⁷⁷ At the foundation of his "Anfectung" lies the basic distinction between law and gospel.¹⁷⁸ Luther, therefore, makes the same contradictory statements about "Anfectung" as he does about the law. It is the very door of death and hell and yet the worst "Anfectung" of all is to have no "Anfectung".¹⁷⁹ Luther means by this that a man must be brought to a realization of his own impotence, wretchedness and sinfulness before God is able to help him. As he says in his Resolutiones disputationum de indulgentiarum virtute, a man must be damned before he can be saved, destroyed before he can be edified, killed before he can be given life; the anxiety at the knowledge of sin is the beginning of salvation:¹⁸⁰ "In ista autem conturbatione incipit salus." One may clearly see here the basic dialectic between law and gospel.

This effect of the law, therefore, however terrible and frightening it may be, is a very necessary and salutary part of God's plan of redemption. The law, says Luther, has its proper place and time; its work is a good one.¹⁸¹ It kills in order to prepare for life.¹⁸² It is not against the promises of God but confirms them.¹⁸³ The law is preparing the way for the gospel.¹⁸⁴ Luther uses various metaphors to describe this proper effect of the law. The law is the voice of servants but the gospel is the voice of

185 the Lord. The law is the schoolmaster to bring us to Christ. 186

Even more vividly, as the dry ground desires the rain after the shining of the sun, so the law makes the afflicted consciences thirst for Christ; He comes only to "dry" souls for His life is too costly to be wasted on ground which does not desire the living water which He gives. 187 All these metaphors, borrowed in part from Paul, stress the anticipatory character of the work and effect of the law. The law is making ready for something which is yet to come and that is the gospel.

It is here that the contradictory statements of Luther on the relation between law and gospel are resolved. Both law and gospel are the expression of God's will and yet they must be separated from one another as day is from night; to mingle them is the basis of false religion but neither can either of them stand alone. The true interpretation, says Luther, is that law and gospel have different functions which must never be confused and in this sense they must be divided as completely as possible; when seen in their proper perspective, however, it is apparent they are in perfect correlation for together they lead man to redemption and salvation: "Hic iterum videmus Legem et Evangelium quae inter se longissime distincta et plus quam contradictoria separata sunt, affectu coniunctissima esse... Quare non satis est nos conclusos esse sub lege, quia, si nihil aliud sequeretur, cogeremur desperare, in peccatis mori etc. Sed Paulus adit nos conclusos esse et coherceri sub Paedagogo, lege, non in aeternum, sed in Christum qui est finis legis. Ista igi-

tur pavefactio, humiliatio et custodia non durare debet perpetuo, sed in futuram fidem, hoc est in salutem et bonum nostrum, ut nobis conterritis lege dulcescat gratia, remissio peccatorum, liberatio a lege, peccato, morte etc., quae operibus non acquiruntur, sed sola fide apprehenduntur etc."¹⁸⁸

It is when the true purpose of the law is distorted that it becomes the agent of the devil instead of the agent of God.¹⁸⁹ If, when in a state of "Anfechtung", we remain in this anguish and despair and do not see it as the preparatory stage for the gospel, we are truly in the hands of the devil.¹⁹⁰ He seeks to bring the condemning and terrifying word of the law to us in our humiliation, after its proper work is finished; if we permit Satan to have his way we shall be destroyed and the word of the healing and saving gospel will not come to us. One of the chief attacks of the devil is to convince the sinner that the terrors of conscience, the dark prison of despair, is the end of the work of the law, rather than a means to an end.¹⁹¹ The classic examples of those who remained and languished in this prison are Cain, Saul and Judas. We must take a different way than they did, realizing that this "Anfechtung" of conscience is the means by which God is leading us to His gospel.¹⁹²

Luther's interpretation of "Anfechtung" illustrates the subtle and expert division which he is making between law and gospel; he who knows how to divide and join together these two things is entitled to be called a real theologian: "Qui istam artem bene nosset ille merito diceretur Theologus."¹⁹³ The effect

of the proper work of the law is to bring us to the very edge of desperation. On one side of the "razor's edge" are the wrath of God, the terrors of hell and the attacks of the devil; on the other, the sweet and heavenly consolations of Christ. The whole of the Christian life is in a tension between these two alternatives and the basic problem of Christian experience is to put law and gospel in right relationship to one another.¹⁹⁴ Even if it were easy to make this distinction in a speculative way, the real testing comes at the times of spiritual crisis, in times of temptation--in short, at the height of our spiritual warfare.¹⁹⁵ Here there is no time for quiet reflection or detached objectivity for every Christian is involved in this battle! "Idem certamen experitur unusquisque Christianus."¹⁹⁶ This is so profoundly difficult that Luther admitted that he himself had hardly learned the first elements of how to make the division; nor will anyone be able to learn it perfectly as long as sin and flesh remain in this life: "Ego vero et mei similes vix tenemus huius artis prima elementa; Et tamen seduli sumus discipuli in ea schola, ubi ista ars discitur. Discitur quidem, sed donec caro et peccatum manent, non potest edisci."¹⁹⁷ Nevertheless, we must always strive to learn the art as best we can since it lies at the center of the mystery of our spiritual existence.

II. The Gospel: The Fulfilment of the Law

All natural religion, all religion of the man who is outside of Christ, all religion, indeed, which fails to understand the proper division of law and gospel, falls into two main errors. Religion which does not divide law and gospel rightly--whether it be Roman, Jewish, Moslem, or Sectarian--must eventually lead either to pride, on the one hand, or despair, on the other, or constantly oscillate between the two extremes.¹ As we have seen, pride or presumption is ultimately based on a false understanding of the nature of the demand of the law. It is the work of the law to be the mighty hammer of God to break down the proud hearts and destroy the self-righteousness which is hiding within.² But the law, having done its work, leaves a broken and terror-stricken conscience which does not know in which direction to turn and will languish in despair until it is lifted up. This is the work of the gospel.³

Luther, with his vivid imagination, sees all false religion originating from the conspiracy of the devil. Satan, on one side, seeks to confirm men in their pride and bolster their natural presumption; on the other side, he seeks to confirm men in their misery and hold them in the prison of despair. If he loses the first battle against the law he then strives to win the next one against the gospel. The law and gospel working together, therefore, are the most powerful and effective weapons⁴ of God against the devil.

(A) The Nature of the Gospel

The gospel is the essence of the Christian message for Luther; it is the summary of the Christian faith. Luther often says that the gospel is the "New Testament", and he uses the two terms almost interchangeably.⁵ Nevertheless, he did not intend by this to identify the gospel and the New Testament, insofar as the latter is considered as one section of the Bible. The New Testament does in this Biblical sense properly contain the gospel and the Old Testament the law: "Novum testamentum proprie constat promissionibus et exhortationibus, sicut Vetus proprie constat legibus⁶ et minis." But the gospel is far more than the Scriptures; as he points out in the Commentary on Romans: "Euangelium non est solum, quod Mattheus, Marcus, Lucas, Iohannes scripserunt. Quod satis ex hoc loco patet. Qui Expresse dicit, Quod Euangelium sit verbum de filio Dei incarnato et passo et glorificato."⁷

Speculative knowledge or definition of the gospel, as with the law, is not enough. Luther can only define the gospel in terms of what it does for and works within him: "Hatt die seele keyn ander dinck, widder yn hymel noch auff erden, darynnen sie lebe, frum, frey, und Christen sey, den das heylic Euagelij, das wort gottis von Christo geprediget."⁸ More specifically, the gospel is for Luther that which delivers us from our sins: "Was ist den diss testament oder was wirt uns drynnen bescheyden von Christo? furwar ein grosser, ewiger, unaussprechlicher schatz, nemlich vorgebung aller sund, wie die wort klar lautten 'diss ist der kilch eyns newen ewigen testaments yn meynen bluet, das fur

euch und fur viele vorgossen wirt zur vorgebung der sund⁹." Twenty years later Luther still maintains that the forgiveness of sins is the principle office of the gospel: "vergebung der sunden jnn alle welt, welchs ist das eigentliche Ampt des Euangelij."¹⁰ This work of the gospel is the true source of joy in the Christian life;¹¹ it is the myrrh which makes the bitterness of sin and death sweet.¹² The voice of the gospel is, therefore, the sweetest one possible: "illam vocem dulcissimi Euangelii", and the most pleasant consolation to the miserable sinner: "Vox Euangelica et dulcissimum solatium est miseris peccatoribus."¹³

The clearest picture of the gospel may be painted against the background of the law. The law is an exactor which tells us what is required and what is demanded of us; the gospel is a giver which demands nothing of us except that we reach out our hands to receive what is given. The gospel never says to do this or that but only tells us what God has done for us. The gospel is a gift and promise, while the law is a demand and threat.¹⁴ This is the theme which runs through the whole of the Commentary on Galatians, and which appears even more concisely in other of his works,¹⁵ as for instance in a sermon from the year 1532 entitled: Wie das Gesetz und Euangelion recht grundlich zu unterscheiden sind: "Euangelium non est aliud quam promissio et donum, ich sol den sack her halten. Maxima differentia nemen und geben."¹⁶ By its fulfillment of the law the nature of the gospel is delineated.

The relation between Christ and the gospel is a very intimate one. The gospel is that heavenly teaching which tells the world the meaning of Christ; it is a combination of gift and promise of forgiveness of sins, redemption from death, victory over the devil, and life eternal. Luther calls this gospel the revelation of the Son of God, the "doctrine" which is different from all others: "doctrina Evangelii quae est re-¹⁷velatio filii Dei...Et ea diversa est doctrina ab omnibus aliis." The gospel alone reveals the Son of God: "Evangelium solum re-¹⁸velat filium Dei...Christus est obiectum Evangelii." To use the word "doctrine" may seem to indicate that Luther has a Scholastic understanding of what the gospel is; Harnack falls into this error by saying that the gospel is for Luther: "saving¹⁹ doctrine...which certainly includes the old dogmas." Luther, however, explicitly disassociates himself from such a view by saying that this "genus doctrinae" cannot be learned or taught except through God--first by the outward word and then inwardly by the Holy Spirit: "Hoc autem genus doctrinae non discitur, docetur, indicatur per hominem, legem, sed per deum, externo verbo; deinde intus revelat spiritus per suum donum. Euangelium est verbum quod descendit de coelo et revelatur per spiritum sanctum qui ad hoc missus."²⁰ The gospel is to Luther precisely what the words "εὐαγγέλιον" or "gospel" literally mean in the Greek and English respectively: the "good announcement" or the "glad tidings". That "good news" is to Luther the essential content of the Biblical, and more especially, of the

New Testament message; it is the heart of what we have come to know as the "εὐαγγέλιον", the proclamation which first told²¹ the meaning of Christ to the world.

In his Vorrede auf das Neue Testament Luther gives a long discussion of his interpretation of the word gospel. He says of it: "Denn Evangelium ist ein Griechisch Wort, und heisset auf Deutsch: gute Botschaft, gute Mahre, gute neue Zeitung, gut Geschrey, davon man singet, saget und frolich ist."²² Just as the good news which came to the Jewish people when David had overcome their great enemy Goliath, so the gospel is the good news of the true David who has overcome sin, death and the devil and rescued all those who are in bondage to them: "So ist nun das Evangelium nichts anders, denn eine Predigt von Christo, Gottes und Davids Sohn, wahren Gott und Menschen, der fur uns mit seinem Sterben und Auferstehen aller Menschen Sunde, Tod und Holle überwunden hat, die an ihn glauben."²³ This "good news" may also be called the New Testament for just as a dying man bequeaths his goods to his heirs, so Christ bequeathed the gospel to all who believe in it and his "goods" are His life, His righteousness and His salvation.²⁴ The true gospel may, therefore, be either a short or a long message; it is a long message when the works of Christ are described in detail but it may be a brief one when it simply tells how the death and resurrection of Christ means the overcoming of sin, death and hell for those who believe in him, as Paul and Peter taught it: "der beschreibts aber kurtz, der nicht von Christi Wercken, sonder kurtzlich anzeiget, wie er durch sein

Sterben und Auferstehen Sunde, Tod und Holle überwunden haben denen, die an ihn glauben, wie St. Petrus und Paulus.²⁵ In conclusion, Luther warns his readers not to make Christ into a "Moses" or the gospel into a book of law or teaching: "Darum siehe nun darauf, dass du nicht aus Christo einen Mosen machest, noch aus dem Evangelio ein Gesetz oder Lehrbuch."²⁶

It is true, Luther says, that Christ (and Paul and Peter besides) gives many commandments and teachings, but this is not properly the gospel; the real gospel is the preaching and the knowledge of the benefits of Christ: "seine Wercke und Geschichte wissen, ist noch nicht, das rechte Evangelium wissen ...also ist auch das nicht, das Evangelium wissen, wenn du solche Lehre und Gebot weissest, sondern, wenn die Stimme kommt, die da sagt, Christus sey dein eigen mit Leben, Lehren, Wercken, Sterben, Auferstehen und allem, was er ist, hat, thut und vermag...dass man allenthalben siehet, wie das Evangelium nicht ein Gesetzbuch, sondern eigentlich eine Predigt von den Wohlthaten Christi, uns erzeiget und zu eigen gegeben, so wir²⁷ glauben."

One may wonder whether Luther is really giving "Evangelium" its proper New Testament definition when he identifies it so one-sidedly with the forgiveness of sins, as contrasted to the teaching of the law. Heiler, for instance, says: "Das Evangelium ist für Luther nicht das neutestamentliche *εὐαγγέλιον*, das Gesetz und Gnadenverkündigung umspannt, sondern ausschliesslich die Predigt von der sündenvergebenden Gnade

²⁸
Gottes." In his earlier writings Luther seems to include both the elements of law and gospel within the concept of "Evangelium"; the gospel has two offices: the first to interpret the old law and the second to preach the good tidings of forgiveness of sins. As he says in his Sermo. Dominica II. Adventus (1516): "Igitur Euangelium habet duplex officium. primum est interpretari legem veterem...hic iam venit officium Euangelii secundum et proprium et verum, quod nuntiat desperatae conscientiae auxilium et remedium."²⁹ Here "gospel" has become an almost all-inclusive term, even though its "proprium et verum officium" is that of forgiveness and redemption. In another sermon of the same year Luther even speaks of a "Cacangelium" which reveals sin and preaches repentance: "In hoc quod dicit omnibus 'poenitentiam agite' utique omnes peccatores arguit et sic tristitia et ingrata nunciat, quod est Cacangelium, i.e. malum nuntium et officium alienum."³⁰

Later, however, Luther interprets gospel in a far more circumscribed way so that no element of law is included in the term and indeed stands directly contrary to it. Luther does make the concession that Christ had a two-fold office, that of interpreting the law and that of proclaiming the gospel. It is the latter which is his proper work and the former only a by-product of it for which he did not principally come into the world.³¹ But the important thing to note is that when Christ gives commandments or expounds the law He is precisely teaching the law and He is not revealing a legal side of the gospel.³²


That would be to make Christ into another law-giver and this to Luther is the betrayal of the Christian faith: "Ideo non legislator sed redemptor noster a lege, quia fecit se servum legis. Quod vero dat praecepta, das setz in alium locum. Das ist nicht officium praecipium Christi sed accidentale."³³

The gospel is, therefore, in Luther's thought neither the New Testament, nor the "εὐγμ" , nor even Christ, insofar as they are considered to contain elements of the law. The gospel is the divine word of forgiveness and salvation, which both abolishes and fulfils the law; as such it is the axis of the New Testament and of the whole Biblical revelation, it is the essence of the "εὐγμ" , and the "doctrine" of the Son of God who was incarnated, crucified and resurrected that sinners might have life. Luther's teaching of the gospel as the "good news" which is offered only through God's grace, revealed only by the Holy Ghost, whose sole content is the redemptive work of Christ, and which is apprehended by faith alone is his central theological affirmation and his ultimate formulation of the Christian faith.³⁴

(B) The Form of the Gospel

According to Luther the gospel comes to us in two forms: first, as the spoken word and second, as the sacramental word. The spoken or preached gospel is the exposition of the "doctrine" which has been discussed above; it is the articulation and clarification of the significance of Christ coming into the world. But the word of the gospel is not merely something spoken by word of mouth and heard by the ears. Through the sacraments we have visible and tangible signs of the gospel; they are testimonials or pledges of God's good will towards us and tokens of His promises. ³⁵ In De captivitate Babylonica (1520), one of Luther's first major pronouncements on the sacraments, he ultimately defines a sacrament as a promise to which has been added a sign: "Proprie tamen ea sacramenta vocari visum ³⁶ est, quae annexis signis promissa sunt." He says that if one wishes to speak quite exactly only two of the seven sacraments of the Roman church are to be considered real sacraments: Baptism and Holy Communion. The others are to be abolished because they do not fulfil this two-fold requirement. ³⁷ The sacrament of Penance, for instance, to which Luther was otherwise favorably disposed, though it contains a promise, does not have a divinely instituted and visible sign; it therefore cannot be considered as a real sacrament but only a renewal of Baptism. ³⁸

The special virtue of the visible, divinely appointed character of a true sacrament lies not in its own essence but primarily in the fact that it is a witness of God's presence and to



the promise of forgiveness of sins.³⁹ Luther is very critical of those whose pride of heart makes them contemptuous of real and sensuous signs of God's love.⁴⁰ It was Luther's own experience that men are so weak and poor that they need visible signs of grace and forgiveness to strengthen them in times of great spiritual tribulation; these signs are God-given antidotes against "Anfection": "Drub ist yn dissem sacrament, unss geben die unmessige gottis gnad und barmhertzickeit, das wir, da allen yamer, alle anfection, von unss legen auff die gemeyn, und sonderlich auff Christo."⁴¹ The sinner who has been convicted of his sinfulness is utterly crushed down and it is only with extreme difficulty that he can believe the promises of the gospel.⁴² It is the paradox of the religious life that the pious should tend to see sins where none actually are;⁴³ Christ comes to the sinners as one seeking the lost sheep or lost coins and tells them "das Gott den Sundern nicht feindt sey, er habe nit lust an jrem todt."⁴⁴ Against the wiles of the devil, therefore, one holds fast to the signs (even though knowing that faith in one's heart is sufficient in the eyes of God) and says: "Siehe, du Tyrann, siehe, du Teufel fichtst mir an mein Leben und Gewissen; sieh, da hab ich ein Zeichen, dass Christus sein Leib⁴⁵ and Leben, Blut und Fleisch fur mich gesetzt hat."

1. Luther's teaching on Baptism reveals how sacraments may be considered as visible signs of the gospel of God. In Der kleiner Katechismus he defines Baptism in this way: "Die Tauffe ist nicht allein schlecht wasser, Sondern, sie ist das

wasser jnn Gottes gebot gefasset, und mit Gottes wort verbunden.⁴⁶"

That this is the word of the gospel is clearly shown when he asks what Baptism gives or of what benefit it is and answers:

"Sie wirckt vergebung der sunden, erloset vom tod und teuffel, und gibt die ewigen seligkeit, allen die es gleuben, wie die wort und verheissung Gottes, lauten."⁴⁷ This is a simple restatement of the work of the gospel; the fact that it comes in a different form does not affect its essential character of being a free gift from God. Luther's differences with the Roman and Anabaptist views of Baptism are only variations of his differences with them over the nature and work of the gospel.

Against the Roman teaching that original sin is completely eradicated in Baptism and that a new sacrament, Penance, is needed to repair the damage of sins committed after Baptism, and that the benefit of a sacrament is bestowed without the faith of the recipient, Luther stands firmly. He constantly maintains that Baptism is of life-long validity; it is the ship of salvation which never goes down and therefore we do not need the "second plank" of salvation, Penitence, as Jerome had taught: "Manet illa una, solida, et invicta navis, nec unquam dissolvitur in ullas tabulas, in qua omnes vehuntur, qui ad portum salutis vehuntur, quae est veritas dei in sacramentis promittens."⁴⁸ The sacrament is simply a sign of the promise or gospel of God and cannot perish; conversely, being a promise it may only be received by faith.⁴⁹ There is no place here for either magical infusion or legalism.

The Anabaptists were not long in attacking him from the other side; for they said if a sacrament is only of value when it is received by faith then its intrinsic validity is also dependent upon faith. In Der grosse Katechismus Luther seeks to meet this difficult objection. He attacks the Anabaptist view that the validity of a sacrament depends on the faith of the recipient and of the administrator; a true sacrament, he says, is bound not to faith but to the Word.⁵⁰ The water without the Word is simply cooking water such as a maid uses and might be called a bath-baptism:⁵¹ "mag wol ein bader Tauffe heissen." When it is bound to God's Word, however, baptismal water becomes something far different:⁵² "ein ander ding ist Tauffe, denn alle ander was-
ser." Though this is not in a natural way:⁵³ "nicht des natu-
lichen wesens halben," nevertheless, where God's name is, there is life and salvation and the water is to be called godly, holy, fruitful and gracious water.⁵⁴ The Word combined with the water brings us an inestimable treasure; this treasure being a work and gift of God stands by itself whether we have faith in it or not. Without faith, however, this treasure will avail us nothing:⁵⁵ "On glauben ist es nichts nutz, ob es gleich an yhm selbs ein Gottlicher uberschwenglicher schatz ist."

On the one side, Luther is protesting against the view that a sacrament has efficacious power without faith and, on the other, that the validity of a sacrament is dependent upon faith. Between these two extremes Luther maintains that both the Word and faith are necessary to make a sacrament both valid and efficacious:

"Quilibet enim facile intelligit, quod haec duo sunt simul necessaria, promissio et fides. sine promissione enim credi nihil potest, sine fide autem promissio inutilis est, cum per fidem stabiliatur et impleatur."⁵⁶ Baptism, for instance, is the promise of God in the form of an ordinance for washing by water. As a promise it is purely dependent upon God for its existence and validity. But as with all promises of God, faith and faith alone, is necessary for its apprehension and the conferring of its benefits.⁵⁷ Luther's dislike of adult Baptism is largely based on his fear that any sort of legalism should penetrate this sacrament; it was one of the only sacraments which had been uncorrupted in the Roman church for even in it infants are baptized and this is certainly an implicit rejection of ideas of meritorious achievement or moralistic attainment, as⁵⁸ a prerequisite of salvation.

This does not mean, however, that Luther is rejecting the possibility of moral attainment. Baptism is a perfect sign of the Christian life since it is the picture of the submerging of the old man and the emerging of the new man; it is the symbol of death and resurrection.⁵⁹ For such a complete and perfect thing Luther would prefer to have a complete and perfect sign, that is, total immersion.⁶⁰ Indeed, the whole of our Christian life is nothing more than a continual "re-Baptism" in which we daily die⁶¹ to the flesh and live to the spirit. Sacramentally, therefore, we are new creatures, reborn in a new creation; but in this life we have only begun to become what we really are because our body

of sin is not entirely laid aside until the final Resurrection.⁶²
The new life of faith is a constant spiritual Baptism in which we begin to die to this world and live to God: "Quare, dum incipimus credere, simul incipimus mori huic mundo, et vivere deo in futura vita, ut fides vere sit mors et resurrectio, hoc, spiritualis ille baptismus, quo immergimur et emergimus."⁶³ Sins after Baptism are not to be dealt with by means of another sacrament, Penance, but they are to be viewed in terms of the promise of Baptism which has lasting significance.⁶⁴ The whole problem of sin is to be resolved by a person simply returning to the promise of Baptism and resting in faith in that promise. The life of sanctification is simply the becoming of what we already are--of becoming actually what we are sacramentally: "Quam diu enim vivimus, semper id agimus, quod baptismus significat, id est, morimur resurgimus...Ita semel es baptisatus sacramentaliter, sed semper baptisandus fide, semper moriendum, semperque vivendum. Baptismus totum corpus absorbit, et rursus edidit; ita res baptismi totam vitam tuam cum corpore et anima absorbere debet, et reddere in novissimo die, indutam stola claritatis et immortalitatis."⁶⁵

Baptism is to be seen as a symbol of the meaning of the gospel. There is no merit, nor law, nor self-achievement involved; it is simply the seal of God's promises to forgive us our sins and to make us new creatures.⁶⁶ The fourth section on Baptism in Der kleiner Katechismus might seem on first reading to be a statement of the "new law" for those who have been bap-

tized: that they should drown the old Adam in them by daily repentance and that they should die to all sins and evil desires: "Was bedeut denn solch wasser teuffen? Antwort: Es bedeut, das der alte Adam jnn uns, durch tegliche rew und busse, sol erseufft werden, und sterben mit allen sunden und bosen lusten."⁶⁷ Such is not Luther's meaning, however; he quotes Paul's words in Romans 6:4ff., whose argument clearly is, as Dodd has pointed out: "that the death and resurrection of a Christian is sacramentally complete", even though actual resurrection is spoken of in a future tense.⁶⁸ Luther plainly follows this symbolism of Paul by completing his discussion on Baptism with the Resurrection used as the analogy for the whole Christian life, an absolute repudiation of any thought of moral attainment through the law. Our old Adam: "widerumb teglich heraus komen und aufferstehen. Ein newer mensch, der jnn gerechtigkeit und reinigkeit, fur Gott ewiglich lebe."⁶⁹ Baptism is, therefore, the symbol of the Christian life as it is lived through the gospel. It symbolizes the life of grace and the gospel as one of pure gift, without any merit of our own, and of God's promise which is only dependent on our faith and trust in it to become effective in our lives.

2. Though Baptism and Holy Communion use different elements, their essential nature is the same. They both signify the forgiveness of sins and the new life in Christ. Luther says of the Lord's Supper in Der kleiner Katechismus: "Was nut-

zet denn solch essen und trincken? Antwort: Das zeigt uns diese wort. 'Für euch gegeben und vergossen zur vergebung der sunden,' Nemlich, das uns jm Sacrament vergebung der sunden, leben und seligkeit durch solche wort gegeben wird, Denn wo vergebung der sunden ist, da ist auch, leben und seligkeit.⁷⁰"

As with Baptism, so this sacrament is founded on God's Word and stands whether we believe in it or not: "Denn es ist nicht gegründet auff menschen heiligkeit, sondern auff Gottes wort."⁷¹

But faith is necessary for the conferring of its benefits:

"Und weil er vergebung der sunden anbietet und verheisset, kan es nicht ander denn durch den glauben empfangen werden. Solchen glauben foddert er selbs ynn dem wort als wer spricht, FÜR EUCH gegeben, und FÜR EUCH vergossen, als solt er sagen."⁷²

He admits that fasting and prayer may be a good external discipline as preparation for the sacrament but this does not make us worthy of it; only humble faith in the promises offered by the sacrament is a worthy preparation, for this blessing may be grasped only with the heart: "Praeparatio itaque digna et usus legitime non est, nisi fides, qua creditur Missae, id est, divinae promissioni."⁷³

Those who do not come to the sacrament because they do not feel worthy of it, in the sense of being pure and without sin, are being misled; we should come to the Lord's Supper precisely because we are unworthy and sinful: "Darumb sollen solche leute lernen, das die hohiste kunst ist, das man wisse, das unser Sacrament stehet, nicht auff unser wirdigkeit...Und eben

darumb, das wir unwirdig sind.⁷⁴ Holy Communion, therefore, as a true sacrament is a pure blessing of God, the promise of the forgiveness of sins and a new life in Christ. The Mass is, as such, really a summary of the gospel: "Was ist das gantz Evangelium ynn eyner kurtzen summa begriffen mit den Worten dieses testaments oder sacraments;⁷⁵ "At missa est pars Euangelii, immo summa et compendium Euangelii."⁷⁶ As the character of the gospel helps us to understand the meaning of the Lord's Supper, so it in turn may help us to understand the meaning of the gospel.

Luther refuses to let any sort of legalism enter the true teaching on the Lord's Supper. It is not a good work, as taught by Roman theology, but a pure gift and promise of God.⁷⁷ Neither is there room for legalism in the relation between the Mass and the sanctified life of a Christian. The Mass is rightly called food for the soul; through Baptism we become reborn men and the Lord's Supper is needed to strengthen and nourish the new man in us: "Darumb heisset es wol ein speisse der seelen, die den neuen menschen neeret und sterckt. Denn durch die Tauffe werden wir erstlich new geboren."⁷⁸ We are constantly tormented by the world, our flesh and the devil; in our weariness and depression we are to turn to this sacrament to draw strength and comfort from it: "Dazu ist nu der trost gegeben, wenn das hertz solchs fulet, das yhm wil zu schwer werde, das er hie⁷⁹ neue krafft und labsal hole." If we depend upon God and use His signs we need not be unduly pessimistic about this life; the battle may be a hard one but Luther is confident that the

new life in us will constantly increase and be strengthened:

"Darumb ist es gegeben zur teglichen weide und futerung, das sich der glaupe erhole und stercke, das er ynn solchem kampff nicht zuruck falle, sondern ymmer yhe stercker und stercker werde. Denn das newe leben sol also gethan sein, das es stets zuneme und fort fare." ⁸⁰

This advancement in the spiritual life is, however, not of our doing or achieved through our efforts. We come to the Lord's Table as sinners and receive this rich food gratuitously for our profit and benefit. ⁸¹ As with Baptism so this sacrament both makes us righteous by forgiving our sins and gives us strength to become what we are. This is the central paradox of Luther's ethical teaching by which he seeks to avoid legalism on one side and quietism on the other. His might be called a sacramental theory of morals.

What to many has been the chief stumbling block in Luther's theology is his doctrine of the real presence in the Lord's Supper. In the light of what has been said about his sacramental theory as a whole, however, and his understanding of the relation of law and gospel, his views may seem somewhat more acceptable than what one has described as "a crude and unintelligible theory of the Eucharist, repellent to the enlightened mind and the spiritual consciousness of men." ⁸² Luther's attitude towards the theory of "concomitance" has already been mentioned, in which he disparages attempts to understand the manner of the presence of Christ's body and blood in the sacrament and advocates a simple and unquestioning acceptance of the fact by faith: "Es ist gnug, das

du wissest, es sei ein gottlich Zeichen, da Christi Fleisch und Blut wahrhaftig innen ist; wie und wo, lass ihm befohlen sein."⁸³ This, of course, is in perfect harmony with Luther's consistent suspicion of attempts to pry into the divine mysteries by abstract speculations.

Even more important is Luther's strong emphasis on the presence of the Word in the sacrament. Without it the wine and bread remain what they always have been; when the Word is added, however, they become something entirely different. Luther quotes with high approval the words of Augustine: "Accedat verbum ad elementum et fit sacramentum;" and says that Augustine has hardly said anything better.⁸⁴ But this union of the Word with the elements must not be thought to bring a magical change of those elements; on this point Luther's strong words against the doctrine of "transubstantiation" must be clear enough.⁸⁵ The body and blood are indeed in and under ("ynn und unter") the bread and wine; this bread and wine, therefore, is not ordinary bread and wine but bread and wine "ynn Gottes wort gefasset, und daran gebunden."⁸⁶ To go beyond this affirmation is to indulge in needless and dangerous philosophizing.⁸⁷

The question still remains as to why Luther was so insistent on maintaining the doctrine of the real presence, even though he attacked transubstantiation so bitterly. It may seem, as it apparently did to Zwingli, an arbitrary distinction and hardly less speculative than the doctrine it purported to displace. As in the case of Baptism, Luther again is trying to

steer a course between what seems to him to equally unpalatable alternatives. He admits that at one time he had seriously considered abandoning the doctrine of the bodily presence and would have welcomed a convincing case by which an even stronger blow might have been struck against the Romanists. This, however, had not come forth and indeed Carlstadt's arguments in this direction had only confirmed him to the opposite view.⁸⁸ Nevertheless, the real presence is not to be thought of in a crude or literal way.⁸⁹ The presence of Christ in the sacrament is related to the manner of the omnipresence of God throughout creation, he says in Dass diese worte Christ: 'Das ist mein Leib' noch feststehen (1527); though no one can say exactly how, it is perhaps present like light and color, as objects in the eyes of the one seeing them, as a tree is in the acorn, or as God is in our heart.⁹⁰ Luther's strongest analogy is that of the Incarnation of the Word; the Lord is present in the sacrament as His two natures were inseparable in the Incarnation.⁹¹

That the bodily presence in itself was not of primary importance to Luther may seem a misrepresentation in view of his violent philippics against those who denied it. Nevertheless, an examination of his more irenic writings seems to indicate that it is the presence of the Word which is of primary importance to him.⁹² That Word is the word of the gospel which promises us forgiveness of sins and a renewal of life: "Wie kan leiblich essen und trincken solch gros ding thun? Antwort: Essen und trincken thuts freilich nicht, Sondern die Wort so da

stehen, 'Für euch gegeben und vergossen zur vergebung der sünden.' Welche wort sind neben dem leiblichen essen und trincken, als das heubstuck jm Sacrament. Und wer den selbigen worten gleubt, der hat was sie sagen, und wie sie lauten, Nemlich, 'Vergabung der sünden.'⁹³ "The bodily presence of Christ is, therefore, not important per se but because it reinforces and establishes the validity of the promise which the sacrament signifies. In the first place, Luther is protesting against a rigid rationalism of a man like Zwingli which would deny the possibility of the real presence and thereby challenge the omnipotence and omnipresence of God.⁹⁴ In the second place, he is attacking a pride which tends to despise the union of the sensual and divine and thereby challenges the need of personal, tangible symbols of God's love and forgiveness and promises and, implicitly, the central meaning of the Incarnation.⁹⁵ The strongest and most acute argument of Luther throughout the whole Zwinglian controversy was his observation: "You have a different spirit from us."⁹⁶

The whole of Luther's sacramental theory is a confirmation of his fundamental theological principles. The gospel is the same gospel even though it comes in sacramental form, and its relation to the law remains the same. Even in the heat of the controversies over infant Baptism and the real presence in the Lord's Supper, Luther held to his original views, however far provoked he may have been not to do so and however paradoxical his attempts at harmonization may appear on first reading. The real presence in the

Mass and the legitimacy of infant Baptism, which he affirmed, in no way compromised his basic principles that the sacraments are promises or the gospel in symbolic form and that faith alone is necessary to apprehend their benefits. Beard's view that there is a "radical incompatibility between the doctrine of justification by faith alone and a theory of sacraments"⁹⁷ in Luther's theology is a questionable one in view of Luther's position which maintains that the gospel can come either as the spoken word or as the sacramental word. The admitted incongruities, medieval theological residues, controversial exaggerations of Luther's thought take on their proper proportion when they are set against this dominant background.

3. Finally, the gospel comes to us through the power of the Keys and the fellowship of the brotherhood of the Church. In the Schmalkaldische Artikel (1538) Luther summarizes the means by which the gospel comes to us, saying that it comes to us: first, by word of mouth: "mundlich wort"; then, through the sacraments of Baptism and Holy Communion; and finally, "durch die krafft der Schlüssel, und auch per mutuum colloquium, et consolationem fratrum."⁹⁸ In what way is Luther able to reinterpret the Roman doctrine of the Keys so that it conforms with his view of the nature and purpose of the gospel and in what relation does the fellowship of the Christian community stand to it?

Luther's whole teaching on the power of the Keys was formed against the background and in opposition to the Roman sacrament of Penance. One of his most explicit statements of his opposition

to the Roman theology which formed the foundation for the sacrament of Penance is in the Schmalkaldische Artikel quoted above. Here he bitterly attacks the false repentance of the Papists: "Von der falschen Busse der Papisten", who teach that contrition, confession and satisfaction are necessary for the forgiveness of sins.⁹⁹ Those who do not feel real contrition have their attrition reckoned as the beginning of real contrition and therefore are considered as having satisfied the requirements.¹⁰⁰ This system, says Luther, either leads to desperation (for no one really feels as contrite as he ought) or to callousness (for attrition is only word for lack of contrition). The Roman teaching is that of active contrition ("activa contritio") while the true doctrine is that of passive contrition ("passiva contritio").¹⁰¹

Luther's chief reason for rejecting Penance as a sacrament was, as has been mentioned, that it did not have a divinely ordained sign. Nevertheless, he prized the essential meaning of it and his case against the Roman theologians is that they have perverted its original significance. Originally, says Luther in De captivitate Babylonica ecclesiae praeludium, Penance consisted in a divine promise on one side and our faith on the other (as in the real sacraments): "Nam cum et ipsum, sicut et alia duo, constet verbo promissionis divinae et fide nostra."¹⁰² The Papists have corrupted the original meaning of the sacrament and made out of the promise of the Keys the worst kind of tyranny. Though contrition, confession, and satisfaction are good if

they are interpreted in an evangelical way, the Roman treatment of them subverts their meaning: "Obliteratis itaque ac subversis promissione et fide videamus, quid substituerint in locum earum. Tres partes dederunt poenitentiae: Contritionem, confessionem, satisfactionem, sed sic, ut in singulis, si quid boni inesset, tollerent, et in eisdem quoque sum libidinem et tyrannidem constituerent."¹⁰³ They have made contrition something prior to faith, and have even claimed that it is a work of merit; by adding the conception of "attrition" the original significance¹⁰⁴ has been still further degraded. The true Christian teaching of contrition is that it comes from the contemplation of the divine threatenings (the law) and leads to the divine promises (the gospel), through which by faith man gains forgiveness of sins: "veritas comminationis sit causa contritionis, veritas promissionis sit solacii, si credatur, et hac fide homo mereatur peccatorum remissionem."¹⁰⁵ Confession has also been corrupted.¹⁰⁶ The secret confession, which has become a tyrannical instrument in the hands of the Roman hierarchy, was intended to be a wonderful remedy for burdened consciences, who after confessing their sins to a brother would receive the word of forgiveness from him.¹⁰⁷ Finally, the whole legalistic system of the Roman church has been built up on a false interpretation of satisfaction, which Luther says he has fully discussed in the indulgence controversy. Satisfaction in its real meaning, he points out, is a renewal of the entire life; this cannot come by fasts, vigils, scourgings, vows or any outward works by which Roman theology plagues men's con-

sciences, but only by the faith of a truly contrite heart:

"Quae monstra tibi debemus, Romana sedes, et tuis homicidis legibus et ritibus, quibus mundum totum eo perdidisti, ut arbitrentur sese posse deo per opera pro peccatis satisfacere, cui sola fide cordis contriti ¹⁰⁸satisfit."

The combination of radical and conservative strains in Luther's character are shown here. With rare theological acumen and keenness he has cut through the Roman penitential system and stripped it to the simple formula of: threatenings or the law to bring contrition, the promises or the gospel to bring consolation, and faith to complete the satisfaction. To discuss Luther's criticisms of the Roman sacrament of Penance and his theological "re-formation" of it in detail would be a large-scale job. Suffice it to say that he transposed the concepts of penance, contrition, confession and absolution out of the realm of law into that of the gospel. The sacrament of Penance became for him, then, not the confirmation of the way of the law to salvation, but an affirmation of the way of the gospel. Consisting essentially in demand, promise and faith, it could not properly be considered as a real sacrament because of its lack of a divinely instituted sign. It is, nevertheless, a real ministry of the gospel and is to be treasured and exercised accordingly.

Luther's interpretation of the Keys is one facet of his re-formulation of the sacrament of Penance. The power and the office of the Keys is essentially the work of preaching the law and gospel rightly. The binding of sins through the preaching of the law

leads to real contrition and the loosing of sins through the gospel gives real forgiveness. In one of his main discussions on the doctrine of the Keys, Von den Schlüsseln (1530), Luther brings out this thought very clearly: "Und treibt also dieser schlüssel und richtet aus das ampt des gesetzes, das auch die sunde zeigt und zur furcht Gottes treibt; der ander schlüssel treibt und richtet aus des Euangelij ampt, lockt zur gnade und barmhertzigkeit, trostet und verheisst, leben und seligkeit, verkündigt vergebung der sunden."¹⁰⁹

The work of the Keys has to do with both law and gospel but Luther's special concern is for its expression of the gospel. The second office of the Keys--to loose sins ("zu lösen die sunde")--is the one that has been most perverted by Roman theology: "Also mus nu das arme Loseschlüsselin, nicht seines ampts brauchen, sondern den binde schlüssel, helffen gelt und gewallt mehrren, obs der bindeschlüssel für sich allein zu weng¹¹⁰ thet." Furthermore, whereas absolution ("Absolutio") is meant to be a free gift of consolation to the troubled consciences, the Roman system has made a tyrant of it by demanding that a full confession should be made before it is granted.¹¹¹ In his earlier writings Luther subjects the Roman teaching on the power of the Keys to the same criticism. In Grund und Ursach aller Artikel D. Martin Luthers, so durch römische Bulle unrechtlich verdammt sind (1521) he says that true repentance signifies a change of the whole life and this can never come by our own efforts.¹¹² Were we to be forgiven on the basis of our self-

made contrition it would mean that we were being forgiven on the basis of our own merit.¹¹³ Also, contrition by itself is simply "gallows" or "Judas" contrition. Full repentance depends upon the working of the law, followed by the working of the gospel; the first use of the power of the Keys must always be followed by the second or else despair results:

"Den d' teuffel und alle vordampten haben auch solche rew,¹¹⁴ die heisset man auff deutsch: Judas rew, un galgen rew." The same thought is brought out in the Schmalkaldische Artikel:

"Also sagt auch Christus Luce ultimo selbs, Man mus jnn meinen Namen jnn alle welt predigen, Busse und Vergebung der sunden. Wo aber das Gesetze solch sein Ampt allein treibet on zuthun des Evangelij, da ist der Tod und die Helle."¹¹⁵

It has been mentioned before how desperately Luther felt the need for positive confirmation of the forgiveness of sins. He found that confirmation in the proclamation of the gospel through preaching. He also found that confirmation in an even more vivid and tangible way in the sacraments. Now he finds another confirmation in the power of the Keys which Christ has granted to His Church; as he says in Von den Schlüsseln:

"So sind nu die Schlussel nicht anders, denn ein Gottlicher befelch odder Gottlich wort, darinn Christus befelhet odder¹¹⁶ macht gibt, seiner kirchen die sunden zu behalten und zuuergeben."

As he indicates in the Schmalkaldische Artikel, it is for this reason that the power of the Keys should never be surrendered by

the Church: "Weil die Absolutio, oder krafft des Schlussels auch ein hulffe und trost ist, wider die sunde und bose gewissen, im Euangelio durch Christum gestifft; So sol man die Beicht oder Absolutio bey leib nicht lassen abkomen jnn der Kirchen."¹¹⁷

This power of the Keys is not an absolute power, however. In the first place, the Church may only exercise the Keys insofar as their offices are interpreted in the light of the Scriptures, that is by rightly dividing law and gospel.¹¹⁸ In the second place, the power of the Keys is of no effect without our faith; this is to be interpreted in the same way as with the sacraments, in which the validity of the Keys (as a promise of God) is dependent on God alone but the Keys only become efficacious through our faith.¹¹⁹ We must truly believe that we are loosed of our sins before God when we receive absolution here on earth: "Sso muss er do beicht und pusset, fur allen dingen, ya fleyssig warnehmen, das er disse wort, warhafftig halte, unnd festiglich glewbe er sey loss fur got ym hymell, wo er absoluiert wirt auff erdenn."¹²⁰ The worst sin of which we can be guilty is unbelief, for we thereby despise God by mistrusting His promises: "Denn der unglawb lessit yhn da stehen als einen narre odder lugener. Sso gar ein schwere unchristlich, grewlich, schrecklich, sund ist der unglawb odder misstraw, yn den Sacramenten."¹²¹

Luther attacks papal pretensions based on the Roman interpretation of the office of the Keys in two ways. Firstly,

the power of absolution does not reside solely in the Pope but belongs to every priest in the Church of Christ; as he points out in Von den Konziliis und Kirchen (1539) one of the marks of the people of Christ, or the Church, is the power of the Keys and this belongs to the whole Church not exclusively to the Pope: "Gleich wie die Tauffe, Sacrament, Gottes wort nicht des Bapsts, sondern des volcks Christi sind und heissen auch 'claves Ecclesiae', nicht 'claves Papae'."¹²² The power of loos-
ing from sins is not based on a papal prerogative but on the word and promise of Christ: "Aber das, sso prachen alle Pries-
ter dyesser wort Christi, wenn sie absoluieren, und absoluieren nit denn yn crafft der selben wort und zusagung Christi."¹²³ If
the Pope pretends to be doing anything more than the work of a humble priest when he grants absolution, he is pretending to drink rare wine out of a cask from which others get only
water!¹²⁴ In the second place, were Peter and the Pope to ab-
solve our penalty and guilt a thousand times it would make no difference, since it depends on our faith before it is of any benefit to us. If God Himself cannot give heaven to one who does not believe, how can the Pope do it? "d' glawb macht die schlussel tetti; und tuchtig, d' unglaub macht sie untetti; und untuchtig...kan doch got selb de hymel nit geben de d' nit glewbt, wz solt den d' Bapst mit de schlusseln thun, an de d'
nit gleubt."¹²⁵

Luther's view that the power of the Keys lies in the hands of all priests, combined with his doctrine of the priest-

hood of all believers, has revolutionary implications for papal pretensions and for the whole Roman theory of the Church. As Luther himself put it, this knocks the Keys out of the Roman coat-of-arms!¹²⁶ But Luther's theory of the universality of the power of the Keys is not purely a destructive doctrine. It is positively the "mutuum colloquium et consolationem fratrum" mentioned previously. Here Luther steps beyond a purely spiritual conception of the Church and speaks of it as an actual, visible congregation of believers. One of the most important activities of such a community is the mutual strengthening and consoling through the exercise of the power of the Keys by all the members of the group. It is in this context that Luther in Ein Sermon von dem hochwurdigen Sakrament des heiligen wahren Leichnams Christi (1519) speaks of laying all our fears and "Anfectung" on the congregation as well as on Christ: "das wir da allen yamer, alle anfectung, von unss legen auff die gemeyn, und sonderlich auff Christo."¹²⁷ In this sermon Luther elaborates on this theme, further developing it in Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen where he says that as we have received good things from God so these things ought to flow from one to another in the Christian community; my faith and righteousness ought to be laid down as an intercession and covering for the sins of my neighbor, as Christ has done for all of us: "Sihe also müssen gottis gutter fliessen auss eyne, yn den andern un gemeyn werde."¹²⁸ Specifically, this working of true Christian love may be seen in

the use of the Keys, when fellow Christians confirm one another in the faith and assure one another of the mercy of God and His forgiveness. The confessional, which has become a means of tyranny and extortion for the hierarchy of the Roman church, is to become part of the glory of the Christian brotherhood ("fraternitatis Christianae gloria") in which we find a truly great remedy for a turbulent conscience by unveiling our evil heart before our brother and receiving from his mouth the word of consolation sent by God.¹²⁹

Luther's vision of the living, active "communio sanctorum" of faith and spontaneous love stands in sharpest contrast to the medieval Roman church with its elaborate ritual, its complicated dogmatic structure, its rigid hierarchical framework, its autocratic clericalism, and its casuistic moralism. Today, even Roman ecclesiastical scholars recognize that Luther's protest had a real basis and justification and that his word was, in part at least, a prophetic one. As Hughes in one of the most recent Roman church histories points out, of the thirty-four popes between Aquinas and Luther not one has been canonized so far and "of the episcopate as a whole, in these last fifty years before the Reformation it can only be said that it rapidly went from bad to worse."¹³⁰

Such an admission, however, should only remind us that Luther spoke as he did because his theology was built on a different foundation from that of medieval Scholasticism, of which he felt that the flagrant abuses in practical matters were only

outward symptoms. And the Council of Trent, while it attempted a practical purification of the life of the Roman church, confirmed rather than reformed the medieval theology which was the root cause of Luther's protest.¹³¹ Luther, it is true, was often very conservative: but he could also be very radical. His sacramental theory, including his interpretation of the power of the Keys, shows this blend of conservatism and radicalism. As Fairbairn has said of him: "he was a revolutionary without being a radical, or, as it were, a Protestant under protest."¹³² This paradox becomes less stark when one sees how strongly Luther affirmed that he was a true son and servant of the Church. He was not destroying the Church but he was recalling it to its original charter; he was pleading for a return to the form and spirit of the early Christian brotherhood communities, built on a theology and sacramental theory which rightly divided law and gospel. Luther was confident that it was not he who was guilty of heresy but the Roman church to which he was speaking.¹³³ It is one of the tragedies of the Church that the supremacy of the papacy over the Conciliar movement insured the fact that any such protest or attempt at reformation could only lead to suppression or revolution.¹³⁴

(C) The Gospel in the Law

Luther's exposition of law and gospel up to this point has largely referred to its context in the New Testament and in the Christian Church. The question now raised is whether the relation of law and gospel was the same under the Old Dispensation as it is under the New since the coming of Christ. The most concise summary of Luther's position on this question is found in his Vorrede auf das Alte Testament, which first appeared in the 1522 edition of the Deutsche Bibel¹³⁵. In this introduction Luther defines the relation of the Old and New Testaments and it is not difficult to see that the distinction between law and gospel is the scheme on which his interpretation is based.

He makes the complaint, so familiar among modern Biblical scholars, that the Old Testament is being ignored by Christians, who tend to look at it as an antiquated history of interest only to the Jews; these Christians think that the New Testament is enough for them. But, says Luther, we should not despise the writings of the Old Testament; Christ, Peter and Paul all bear witness to the importance of them. The Old Testament is the ground on which the New Testament rests and is the means by which it establishes its validity. The New Testament is really the preaching of the Old Testament promises fulfilled by Christ: "Und was ist das Neue Testament anders, denn eine öffentliche Predigt und Verkündigung, durch die Sprüche im Alten Testament gesetzet und durch Christum erfüllet?"¹³⁶ We are not to disdain the

the simple stories that we find in the Old Testament because in them is hidden the highest majesty and wisdom of God; in this way God makes fools of all who are wise and clever, and reveals Himself to the young and simple. Here we find the crib and swaddling clothes in which Christ lies; the clothes are poor and humble, but rich is the treasure within.¹³⁷

It is true that the Old Testament is a law-book ("Gesetzbuch" "librum legis") which tells us what we may or may not do, just as the New Testament is the gospel or grace-book ("ein Evangelium oder Gnadenbuch") which tells us how to fulfil the law. But as the New Testament is not purely the gospel but also has commands and law, so the Old Testament is not purely a book of the law; in it are promises of the gospel through which the ancient fathers and prophets, though "under the law" are saved by faith just as we: "also sind auch im Alten Testament neben den Gesetzen etliche Verheissungen und Gnadenspruche, damit die heiligen Vater und Propheten unter dem Gesetz im Glauben Christi, wie wir, erhalten sind."¹³⁸ The fact that the chief teaching of the New Testament is the gospel and the chief teaching of the Old Testament is the law, does not affect Luther's conclusion that under both covenants man is saved only through faith in the gospel of Christ.

Luther finds substantiation for his view in the contents of the first five books of Moses. In Genesis we learn about the creation of all things but the primary purpose of the book is to tell us from where sin and death have come, namely from

the evil of Satan and from Adam's fall. Before the law is given, however, we are taught from where we are to seek release from sin and death and that is from the "seed of a woman"--Christ.¹³⁹ Such promises or preaching of the gospel are found in Gen. 3: 15, 12: 3 and 22: 18. The first gospel in the Bible is not the one according to Matthew but, as Luther points out in several of his writings, it is the one in Gen. 3: 15.¹⁴⁰ The emphasis on faith and its exaltation over law and good works which he sees in Genesis, so delights Luther that he calls it an evangelical book:¹⁴¹ "fast ein evangelisch Buch."

Further substantiation is found in the other books of Moses. The book of Exodus tells us that because the world had sunk into blindness, by which it could not see what sin was, nor from where death came, God gave the law through Moses that sin might once again be recognized.¹⁴² In the third book the priests are instituted; their office is to show the people their sin and to intercede to God on their behalf. Sin and sinners make priests necessary: "Da siehet man, wie ein priest-erlich Amt nur um der Sunde willl wird eingesetzt...also, dass alle sein Werck ist, mit Sunden und Sundern umgehen."¹⁴³ The book of Numbers, says Luther, is to be seen as a note-worthy example that laws don't make people better but only aggravate sin and wrath.¹⁴⁴ The fifth book establishes the religious and secular authorities and summarizes the law as: faith in God and love to one's neighbor: "diese Erklarung im funften Buch halt eigentlich nichts anders innen, denn den Glauben zu Gott

und die Liebe zum Nächsten.¹⁴⁵

In summary, Luther points out that the law, even under the Old Dispensation, was given for only two purposes. First, as a means by which civil order is maintained and outward forms of worship are regulated;¹⁴⁶ and second, as a means by which sin may be recognized. This latter work of the law--to reveal sin and death--is its chief and most important use in the world. The law was never at any time intended to make man able to do good and to live well but far more to show us our blindness to sin and teach us our inability to do that which is right. This should force us to seek further so that we find our ultimate succour in the grace of God through Christ.¹⁴⁷ There are three types of pupils of this work of the law: the contemptuous, the presumptuous and the pious. The first ignore the law and go their own way without fear.¹⁴⁸ The second think that they can fulfil the law with their own strength.¹⁴⁹ The third are they who see Moses unveiled, that is, who understand the real inner meaning of the law and see that Moses does not only reveal the "natural" sins of the Ten Commandments but teaches that unbelief is sin, which the natural reason of man is too blind to see.¹⁵⁰ Realizing that the law demands impossible things they fasten themselves to Christ: "Die dritten sind, die Mosen klar ohne Decke sehen. Das sind die, die des Gesetzes Meynung verstehen, wie es unmöglich Ding fordere...Diese fallen ab von allen Wercken und Vermessenheit und lernen am Gesetz nicht mehr, denn allein Sunde erkennen

und nach Christo zu seufsen, welches auch das eigentliche
Amt Mosis und des Gesetzes Art ist."¹⁵¹

And what of the other parts of the Old Testament, for instance the prophetic and historical writings? Luther says that they are simply Moses in another guise. The prophets, for example, are administrators and witnesses of Moses and his office of the law, convicting the people of their sin and unrighteousness and driving them to Christ: "Was sind aber nun die andern Bucher der Propheten und der Geschichte? Antwort: Nichts anders, denn, was Moses ist...das sie durch des Gesetzes rechten Verstand die Leute in ihrer eigenen Untuchtigkeit behalten und auf Christum treiben, wie Moses thut."¹⁵² In his Vorrede auf den Psalter he says that the Psalter would be valuable and lovely for no other reason than it contains promises of Christ's death and resurrection: "Und sollte der Psalter allein deshalb theuer und lieb seyn, dass er von Christi Sterben und Auferstehung so klarlich verheisset, und sein Reich und der gantzen Christenheit Stand und Wesen vorbildet."¹⁵³ Even the sacraments of the Old Testament are the same in essentials as those of the New Testament; they contain God's promises and are efficacious only through faith: "Denn es ist kein unterscheyd, zwischen alten un neuen Sacramente, es geben widd' disse noch ihene die gnade gottis, ssondern wie gesagt ist, d' glaub allei auff gottis wort un zeiche, gab dort un gibt, hie gnade. Darumb habe die alten eben ssowol durch de selbe glawbe gnade er-

laget als wir.¹⁵⁴ The gospel is therefore the center of both the Old and New Testament and it is the relation between law and gospel which gives meaning and unity to the whole of the Biblical revelation.

With this foundation securely laid, Luther felt free to judge and criticize the relative worth of the various Biblical writings in what was a radical way for his time.¹⁵⁵ The authorship of Genesis is a matter of indifference. The book of Esther might better be excluded from the canon. The prophets were sometimes mistaken in their predictions of worldly affairs. The synoptic Gospels contain discrepancies and have misquotations from the Old Testament. The letter to the Hebrews seems to be mistaken in its teaching on repentance. No one can deny that Jude is only a condensation of II Peter. James is not an apostolic writing, for what does not preach Christ is not apostolic even if Peter and Paul were to teach it: "Was Christum nicht lehret, das ist noch nicht apostolisch, wenn es gleich St. Petrus oder St. Paulus lehrete; widerum, was Christum prediget, das ware apostolisch, wenns gleich Judas, Hannas, Pilatus und Herodes that."¹⁵⁶ Though Luther had grave doubts as to the value of the Apocalypse he did think that it was praiseworthy insofar as it assures us, as a word of the gospel, that Christ will be with us though all the powers of heaven and earth seek to prevent Him: "So allein das Wort des Evangelii bey uns rein bleibet, und wirs liebe und werth habe, so sollen wir nicht zweifeln, Christus sey bey und mit

uns, wenns gleich aufs argste gehet, wie wir hier sehen in diesem Buche, dass Christus durch und uber alle Plagen, Thiere, böse Engel dennoch bey uns mit seinen Heiligen ist und endlich obliegt.¹⁵⁷"

Luther is no modern Biblical scholar, but, on the other hand, his introduction of a new standard of critical discrimination based on the gospel of the Incarnate Word was both objective and dynamic. It was a radical break with the mechanical and brittle exegesis of the medieval theologians and yet avoided the excesses of the rationalistic subjectivism into which some of the humanists had fallen. Luther's interest in the Scriptures, as Scheel has pointed out, was not primarily historical but "Heilsinteressen".¹⁵⁸ This soteriocentric interpretation of the Bible, while it has its limitations and dangers as a theory, is one of Luther's most important contributions to Christian learning. What Luther was so strongly against (and much of the disagreement over his views of Biblical criticism arise from a misunderstanding of this point) was the dependence on human reason and understanding as the sole standards for Scriptural study.¹⁵⁹ This can lead only to perversion and heresy. Real Biblical study must rest on: "Oratio, meditatio, tentatio"--prayer, meditation and spiritual trial. The Holy Spirit working in us--guiding, enlightening and teaching--will bring us to a true understanding of the holy treasures which Scripture contains.¹⁶⁰ The Bible is of immense authority to Luther but that authority does not rest primarily on its historical precedence

nor does it arise from an obsession of Luther to appeal to some kind of external judge. Luther does not, as some have said, substitute the authoritarian Bible for the authoritarian Roman church.¹⁶¹ The Bible is of ultimate authority insofar as it contains the Word of God which presupposes, validates and confirms our deepest experiences of being confronted by the living God. The Word of God is spiritually self-validating in the way that a great work of art is aesthetically self-validating; it cannot be proved in a rational or dogmatic manner but the sensitive mind and soul needs no such "proof". Scriptural authority is of the same ineffable quality as that of the Lord to Whom it bears witness.

For Luther, law and gospel is the essence of the Biblical message just as it is of our spiritual experience. Those portions of Scripture, therefore, which bring out this relationship most clearly are to be prized above the others. The grand theme of the Bible is Christ and His redemptive work. The Psalter, for instance, because it has the main elements of the theme could be considered as a miniature Bible.¹⁶² Or Paul's Epistle to the Romans, with its elaborate exposition of the relation between law and gospel, is to him the best part of the New Testament, which ought to become the daily bread of our souls; it can never be read or meditated on too much or too well.¹⁶³

In his Commentary on Galatians Luther sums up his view of the continuity of God's dealing with men and the unity of the Biblical witness to that unchangeable pattern. It is "Jesus Christ, the same yesterday, today and to all eternity" through Whom all faithful--Jew or Gentile--either have been, or are, or shall be, delivered from the law and justified and saved: "Sic et patribus quotidie in spiritu veniebat, antequam cero tempore semel veniret. Habebant illi in spiritu Christum in quem revelandum, ut nos in iam revelatum, credebant, ac aeque per eum salvati sunt ut nos, Iuxta illud: 'Iesus Christus heri et hodie Idem est et in secula.' Heri, ante tempus sui adventus in carnem; Hodie, cum revelatus est in tempore; Nunc et in secula est idem Christus. Per unum et eundem igitur Iesum Christum liberantur a lege, iustificantur et salvantur omnes credentes praeteriti, praesentes et futuri."

(D) The Law in the Gospel

Luther had developed his teaching on law and gospel against two main parties; these were the Romanists on one side and the Anabaptists on the other. Up to the middle of the 1530's most of his polemical writing on this subject had been directed against these two antagonists. But, says Luther in the preface to Commentarius in Epistolam ad Galatas, though outwardly they appear to be very different they are really very similar in their teaching. They are foxes whose heads are separate but who are tied together by their tails: "Caudis enim sunt coniunctae istae vulpes, sed capitibus diversae." ¹⁶⁵

Both groups hold that the work of God depends upon the worthiness of a man; they depend upon work-righteousness, contrary to grace, instead of turning wholly to Christ, our only righteousness: "Sic et Papistae non cessant urgere usque hodie opera et personae dignitatem contra gratiam et fratres suos Anabaptistas (saltem verbo) fortiter iuvare...Fingunt enim sese foris magnos hostes illorum, cum tamen intus vere idem sentiant, doceant ac defendant contra unicum illum salvatorem Christum qui solus est iustitia nostra." ¹⁶⁶

The Romanists and the Anabaptists, as well as the Jews and Turks (the latter representing all pagan religions), were guilty of legalism and they perverted the whole meaning of the gospel. The emphasis on such things as regulations concerning wearing apparel, dietary restrictions, elaborate moral legislation, which these groups had in common, convinced Luther they were all cut from

the same cloth and it brought down upon them the full force of Luther's often vitriolic criticism.¹⁶⁷

By the time the second edition of the Commentary on Galatians had appeared in 1538 Luther regretfully added a note to his preface recording the appearance of a new sect raised up against him by the devil: "Sed in dies novas suscitatur Satan, Deus ille factiosorum hominum, Et proxime hanc quam minime omnium praevidissem aut sperassem, scilicet eorum qui docent decalogum tollendum ex ecclesia nec homines per legem terrendos, sed per Christi gratiam suaviter monendos esse."¹⁶⁸ Luther is here referring to a group known as the Antinomians, and the leading personality among them, Johann Agricola of Eisleben. Their chief tenet was that the law should be abolished in the Church and that the gospel should be depended upon to accomplish the work of leading men to repentance by preaching to them the mercies of God.¹⁶⁹

Though Luther says that this faction sprang up most unexpectedly and where he would have least foreseen it, in some ways it is surprising that it did not arise earlier. His statements regarding the ending of the law through the coming of Christ were often apparently unqualified; in the Galatian Commentary of 1531 Luther said: "Si est (Christ) victoria, so ghet das lex hin weg,"¹⁷⁰ or in the Commentary of 1535: "Quare Christianus proprie definitus est liber ab omnibus legibus et nulli prorsus nec intus nec foris subiectus."¹⁷¹ It would seem almost

inevitable that some should interpret this to mean that the law was of no use whatsoever and that it should be put "on the gallow": "aus an galgen mit Mose und dem Gesetze, wie
jetzt die Gesetzstürmer auch lestern."¹⁷² Roman Catholic critics, among others, have not spared themselves to point out that Luther was showing his typical duplicity and lack of logical consistency when he so sharply repudiated Agricola and the Antinomians, who "merely carried certain theses of Luther's to their logical conclusion," and whose contentions were¹⁷³ "largely his own, formulated anew."

But is such a criticism, in fact, just? Did the Antinomians really only develop and enlarge Luther's own principles, which he was then forced to repudiate when they were shown in their true light? If so, then much of Luther's earlier writings would have to be discounted and his doctrine of law and gospel in particular would have to be radically revised. In fact, such a conviction would be an extremely damaging one to the whole foundation of his theology. Luther himself was in no doubt as to the fact that Agricola and the Antinomians were misrepresenting his teaching. He was not long in taking up the gauntlet against them, attacking them with as much vigor as he showed against his other opponents. He termed Agricola a slanderer and a second Judas, whose doctrine was subverting both the law and the gospel; eventually he succeeded in forcing Agricola's resignation from the Wittenberg University

faculty when he persisted in his teaching.¹⁷⁴ Luther's vindictiveness and the bellicose spirit with which he carried on the dispute are deserving of censure, though it should be added that this was characteristic of the debates of that day and which, in his case, was aggravated by the ill-health of his later years and the heavy load of responsibility which his ever increasing prominence placed upon him. But whatever the virtues of the spirit in which the contestants waged the battle, the controversy does give an excellent opportunity to see to what extent Luther remained true to his original teaching on law and gospel in his later years and in the face of the only other main criticism which could be brought against the doctrine when the legalists had had their say.

There is no need to go into the full details of the Antinomian controversy nor into Luther's personal dealings with Agricola, both of which are excellently described by Mackinnon in "Conflict with the Antinomians" of his work on Luther, as well as by other biographers.¹⁷⁵ As to the exact nature of Agricola's teachings, one is limited by the fact that Luther has somewhat exaggerated it in his discussions and on the other hand, it was not freely divulged by Agricola himself who was in constant fear of retribution.¹⁷⁶ Since our interest is primarily in Luther's teaching, it is sufficient to know the general outlines of the Antinomian position and the arguments which Luther used to refute those views and establish his own distinctive position.

Luther first showed his hand against the Antinomians in a sermon on the Fifth Sunday after Trinity, July 1, 1537¹⁷⁷ followed by another in the Eighteenth Sunday after Trinity, September 30, 1537¹⁷⁸. In both of these Luther gives only a general warning against the reported views of the group. By the beginning of December, however, Luther's suspicions were so aroused that he published a set of Theses against the Antinomians and held a disputation on them. Agricola's failure to appear at the disputation further annoyed Luther, who as Dean of the Divinity Faculty, suspended Agricola's right to lecture there. Luther soon published another set of Theses and the disputation was held on January 12, 1538. There was a brief reconciliation between Luther and Agricola but it was soon broken; another set of Theses was drawn up and the disputation held on September 6, 1538¹⁷⁹. An examination of the Theses and disputations shows that two main questions were raised: the first, on the relation of law to repentance and the second, on the relation of law to the sanctified life. These were the central issues around which the controversy revolved.

1. The first and second sets of Theses deal with the relative place of law and gospel in the work of repentance. Agricola's view apparently was that repentance is not to be brought through the law but through the teaching of the gospel; accordingly, he stressed the need of a doctrine which not only condemns but also at the same time saves: "Opus est autem doc-

trina, quae magna efficacia non tantum damnat, sed et salvat simul. Ea autem est Evangelium, quae coniunctim docet poenitentiam et remissionem peccatorum.¹⁸⁰" Against this view Luther brings forward his familiar argument that a man must be convicted of his sin by the law before he is ready to receive the gospel: "Poenitentiae priors pars, scilicet dolor, est ex lege tantum. Altera pars, scilicet propositum bonum, non potest ex lege esse...Ideo addenda est legi promissio seu Evangelion quae conscientiam territam pacet et erigat, ut bonum proponat."¹⁸¹

In Wider die Antinomer (1539) Luther also deals with this problem. He says that no one can know what sin is without the law. And if one does not know what law or sin are, how can one understand Christ, Who came to fulfil the law and to make satisfaction for sin?: "Wo her weis man aber, was sunde sey, wo das Gesetz und gewissen nicht ist? Und wo wil man lernen, was Christus sey (welchs er fur uns erfullet), oder was sunde sunde sey, da fur er gnug gethan hat?"¹⁸² Furthermore, he says that law is still law even if it comes through a contemplation of Christ's costly fulfilment of the law; that which convicts me of sin is law, no matter by what name it is called: "Darumb mus doch das Gesetze gepredigt werden, wo man Christum predigen wil, ob man gleich das wort Gesetz nicht nennen wolt, Damit wird gleichwol das gewissen erschreckt durchs Gesetze, wenn die predigt sagt, das Christus das Gesetz fur uns hat so¹⁸³ theur erfullen müssen."

In Theses ten to twenty of the first disputation, Luther attacks the Scholastic theologians who think that the first part of repentance is enough; these pretentious Sophists remain under the law because they do not see the real depth of its demand and therefore they feel no need of the gospel. The Antinomians, on the other hand, do not understand that the law must precede the gospel. We are first sinners by nature, therefore the law must come first: "Ordo rei est, quod mors et peccatum est in natura ante vitam et iustitiam...Quare prior docendus est Adam (id est, peccatum et mors) qui forma est futuri Christi postea docendi." And only the law can reveal sin and death: "Peccatum vero et mors non per verbum gratiae et solatii, sed per legem necesse est ostendi."

Luther's main criticism against the Antinomians is that they have failed to distinguish between law and gospel, giving each its proper function. It is significant that he should draw the Scholastics into the discussion to emphasize the middle position he was occupying. While the Romanists err on one side, the Antinomians have erred on the other; they have both committed the same fundamental error of treating the law and the gospel as though each could stand alone permanently. As he sums up his case in the disputation: "Lex et Evangelium non possunt nec debent separari, sicut nec poenitentia et remissio peccatorum. Ita enim sunt inter se colligata et implicita." As one can see, Luther is simply re-

affirming his basic theological doctrine of the distinction between law and gospel. This new attack, while it required Luther to restate his views with a slightly different emphasis to meet the arguments of his opponents, has not caused a deviation but rather a deepening of his basic premises.

2. The second main question which was raised was that of the relative places of law and gospel in the sanctified life. Agricola and the other Antinomians are not to be credited with the immorality or libertinism which their name might suggest; the fears of Luther and Melanchthon on this point seem to have¹⁸⁸ been largely misplaced. Agricola did, nevertheless, believe that men do not need the teaching of the law for the beginning, the middle or the end of justification, and that the gospel is¹⁸⁹ a sufficient doctrine for the whole of the Christian life. In the second set of Theses Luther agrees that the law is not intended to give life but to reveal sin and work wrath: "Ita lex non est lata, ut per eam iusti fieremus...Summa, quantum coelum a terra distat, tantum debet lex a iustificatione separari."¹⁹⁰ Justification is purely a work of the gospel: "Et nihil docendum, dicendum, cogitandum in re iustificationis, nisi solum verbum gratiae in Christo exhibitae."¹⁹¹

It does not follow from this, however, that the law is to be abolished: "Ex his autem non sequitur, legem esse abolendam, et concionibus Ecclesiae tollendam."¹⁹² In the following three sets of Theses Luther develops his reasons for this belief. He repeats his long held opinion that sin lives in the flesh of a

justified man throughout his life: "Toto enim tempore vitae
durat peccatum in carne nostra, et adversatur spiritui sibi
adversario."¹⁹³ According to him, the three things--law, sin and
death--are inseparable: "Haec tria, lex, peccatum, mors sunt
inseparabilia."¹⁹⁴ It is true that in Christ the law is ful-
filled, sin is done away with and death is destroyed: "In
Christo quidem lex impleta est, peccatum deletum, mors destru-
cta est."¹⁹⁵ But the fact of the matter is (and this is the cen-
ter of his argument) that we are not yet entirely "in Christ";
insofar as we are not, we are still under the dominion of law,
sin and death: "Quatenus Christus in nobis suscitatus, eatenus
sumus sub lege, peccato et morte...Quatenus vero nondum est in
suscitatus, eatenus sumus sub lege, peccato et morte."¹⁹⁶ The
fact of the existence of death proves that law and sin, which
are inseparable from it, are also still effective, even though
Christ has released us from them.¹⁹⁷ This is the paradox of our
human existence which the oversimplified anthropology of the
Antinomians fails to do justice. The law is, therefore, to be
taught generally ("promiscue") to both the pious and impious:
to the impious that they may be humbled by the preaching of
God's wrath and to the pious as an admonition for the cruci-
fixion of the flesh: "Impiis, ut territi agnoscant suum pecca-
tum, mortem et inevitabilem iram Dei, per quam humiliantur...
Piis, ut admoneantur, carnem suam crucifigere cum concupiscen-
tiis et vitiis, ne securi fiant."¹⁹⁸

It has been said that Luther, in reaction against the views of the Antinomians, lapsed into a subtle kind of legalism and, as a result of the controversy, repudiated, or at least radically revised, some of his most distinctive views on the release of Christians from the tyranny of the law. It is undoubtedly true that Luther stressed the admonishing and exhorting work of the law in the sanctified life more than usual during the dispute. He also spoke more of the fulfilment of the law by the penitential life and good works of the believer than he generally did: "Summa: Lex non est utilis nec necessaria neque ad iustificationem, neque ad ulla opera bona, multo minus ad salutem...Sed econtra iustificatio, bona opera et sal-¹⁹⁹us sunt necessaria ad legis impletionem." He even goes so far as to say that the law is before, under and after the gospel.²⁰⁰

This does not necessarily prove, as some of the statements made by Luther during the controversy quoted out of their context might seem to, that he has radically revised some of his basic assumptions on the relation of law and gospel to the sanctified life. In his Vorrede auf das Alte Testament (1522) Luther says that laws and commandments are given in the New Testament to rule the flesh, for the spirit is not perfected in this life: "im Neuen Testament...Gesetz und Gebot sind, das Fleisch zu regieren, sintemal in diesem Leben der Geist nicht²⁰¹vollkommen, noch eitel Gnade regieren kann." Or in his discussion of Baptism, as we have seen in his sacramental theory, he affirms that we, re-born as new men, once and for all, must also

be re-baptized each day, as the new man is strengthened and the old man in us is subdued; as he says in Der grosse Katechismus (1529): "Also sihet man wie ein hoch trefflich ding es ist umb die Tauffe, so uns den Teuffel aus dem hals reisset, Gott zu eigen macht, die sund dempfft und weg nympt, darnach teglich den newen menschen stercket...Wie nu ein mal ynn der Tauffe, vergebunge der sunden uber komen ist, so bleibt sie noch teglich so lang wir leben, das ist, den alten menschen am hals tragen."²⁰²

The basic premise on which these statements, sometimes appearing contradictory when set against one another in isolation, are founded is that a Christian is not a unified man but rather a split personality. This is not to be interpreted in terms of modern psychology but in the religious context in which Luther placed it. As such it forms the fundamental premise upon which Luther's anthropology was developed and to which he remained true from the beginning of his theological career as a reformer to its end. Luther expresses it by saying that a Christian man is simultaneously just and sinful: "simul iustus et peccat!"²⁰³ He expounded this doctrine in his Römerbriefvorlesung (1515-16), developed it in such writings as Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen²⁰⁴ (1520), and reaffirmed it in In epistolam S. Pauli ad Galatas Commentarius (1535): "Sic homo Christianus simul iustus et peccator, Sanctus, prophanus, inimicus et filius Dei est."²⁰⁵ Luther's thought becomes peculiarly enigmatic unless these fundamental paradoxes (or "contraria")

as Luther terms them) are recognized and fully taken into consideration in interpreting specific parts of his teaching.²⁰⁶

The Christian man is freed from law, sin and death through Christ. On the other hand, while he remains in this life he is in part dominated by all three. This is not to be considered in a chronological order, nor as a state of fluctuation from one status to the other, nor as "another" man within us for whom we might claim not to be entirely responsible. It is one and the same man who serves the law of God and the law of sin: "unus et idem homo simul servit legi Dei et legi peccati."²⁰⁷ When, therefore, Luther speaks of a time to hear the law and a time to ignore it: "est tempus legem audiendi, est tempus legem contemnendi",²⁰⁸ he is at the same time saying that a Christian is himself living in two "times": "Ideo Christianus est divisus in 2 tempora: quatenus caro, est sub lege; quatenus spiritus, est sub Euangelio."²⁰⁹ Such a "resolution" of the problem of the sanctified life may seem to pose an even more profound difficulty, as any one who introspectively seeks to distinguish the "old" from the "new" man within soon discovers.

Luther recognized the difficulty of applying his "solution" to the practical problems of the sanctified life and he explicated his definition "simul iustus et peccator" in two ways. In the first place, the relation of the Christian to the law has changed and is changing. Even under the pressure of the Anti-

nomian controversy Luther recognized this; the work of the law in the sanctified life has to do with the flesh: "carnem suam crucifigere", and even here it is only intended to admonish ("admoneantur") or exhort, not to damn: "Non sic docenda est lex piis, ut arguat, damnet, sed ut hortetur ad bonum."²¹⁰ The law working in such a way is really the law in name only. This new relation of the Christian to the law has been described by Th. Harnack as the change from the "Gesetz des Herzens" to the "Herz des Gesetzes".²¹¹ It might be considered as analogous to the angels, who out of free love, naturally do that which the law requires without any sort of compulsion or force, though in the case of a Christian man this free obedience is hindered by the remnants of sin clinging to the flesh.²¹²

Luther draws his most elaborate analogy for the relation of a Christian to the law from the example of Adam and his relationship to the law and gospel in paradise. Luther's fullest treatment of this is in Vorlesungen über 1. Mose (1535-45). In it he says that the Word of God which came to Adam before the Fall was both law and gospel to him: "Hoc verbum erat Adae Evangelium et lex, erat eius cultus, erat servitus et obedientia, quam poterat Deo in ista innocentia praestare."²¹³ Luther calls this kind of commandment a "praeceptum" or a "mandatum", which can only come to an innocent creature like Gabriel when he was told to inform Daniel of certain things or to announce to Mary that she was to become the mother of Christ: "Haec sunt vere praecepta, quae innocenti naturae proposita sunt."²¹⁴ There is

no doubt, therefore, says Luther, that the "law" given to Adam must be a very different one from that which was given to the unrighteous: "Nihil enim aliud inde sequitur, quam legem, quae iniustus est posita, eam legem non esse positam iusto Adae. Cum autem Adae iusto posita lex sit, sequitur, eam esse aliam legem, quam quae posthac iniustus est posita."²¹⁵ Two things must be made very clear; the first is that the law before sin is far different from the law after sin, and second, a righteous man before sin and a righteous man after sin are not righteous in quite the same way: "Prima, in eo, quod aliud est lex ante peccatum, et aliud post peccatum, Secunda, quod iustus quoque non eodem modo dicitur post peccatum, et ante peccatum."²¹⁶ Because we Christians never become pure and innocent creatures like Adam or Gabriel, therefore the Word of God cannot come to us as a "mandatum" or "praeceptum" which combines both law and gospel. Nevertheless, through Christ our redemption and re-creation has begun and part of that re-creation is the gradual restoring of the relation between us and the Word which existed between it and Adam before the Fall: "Deum Adae verbum, cultum et religionem dedisse nudissimam, purissimam et simplicissimam, in qua nihil laboriosum, nihil sumptuosum fuit...Huius cultus reliquias habemus aliquomodo per Christum restitutas in hac carnis nostrae infirmitate, quod nos quoque laudamus Deum, et gratias ei agimus de omni benedictione spirituali et corporali."²¹⁷

In the second place, Luther explicates his understanding of the relation between law and gospel in the sanctified life

by pointing out how Christ brings an end to the reign of law in the Christian life. Our release from the law through the gospel is to be seen in two stages. First, Christ came in the flesh to set us free from the law in the appointed time, a deed once and for all accomplished; second he comes to us daily in the Spirit to complete the abrogation of the law: "Tempus autem legis dupliciter finitur: Primum, per adventum Christi in carnem tempore a Patre praefinito... Deinde ille idem Christus qui semel in tempore venit, quotidie et singulis horis ad nos in spiritu venit... Ideo quotidie venit spiritualiter et indies magis magisque absolvit tempus praefinitum a patre, abrogat et tollit legem."²¹⁸

Just as he was unwilling to admit that the law, as we now know it, guided Adam's life in paradise before sin, so Luther is equally unwilling to admit that the law has a positive place in the sanctified life, the "New Creation". When he summarizes his case against the Antinomians in Von den Konziliis und Kirchen he bases his criticism, not on the fact that they have ignored the place of the law in the sanctified life, but that they have failed to understand the working of the Holy Spirit in creating the new life. The Antinomians are fine "Easter" preachers, but poor "Pentecost" preachers; they only preach of the deliverance through Christ and forget to preach of "de sanctificatione & vivificatione Spiritus sancti".²¹⁹

Christ has not only gained for us grace but also the gift of the

Holy Spirit through Whom sins are ended: "Denn Christus hat uns nicht allein 'gratiam', die gnade, sondern auch 'donum', die gabe des Heiligen geists verdienet, das wir nicht allein vergebung der sunden, sondern auch auffhoren von den sunden²²⁰ hetten." It is not the law, or even a "new law", therefore,

which is the center of Luther's teaching on sanctification.

As before the dispute, so now after the Antinomian controversy Luther affirms that it is the Holy Spirit Who is to re-create, vivify and rule the new life in Christ. In doing so the Holy Spirit is restoring the unity of law and gospel, and healing the tragic split in a Christian "simul iustus et peccator", until all again becomes one in the New Day.

The controversy with the Antinomians is really the concluding episode in the development of the conception of law and gospel in the theology of Luther. It is a very revealing episode in more than one way. In the first place, it establishes the distinctive nature of Luther's teaching, setting it off from both legalism and antinomianism.²²¹ Stange has made the acute observation that the Romanists and the Antinomians, widely divergent as their views appear superficially, were both making the same kind of mistake; they both tended to identify religion and morality so that for the Romanists religion was simply the fulfilment of the law, while for the Antinomians it was simply freedom from the law.²²² Luther's case against both parties was on the basis of the "and". His opponents were trying to decide whether it should be law or gospel; for Luther

the correct formulation was always law and gospel. Those who seek to abolish the "and" are attempting to harmonize a dualism between law and gospel which for Luther can only be resolved through the work of the Holy Spirit now in this life and completed eschatologically by the direct intervention of God at the New Day.

In the second place, the Antinomian controversy reveals the fallacy of the ideas that Luther is no systematic theologian and that there is a lack of consistency between his early and later theology. Throughout the controversy and afterwards Luther continued to reiterate the basic principles of the relation between law and gospel which he had already laid down in some of his earliest Reformation writings and which he had elaborated and expounded with such force and clarity in others of his works, especially his great Galatian commentaries. A study of the treatment of law and gospel by Luther in the Antinomian dispute substantiates the view of Seeberg, who has collected ample evidence in his Studien zu Luthers Genesisvorlesung, that Luther remained faithful to the great theological conceptions of his youth in his last large Biblical commentary of 1535 to 1545.²²³ It is a remarkable testimony to the integrity and consistency of Luther's thought that the many years of fierce theological warfare should not have shaken, but rather deepened and sharpened, his fundamental views on the relation between law and gospel.

N O T E S

Section I: 101 - 137.

Section II: 138 - 188.

Notes

1. George S. Hendry, God the Creator: The Hastie Lectures in the University of Glasgow, 1935 (London, 1937). The lectures are not specifically on Luther's theology, but large use is made of Luther's writings and one part of his theology is discussed in some detail.
2. Philip S. Watson, Let God Be God! An Interpretation of the Theology of Martin Luther: (London, 1947). This is a discussion of Luther's whole theological thought in systematic form. A note of introduction says that the book is "the first of its kind in English", indicating how recent this development is.
3. Brian Lunn, Martin Luther: The Man and His God (London, 1934). A biography intended for popular consumption, it nevertheless shows a real acquaintance with the source materials and an understanding of some of the theological issues involved.
4. Watson, Let God Be God, introd.
5. "The defects of his education and the limitations of his learning made him ill-equipped for the task of proclaiming a new theology." Sykes, Crisis of the Reformation, 39-40. "Luther was singularly untouched by the intellectual currents of his day. The impulses which controlled him were never those of the scholar, the scientist, or the philosopher. He cared little for clearness and consistency of thought...he had mental gifts of a very high order, but his genius was wholly practical. He was pre-eminently a religious genius...His confidence in the Catholic system was absolute, and his acceptance of its tenets complete, until he was shaken out of it by practical considerations which had nothing to do with theology...Under these circumstances it is a mistake to think of him as a theologian and of his work as a reformation of theology." McGiffert, Protestant Thought Before Kant, 20-1. McGiffert goes on to discuss Luther's teaching on grace, salvation, Christian liberty, predestination, faith, the Church as a sacramental institution, etc. as though these were not to be included in the realm of theology!
6. Cave, Person of Christ, 148. Cited by Watson, Let God Be God, 4.
7. Hughes, History of the Church III, 508. The general tone of his analysis of Luther is indicated by the following statement: "Luther as a Christian force was to prove sterile; there would not follow upon his activities any betterment of the moral lives of his disciples, any advance in learning, any new peace through social renewal." Ibid. 499. The work is the newest Roman Catholic church history and is not yet completed; his views reflect

all too well the general Roman interpretation of Luther. For a criticism of his treatment of Luther see Times Literary Supplement, July 5, 1947.

8. Watson's first chapter: "Luther as a Theologian" deals with this. He points out the mistake of thinking of Luther's reformation of theology as a destruction of theology as a result of an ignorance as to the real meaning of the discipline.
9. For his work as lecturer at Erfurt: Mackinnon, Luther and the Reformation I, 131ff. He tells how the discovery of some of the books which Luther used and annotated for his lectures has thrown new light on his wide reading and shows his careful preparation for his teaching. Scheel has made a careful study of Luther's acquaintance with Aristotelian thought, the Scholastics, Stoicism, etc.: Martin Luther I, 120-229. Smith says that Luther later regretted that he had spent so much time reading scholastic theology to the exclusion of poetry: Martin Luther, 6; this study was chiefly in the "Modernists" though his lack of intimate knowledge of Aquinas and the "high" Scholastics seems to have been mainly due to the general lack of interest in their writings in his day: Loofs, Dogmengeschichte, 690. Of his theological studies Lindsay says: "His aptness for study, his vigour and precision in debate, his acumen, excited the admiration of his teachers." Cambridge Modern History II, 114. For his earlier studies: Ibid. 110f. Boehmer, Luther and the Reformation in the Light of Modern Research refutes the Roman Catholic disparagements of Luther's learning: 34-6, 159ff., 163f. Smith says that Luther's lectures show "extreme thoroughness" for which German scholarship is still renowned; "He criticized his authors and with such acumen that two words attributed to Augustine, the genuineness of which he first disputed, have been proved by modern criticism to be spurious." Martin Luther, 22.

Luther himself gave evidence that he had considerable confidence in his understanding of Scholastic theology; in Operationes in Psalmos (1519-21) he says: "Scio, quid mihi fecerit scholastica Theologica; Scio rursum, quid ei debeam, guadeo me erutum, et gratias ago Christo domino meo. Non est, quod me doceant eam, novi eam, nec quod concilient mihi eam, nolo eam." W. A. V, 22. In An den christlichen Adel deutscher Nation von der christlichen Standes Besserung (1520), Luther claims a better knowledge of Aristotle than the scholastic theologians; an exaggerated statement no doubt but one that indicates that Luther was not entirely unfamiliar with this field of studies and that he felt he was sufficiently competent in them to suggest certain reforms of the curriculum in the schools. He furthermore says he will prove his competence if necessary! "wo es nocht ist, wol beweyssen kan...Darff mir niemant aufflege, ich rede zuviel odder vorwirff das ich nit wisse. Lieber freund ich weyss wol was ich rede; Aristoteles

ist mir so wol bekant, als dir, und deynis gleychen, ich hab yhn auch gelessen unnd gehoret, mit mehrem vorstand, dan sanct Thomas odder Scotus, des ich mich on hoffart rumen, und wo es nodt ist, etc." Among his suggestions for reform of the curriculum was that Aristotle's Physics, Metaphysics, the Soul, and Ethics should be abolished and his Logic, Rhetoric and Poetry should be retained: "Hie were nu mein rad, das die bucher Aristoteles, Phisicorum, Metaphysice, de Anima, Ethicorum, wilchs bisher die besten gehalten, gantz wurden abthan...Das mocht ich gerne leyden, das Aristoteles bucher von der Logica, Rhetorica, Poetica, behalten." B. A. I, 412-3 (W. A. VI, 457-8). In a note appended to his Vorrede auf das Alte Testament in 1523 Luther says that those who criticize his translation of the Bible ought to try it themselves and then see what they think! "Ich habe es von Anfang wohl bedacht, dass ich ehe zehen tausend finden wollte, die meine Arbeit tadeln, ehe ich einen funde, der mir das zwanzigste Theil nachthate...Ist nun jemand so fast uber mich gelehrt, der nehme ihm die Bibel gantz vor zu verdeutschen und sage mir darnach wieder was er kann...Ich meynete auch, ich ware gelehrt, und weiss mich auch gelehrter, denn aller hohen Schulen Sophisten, von Gottes Gnaden." H. A. X, 18.

10. When, for instance, Luther posted his famous Ninety-five Theses on the door of the Castle Church of Wittenberg he was not just a simple monk defying the Roman hierarchy. He was following the usual academic procedure by which a doctor of theology offered to hold a disputation on a certain subject as set forth in a number of theses, in this case on the indulgence traffic: "The theses were posted on the door of the Castle Church in Wittenberg on 31 October 1517. This was the usual procedure for giving notice of such disputations, which were a regular feature of University life, and there was nothing dramatic in the action." Bettenson, Documents of the Christian Church, 260. Lindsay, however, holds that Luther "approached the whole question not from the side of theological theory but from its practical moral effect on the minds of the common people...Luther's Theses, in their lack of precise theological definition and of logical arrangement, are singularly unlike what might have been expected from a professional theologian." Cambridge Modern History II, 129. Luther himself admitted the manifest limitations of the Theses, but his own criticism is mainly that he did not go far enough in them to reject the tyranny of the papacy: W. A. VI, 497 (De captivitate Babylonica ecclesiae praeludium, 1520). He may have been influenced to propose the disputation because of certain practical abuses of the Indulgence sellers but the Theses themselves are a heavy blow at the whole Roman Catholic view of the doctrine of repentance. Köstlin points out that the Theses were produced at a time when Luther was evidently seeking some kind of theological justification for the indul-

gences, as revealed in his sermons and lectures at that period. Also, in his defense of the Theses: Resolutiones disputationum de indulgentiarum virtute (1518), W. A. I, 525ff., Luther makes an extensive theological statement of the reasons for his opposition "which involves, at the same time, a statement of the entire doctrine of salvation." Köstlin, Theology of Luther I, 218. Lindsay has recognized the importance of the Resolutiones but he does not seem to recognize that they might refute his view that Luther's interest in the indulgences was only a practical moral concern: "The book, Resolutiones, was probably the most carefully prepared of all Luther's writings. It was meditated over long and rewritten several times." Cambridge Modern History II, 131. Mackinnon says that the Theses were the outcome of indignation against both practical abuses and theological aberrations: Luther and the Reformation I, 294ff; "The doctrine of justification by faith is assumed in the theses and finds explicit expression in the "Resolutions". It is at the bottom of his antagonism to the crass conception of such an ecclesiastical expedient as the papal indulgence." *Ibid.* 304.

Even were the Indulgence Theses to be considered as purely a practical protest, it is interesting to note that Luther published a disputation against Scholastic theology, Disputatio contra scholasticam theologiam, W. A. I, 221ff., at about the same time--September 4, 1517. Andreen, in a brief study entitled Martin Luther, Humanist, holds that this factor has been overlooked by most scholars, indicating a general neglect of the scholarly and humanistic phase of the Reformation: "The Reformation cannot be adequately understood or studied unless these two factors are presented. The movement must be approached not only from the angle of the Ninety-five Theses against Indulgences, but also from the angle of the Ninety-five Theses against Scholasticism." *Ibid.* 18ff. Andreen quotes Smith's observation: "Every one is familiar with the Ninety-five Theses against indulgences...yet Luther, who did not think the theses on indulgences worth publishing, printed this protest against Aristotle and his followers, and sent it around to numerous friends for opinions." Martin Luther, 25. Mackinnon, on the other hand, says that Luther did not print the Ninety-five Theses: "in order, if possible, to avoid scandal." Luther and the Reformation I, 303. The whole question as to which set of Theses is to be considered more important becomes irrelevant when it is seen that both Theses originate from the same theological presuppositions and both sets reveal Luther's strong theological approach to the problems confronting the church. The Ninety-five Theses interpreted in the light of the Resolutiones show by themselves that: "it was no longer a mere dispute as to indulgences and their abuse; obscure, and almost alone, he had challenged the whole Papal system." Beard, Martin Luther, 230ff. Before the Resolutiones

were published the Heidelberg Disputation was held (W. A. I, 353ff.) and in it there is "no mention of indulgences . . . he seems to regard that controversy as a quite unimportant thing compared with the 'Theology of the Cross', . . . The Lutheran doctrine of salvation could not be more vividly stated than in these theses." Beard, Martin Luther, 227-8. That Luther's differences with the Roman system were primarily of a theological and doctrinal nature is a thesis which would be difficult to refute. This emphasis he maintained: "Quare non tam in sceleratam vitam Papistarum intendere oculos debemus, quam in impiam ipsorum doctrinam et hypocrisin, quam et praecipue impugnamus." W. A. XL, 1, 686 (1535).

11. "Ne tu rationem, sed Scripturam in hac re observes, et votum a priori, non a posteriori rescindas, hoc est, ut legem voti et ritum ejus confutes." De Wette, Briefe II, 45 (Sept. 9, 1521).
12. "Methodus tua non stulte dicit, votorum servitutem alienam esse ab Evangelio, et adversariam servituti spiritus." Ibid.
13. W. A. VIII, 600-1. K stlin, Theology of Luther I, 450-1. Mackinnon, Luther and the Reformation II, 23.
14. "Si autem animo libero et evangelico voveris, sponteque te servum feceris: justum est, ut serves et solvas; quanquam non asseram evangelicum animum hoc aliquando ausurum, aut ausum fuisse, nisi deceptum." De Wette, Briefe II, 48. De votis monasticis iudicium (1521) is Luther's full treatment of the problem: W. A. VIII, 573ff. His first point is that the vow is contrary to the Word of God: Ibid. 578; next, that it is contrary to faith: Ibid. 591; contrary to evangelical liberty: "Vota Adversari Libertati Evangelicae" Ibid. 605, etc. The contrast between law and gospel is one of the prominent ideas brought out in the work: "Christi opera nobis facta sunt libere et gratis. Verum tunc amplius non sunt opera legis, sed Christi in nobis per fidem operantis et viventis per omnia; ideo non possunt magis omitti quam ipsa fides, nec sunt minus necessaria quam fides. Caeterum opera, quae vere sunt opera legis, ficta et falsa sunt . . . Officium legis est, non exigere nostra opera, sed ostendere peccatum et impossibilitatem nostram. Per legem enim cognitio peccati." Ibid. 608-9. 653ff. "opus legis et iustitiam factorum operarentur, quod est maxime adversarium Evangelio." Ibid. 655.
15. "Diese Abneigung Luthers gegen die Begriffe 'facere', 'operari', und 'necessarium esse ad salutem' h ngt zusammen mit seiner Furcht davor, das der fundamentale Unterschied zwischen dem Evangelium und dem Gesetz durch sie verdunkelt werden k nnte." Loofs, Dogmengeschichte, 770.

16. Harnack, History of Dogma VII, 204.
17. Grisar, Luther V, 7ff.
18. It is his contention that Calvin gives greater emphasis to Christ's office of interpreting the law than does Luther: "In diesem theologischen System hat der Satz allerdings keinen Raum, dass die Gesetzespredigt nur das 'fremde Werk' Christi sei. Hier gehört es vielmehr zu den eigentlichen Amt Jesu Christ und damit zu seinem Wesen als Erlöser, dass er der authentische Ausleger des göttlichen Gesetzes ist." Sasse, Was heisst lutherisch?, 128. For the main differences between the Lutheran and Reformed view of law and gospel: Ibid. 118ff. He says that there are many similarities but seems to think that the differences are more important: "Der Unterschied besteht darin, dass die Reformierten meinen, beides, die Predigt des Gesetzes und die Predigt des Evangeliums, gehöre zu dem eigentlichen Werk Christi und beides gehöre daher zu den wesensmässigen Funktionen der Kirche, während die lutherische Kirche lehrt: die Predigt des Gesetzes ist das 'fremde', die Predigt des Evangeliums das eigentliche Werk Christi." Ibid. 128-9. This may seem like a small difference, says Sasse, "Aber die Nähe ist nur eine scheinbare." One place where this is reflected is in the conception of the Church; which both communions hold to be a "congregatio sanctorum", but in which the Calvinists lay greater emphasis on obedience than do the Lutherans: "Das Evangelium fordert Glauben, das Gesetz Gehorsam. Die Gemeinde, die aus der Predigt des Wortes erwächst, die 'congregatio sanctorum', ist nach lutherischer Lehre Gemeinde der Glaubenden, nach reformierter Lehre Gemeinde der Glaubenden und Gehorchenden." Ibid. 139. Schlink, Gesetz und Evangelium.
19. W. A. VII, 20ff. The work was originally written in Latin for presentation to the Pope: Tractatus de Libertate Christiana, W. A. VII, 49ff., but Luther's free German translation in a more concise form was meant for general circulation among the people. The text as found in Clemen's edition, B. A. II, 1ff., is used herein. Mackinnon calls the tract a "magnificent delineation of Christianity." Luther and the Reformation II, 270. Lindsay says that it contains the principles which underlie the other two great treatises of 1520: Cambridge Modern History II, 136. Kötlin believes that it represents the views which Luther continued to maintain regarding external works throughout his life: Theology of Luther I, 410-19.
20. W. A. XVIII, 597ff.
21. W. A. XXX, 1, 129ff. When it was suggested that a collection be made of his writings, Luther said that only De servo arbitrio and the Catechisms were worth saving. De Wette, Briefe V, 70 (July 9, 1537). Mackinnon, Luther and the Reformation IV, 318.

22. W. A. XL, 1 & 2.
23. B. A. II, 13-4 (W. A. VII, 23-4). "Ma muss nit eynerley allein pdigen, sondern alle beyde wort gottis, Die gepot, sol ma predigen, die sunder zurschrecken un yhr sund zu offenbarnn, das sie rewe haben und sich bekeren. Ader da soll es nit bleyben, ma muss, das ander wort, Die zusagug der gnaden auch predigen, den glauben zu leren, on wilchenn die gepott rew und allis ander vorgebenss geschicht." B. A. II, 23-4.
24. W. A. XVIII, 680.
25. Ibid. 680, 683.
26. Ibid. 756ff.
27. Ibid. 766.
28. Cambridge Modern History II, 105.
29. W. A. XXX, 1, 178.
30. Ibid. 182.
31. Ibid. 193.
32. Ibid. 182.
33. Grisar, in criticism of Luther's view, says: "Luther refuses to admit what all people naturally believe, viz. that if God gives commandments man must be able either to obey or to disobey, and thus incur guilt." Luther II, 271f. Luther believes that the Decalogue is impossible to fulfil because its demand, as reduced to the two-fold summary of the law--love God and love one's neighbor, is really the demand for perfection: "Die erste und rechte Tafell Mosi begreyft die ersten drey gepott, yn wilchen der mensch geleret wirt, was er gott soll un schuldig ist zu thun unnd lassen, das ist, wie er such gegen gott halten soll...Die andere un lincke Tafell Mosi helt ynne die sieben folgende gepott, ynn wilchen der mensch geleret wirt was er den menschen und seynem nehesten schuldig ist zu lassen und thun." W. A. VII, 205-6 (Eine kurze Form der zehn Gebote, etc. 1520). This is a forerunner of the later Catechisms: Troeltsch, Gesammelte Schriften I, 498f. The inclusive nature of the commandments according to Luther is indicated by his summary of each one: "Da gehort her, alles...Da gehort her, alles...etc." W. A. VII, 212-3. "Sso sihstu das in den tzeihen gepotten gar ordenlich und kurtzlich begriffen seyn alle lere, die dem menschlichen leben nott sein." Ibid. 214.
34. K stlin, Theology of Luther II, 210.

35. "wie eine bine das hönig aus mancherley schönen lustigen blümlin zu samen zeucht, also ist dis Symbolum...aus der gantzen Schrifft fein kurtz gefasset für die kinder und einfeltiget Christen." W. A. XLI, 275.
36. W. A. XI, 48, 54.
37. Meyer, Hist. Komm. zu Luthers Kleiner Katechismus, 260-1.
38. W. A. XXX, 1, 192.
39. Ibid. In one of the "primitive" Catechisms Luther uses the analogy of sickness to describe the functions of each part: "Gleych als eynem krancken ist zu ersten nott, das er wisse, was seyn kranckeyt ist...Also leren die gepott den menschen seyn kranckeyt erkennen, das er siht und empfindet, was er thun und nit thun, lassen und nit lassen kan, un erkennet sich synen sunder und bossen mensche. Darnach helt yhm d' glaub fur un leret yhn, wo er die ertzney die gnaden finden soll, die yhm helff frum werden, das er die gepott halte; und zeygt yhm, gott, und seyne barmhertzikeit ynn Christo ertzeygt, und angepotten, und angepotten." W. A. VII, 204f.
40. Kostlin-Kawerau, Martin Luther II, 300f.
41. W. A. XL, 1, 207.
42. Ibid. 209. "Ideo nox sic semper repetimus, urgemus et inculcamus hunc locum de fide seu Christiana iustitia, ut in assiduo usu servetur et accurate discernatur ab activa iustitia legis. (Ex illa enim et in alla sola doctrina fit et consistit Ecclesia)." Ibid. 49.
43. Ibid. 49, 209, 45, 50.
44. "Papa autem non solum miscuit legem cum Evangelio, sed meras leges et eas tantum ceremonialis ex Evangelio fecit. Confudit politica et Ecclesiastica, quae vere Satanica et infernalis confusio est." Ibid. 209.
45. "Istam legis et Evangelii distinctionem Petrus confuderat et hoc facto persuaserat credentibus, quod per Evangelium simul et legem iustificari deberent. Hoc Paulus nullo modo ferens reprehendit, non ut eum ignomia aliqua afficeret, sed ut ista duo iterum pure segregaret." Ibid. 208. "Et illa phrasi solus Paulus utitur, quod legem Dei appellat 'Elementa mundi', 'Infirma et egena elementa', 'Virtutem peccati', 'Literam occidentem' etc. Alii Apostoli non ita locuti sunt de lege. Quisque igitur studiosus Christianae Theologiae diligenter observet hoc genus sermonis Pauli. Christi appellat eum 'electum organon'. Ideo etiam dedit ei lectissimum os et singularem phrasin prae ceteris

Apostolis, ut ipse ceu electum organon fidelissime iaceret fundamenta articuli de iustificatione eumque clarissime traderet." Ibid. 559-60.

46. W. A. TR V, 210. "Luther hat selber bekannt, das das erste Verstehen von Rom. 1: 17 für ihn nichts anderes bedeutete als die Erkenntnis der Notwendigkeit der Unterscheidung von Gesetz und Evangelium." Schempp, Luthers Stellung zur Heiligen Schrift, 71.
47. Stange, Studien zur Theologie Luthers I, 53.
48. "Sic autem discernenda sunt, ut Evangelium ponas in coelo, legem in terra...Ut haec sit lux et dies, illa tenebrae et nox." W. A. XL, 1, 207.
49. W. A. XXX, 1, 182.
50. W. A. XL, 1, 558.
51. "Igitur qui gloriatur in Lege tanquam sapiens et doctus, gloriatur in confusione sua, in maledicto suo, in ira Dei, in morte." Th. XXIII. "Quia Lex sancta et omne donum Dei bonum, omnis creatura bona valde Gene. 1." Th. XXIV. W. A. I, 363.
52. W. A. I, 228.
53. "Nam attento lectori Pauli, cum audit Apostolum vocare legem 'Administrationem mortis', 'Occidentem literam' etc., statim venit in mentem, Cur tam odiosas et, ut apparet rationi, blasphemias appellationes tribuat legi, quae divina doctrina est, e coelo revelata?" W. A. XL, 1, 559.
54. Schempp, Luthers Stellung zur Heiligen Schrift, 75. Loofs, Dogmengeschichte, 772.
55. Roman Catholic exegetes obviously do not accept Luther's analysis of Pauline theology: Maritain, St. Paul. Even among Lutherans, however, there have been conflicting views of the validity of Luther's exegesis; Althaus is one who believes that Luther misinterprets Paul at some important points: Paulus und Luther über den Menschen. Feine, Die Erneuerung des Paulinischen Christentums durch Luther also discusses this problem.
56. W. A. XL, 1, 559.
57. Ibid. 42.
58. Ibid. 518. "Et, quod spectaculum valde iucundum est, proponit et producit legem velut furem aut latronem aliquem iam damnatum et adiudicatum morti, etc." Ibid. 277.

59. W. A. XL, 1, 505.
60. "Solet enim diabolus in afflictione et pugna conscientiae per legem terrere nos et opponere conscientiam peccati, vitam nostram pessime transactam, iram et iudicium dei, infernum et aeternam mortem, ut sic nos in desperationem adigat, nos sibi subiiciat et a Christo abstrahat." Ibid. 50. According to Luther we commit a double sin when we refuse to acknowledge the goodness of the law; the law comes and brings to light our secret sins, which makes us hate the law and its Author. It is for this reason that the law can never be redemptive; it increases sins rather than releasing man from them: "Qui igitur potest capere, capiat, quod lex in Christiana Theologia et su vera descriptione non iustificet, sed omnino contrarium effectum habeat, ostendit enim nos nobis, Deum iratum exhibet, iram aperit, perterrefacit nos et non solum revelat, sed etiam abundare facit peccatum, ut, ubi prius peccatum parvum erat, per legem illuminantem fiat magnum, ut homo incipiat odisse et fugere legem et perfecto odio horrere Deum, legis conditio etiam fateri cogitur, sed dupliciter peccare in legem: Primum non solum aversam a lege habere voluntatem, ut non possis eam audire, sed contra eam facere, Imo deinde etiam sic odisse, ut cuperes eam abolitam una cum Deo qui est summe bonus, eius autore." Ibid. 505. Dodd, The Epistle of Paul to the Romans, 109ff.
61. W. A. V, 257. W. A. XXXIX, 1, 555.
62. W. A. XL, 1, 558.
63. "kein gutte werck sein, dan allein die got gebotenn hat. gleich kein sund ist, dann allein die got verbote hat." W. A. VI, 204 (Von den guten Werken, 1520).
64. Kidd, Documents of the Continental Reformation, 216.
65. "Quare ipsa praecepta dei breviter sunt inspicienda, in quibus sine dubio omnia peccata continentur, si recte intelligantur." W. A. VI, 164 (Confitendi ratio, 1520).
66. "Luther, while finding fault with the self-chosen works of the Catholics, points to the Ten Commandments as summing up every good work willed by God...As for the Evangelical Counsels so solemnly enacted in the New Testament, viz. the striving after a perfection which is not of obligation, Luther, urged on by his theory that only what is actually commanded partakes of the nature of a good work, came very near branding them as an invention of the Papists." Grisar, Luther V, 46-7. Luther says that it would take an angelic being to perfectly fulfil the Ten Commandments and yet the monks presume to seek an even higher way! It is as though we were not able to pay a farthing and yet boasted of being able to pay ten shillings: "So haben

wir nu die zehen gepot, ein ausbund Gottlicher lere, was wir thuen sollen, das unser gantzes leben Gotte gefalle, und den rechten born und rohre, aus und ynn welchen quellen und gehen müssen, alles was gute werck sein sollen, also, das ausser den zehen gepoten kein werck noch wesen gut und Gott gefellig kan sein...Sihe aber, ist es nicht ein verfluchte vermessenheit der verzweivelten heiligen, so da sich unterstehen ein hoher und besser leben und stende zufinden, denn die zehen gepot leren, geben fur, wie gesagt, es sey ein schlecht leben fur den gemeinen man, yhres aber sey fur die heiligen und wolkommenen. Und sehen nicht die elenden blinden leute, das kein mensch so weit bringen kan, das er eins von den zehen gepoten halte, wie es zuhalten ist...Darumb ist yhr rhumen gerade soviel, als wenn ich rhumete und sagte, Ich habe zwar nicht ein groschen zubezalen, aber zehen gulden trawe ich wol zubezalen." W. A. XXX, 1, 178-9. This cuts the ground from under the Roman hierarchical view of vocation; gradations of merit according to occupation obscures the fact that the ultimate demand of God can never be satisfied by human effort or achievement. The law reduces all men to the same rank, that of sinners. As Calhoun points out, the term "vocatio" was reserved for monastic or clerical callings; it was left to the Reformers to wipe out the distinctions between the common life and the spiritual life and to apply the term "vocatio" generally: God and the Common Life, 18ff., 253ff.

67. "Luther betont nur immer--im Einklang mit Augustin und in der Hauptsache auch mit der Scholastik--, das des Gesetz 'geistlich' zu deuten, d. h. auf die Gesinnung und nicht nur auf das Werk der Hände zu beziehen sei." Holl, Gesammelte Aufsätze I, 156. See Luther's treatment of the Fifth Commandment: W. A. XXX, 1, 159.
68. Ibid. 179.
69. Ibid. 147.
70. Ibid. 180.
71. Ibid. 139.
72. Ibid. 181.
73. "Also hat die gantze schrifft ublich dis gepot gepredigt und vertrauen gerichtet." Ibid. 180. There are only two alternatives to its demand: faith or sin: "dis werck des 1. gebots ist grosser, ja viel grosser denn alle Monchskappen, fasten, beten und all jre werck, und sind also die werck des 1. gebots gar heilige werck des Gesetzes, aber wer kan sie thun? Warlich, kein mensch, denn sie sind alle sunder bis auff Christum." W. A. XLVI, 664 (Auslegung 1 & 2 Kapitels Johannis, 1537-38).

74. W. A. XL, 1, 424.
75. "Sic Paulus clare confutat confictam a Sophistis glossam de fide formata loquiturque de fide sola, seponens legem. seposita autem lege seponitur etiam charitas et omnia quae legis sunt, et sola fides retinetur quae iustificat et vivificat." W. A. XL, 1, 424.
76. "The more seriously he takes the commandment to love God with all his heart, and the more strict the demand that his love for God shall be pure and unselfish, the more impossible it becomes...External commandments are easier to deal with, but the commandment which requires love with all the heart can only be a law which damns. In the monastery Luther learnt by personal experience that the Commandment of Love in its most intense and inward form is the most tyrannical law; indeed it is a real devil for the troubled conscience." Nygren, Agape and Eros II, 2, 476-7. Aulen, Christus Victor, 129.
77. W. A. XVIII, 681.
78. B. A. II, 25 (W. A. VII, 35-6).
79. "Glaube ist eine lebendige, erwegene Zuversicht auf Gottes Gnade, so gewiss, dass er tausendmal daruber sturbe. Und solche Zuversicht und Erkenntniss gottlicher Gnade machet frommlich, trotzig und lustig gegen Gott und alle Creaturen, welches der Heilige Geist thut im Glauben. Daher der Mensch ohne Zwang willig und lustig wird, jedermann Gutes zu thun, jedermann zu dienen, allerley zu leiden, etc." H. A. X, 74.
80. Ibid. 86 (Vorrede auf die erste Epistel St. Pauli an die Corinthen). He speaks of love, in the same way, as the fruit of the Holy Communion in which one receives Christ and therefore must bear the fruit of love towards one's neighbors: "Nun wollen wir von der Frucht dieses Sakraments, welche die Liebe ist, reden, dass wir uns also lassen finden gegen unsern Nachsten, wie es von Gott geschen ist...Die Liebe, sag ich, ist ein Frucht dieses Sakraments." W. A. X, 3, 55f. (Ein Sermon am Sonnabend oder Samstag vor Reminiscere, 1522). Luther's emphasis on faith rather than on love is one of his chief differences with the mystic tradition which in many ways was the source of much of his own thinking: "For the mystic God is wholly love, and the only obstacle to union with him is human self-assertion, which must be cowed and the old Adam crucified, that the human may become divine. Hence the religious life is a repetition of the incarnation. But for Luther God was not only love but also anger, to be placated by the sacrificial death of Christ. Hence the atonement was more important than the incarnation. As a consequence love gave way to faith." Bainton, Harvard Theological Review XXII, 2,

(April, 1929), 134. Bainton has overemphasized the legalistic side of Luther's theology in reference to the atonement; as a result he presents Luther's view as one which contrasts faith and love. Luther did contrast them but only insofar as love was considered as a means of gaining justification; we are justified by faith alone, and love has no place here. But love is the fruit of the justifying faith. Luther did not hesitate to say that faith without love is probably not real faith at all: W.A. XL, 1, 421.

81. W. A. XL, 1, 329, 671-2.
82. Ibid. 672.
83. Ibid. 50.
84. Ibid. 242.
85. Mackinnon, Luther and the Reformation IV, 51ff. ("The Münster Madness"). Köstlin, Theology of Luther II, 21ff. Carlstadt and the "Zwickau Prophets" appealed to the Old Testament writings and practices for justification to break down images; and the Anabaptists began to teach that wicked men might be destroyed according to the example of the Old Testament zealots. Some had proposed that the Mosaic law should be introduced as nearly as possible in its entirety and the Roman law abrogated as heathenish and the canon law as un-Christian. Duke Johann was almost won over to this view by a court preacher, Wolfgang Stein, before Luther and Melancthon intervened. Grisar, Luther VI, 86.
86. W. A. XXIV, 1ff. (1526). See also Wider die himmlischen Propheten von den Bildern und Sakrament (1525): W. A. XVIII. Pascal, Social Basis of the German Reformation, 109ff.
87. W. A. XXIV, 9. "So haben wir bis daher durch so viel Schrifften beweiset dass Mosis Gesetz uns nicht angehet und kein Recht mehr ist." B. A. IV, 381 (Anfang der Gegenschrift gegen den Melsunger Pfarrer Joh. Lening, 1542).
88. "Man mus also den Rottengeistern das maul stopffen, die da sagen: Also spricht Moses, da stehets ym Mose geschrieben und der gleichen. So sprich du: Moses gehet uns nicht an. Wenn ich Mosen anneme ynn ein gepot, so mus ich den gantzen Mosen annemen, also wurde daraus folgen, wenn ich Mosen zum meister und gesetzgeber anneme, so must ich mich lassen beschneiden, die kleyder waschen nach Judischer weisse und also essen und trincken." W. A. XXIV, 6-7. "Also wollen wir Mosen nicht halten noch annemen, Moses ist tod, sein regiment ist aus gewesen, da Christus kam, er dienet weiter hieher nicht." Ibid.
89. See note 81 above.

90. W. A. XXIV, 15. "Also halt ich nu die gepot, die Moses geben hat, nicht darumb, das sie Moses geboten hat, sondern das sie mir von natur eingepflantzet sind und Moses alhie gleich mit der natur uberein stymmet, etc. Aber die andern gepot ym Mose, die allen menschen von natur nicht sind eingepflantzet, hatten die Heyden nicht, gehen auch sie nicht an...Das ist nu das erste, das ich ynn Mose sehen sol, nemlich Die gepot, zu wilchen ich nichts verbunden bin denn so ferne sie einem yglichen von natur sind eingebildet und ynn sein hertz geschrieben." Ibid. 10.

91. Ibid. 7.

92. "Zum ersten, das er schone Exampel der gesetz gibt, die daraus mogen genomen werden, eusserlich land und leute fein ordenlich zu regiren. Zum andern sind darynne die zusagungen Gottes, damit der glaube gestercket und erhalten wird...Zum dritten lesen wir Mosen von wegen der schonen Exempel des glaubens, der liebe und des creutzes ynn den lieben heiligen vetern Adam, Habel, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob." Ibid. 8ff. Luther constantly emphasized that Moses in his right sphere was admirable and worthy of praise: "ja wol diesen unterschied Mosi und Christi lernen und wissen: Moses ist ein feiner, nützlicher und kostlicher Prediger, der da vleissig treibet in den dreien geboten der 1. Tafeln, das man lerne Gott lieben, furchten und yme vertrauen. Ist also Moses ampt ein kostlich ampt und selige predigt, aber nicht ferner denn allein, etc." W. A. XLVI, 665. Luther often uses Moses as the symbol of the law and for this reason his remarks on him sometimes appear contradictory.

93. W. A. XXIV, 7.

94. Schneider, Christendom XII, 344.

95. W. A. LVI, 176 (Rom. 1:19), 203 (Rom. 2: 14-5).

96. "Differentia autem inter legem Mose et patrum haec est. Moses habuit certum mandatum constituendi sacerdotium Leviticum, quod pertinuit ad certum populum, personas, locum et tempus certum usque ad Christum. Haec est potissima pars legis Mose. Deinde regnum et duodecim principes in politia ordinavit. Decalogus vero et aliae leges ex patribus ortae: non sunt propriae Mosi. Tantum illa ceremonialia, quae ad certas personas pertinebant: sunt Mosaica." W. A. XLIII, 442 (Gen. 26., 1542).

97. W. A. XXX, 1, 192. "Wenn nu die Rottengeister komen und sprechen: Moses hat es geboten, so las du Mosen faren und sprich...Denn was Gott von hymel geben hat den Juden durch Mosen, das hat er auch geschrieben ynn aller menschen hertzen." W. A. XXIV, 9.

98. W. A. XVI, 431.
99. "Ich frage nicht nach dem was Moses geboten hat. Ja (sprechen sie) er hat geboten, man sol ein Gott haben, dem trawen und gleuben, nicht bey seinen namen schweren, Vater und mutter ehren, nicht todten, nicht stelen, nicht ehebrechen, nicht falsch gezeugnis geben und eines andern weib noch gut begeren. Sol man denn das nicht hatten? Sprich also: Die natur hat diese gesetze auch...Die Heyden, die kein gesetz haben, die haben das gesetz ynn yhrem hertzen geschrieben. Wie aber die Juden fehlen, also fehlen auch die Heyden." W. A. XXIV, 9.
100. W. A. XLVI, 667.
101. W. A. XXXII, 494-5.
102. W. A. XI, 279.
103. W. A. XIX, 638.
104. "The law does not last, because it is given by Moses, but because it is divinely written in the hearts. Itaque donec manet hominum natura, manet lex. The law of Moses does not concern us any more than the laws of Solon, therefore we are bound by the law not because of Moses but because it is written in nature." Corp. Ref. XII, 473; quoted by Hildebrandt, Melanchthon, 40. In his introduction to an English translation of the Loci Communes Hill says that through Melanchthon's work: "Natural law is now emancipated forever from theology and all so-called supernatural authority." It is doubtful whether this is Melanchthon's intention; certainly Luther would not abide it. According to Luther, though the Jews and the heathen may have received the law in different ways, they are worshipping the same God; the law no matter how it comes is God's law: "Zum ersten ist zu mercken, das uns Heyden und Christen die Zehen gepot nicht betreffen, sondern alleine die Juden...Das wir aber gleich auch den Gott, den die Juden ehren, der sie auss Egypten gefurt hat, erkennen, anbeten, und ehren, haben wir nicht durch Mosen oder aus dem geschriebenen gesetz, sondern auss andern schrifftten und auss dem gesetz der natur." W. A. XVI, 424.
105. "In religion he was obscurantist." Lloyd, Approach to Reform, 220. Webb says of Luther that he was a consistent anti-rationalist: Studies in Natural Theology, 39, 231, 343. Luther identified law and reason and therefore in this sense, as Aulen has pointed out, Christ's work was "contra rationem et legem." Just as with the law, however, Luther believed that reason was the gift of God and was to be highly prized in its proper work. Prewes says that Luther see both the positive and negative possibilities of reason according to the three forms of its activity: "Die menschliche Vernunft hat für Luther drei Formen ihrer Betätigung." First, the pure formal operations of logical thought.

Second, these operations exercised in theoretical, practical and worldly affairs such as science, art, politics, etc. Third, reason intruding in matters of faith. "Die zweite Fähigkeit der Vernunft hat Luther stets gepriesen...Aber Luthers voller Zorn bricht hervor, wenn die Vernunft etwas in Glaubenssachen dreinreden will. Hier ist kein Ausdruck zu stark, um sie abzuweisen und aus dem Heiligtum hinauszuerwerfen." Martin Luther, 96-9. One cannot depict Luther as a "despiser of reason" without badly misrepresenting his full view. For a flagrant example of this type of caricature see Maritain, Three Reformers, 28ff. Luther's mature view is that human reason can only know material and formal causes; we must depend upon the Word of God to teach us final and efficient causes, for instance, for what end God created man, etc. W. A. XLII, 92ff. (Vorlesungen über 1. Mose).

106. W. A. XL, 1, 521.
107. W. A. XXX, 1, 183-4.
108. W. A. XL, 1, 52.
109. Brunner, Man in Revolt, 531.
110. Troeltsch, Ges. Schr. I, 538.
111. "Luther hat nicht zurückgegriffen auf ein Naturrecht; Ich finde mich hier und im folgenden in einem starken Gegensatz zu Troeltsch...Das eine Mal sind *lex naturae* die unveränderlichen Naturverhältnisse, unter denen der Mensch steht--also etwas Tatsächliches; das andere Mal ist es das Bewusstsein eines Seinsollenden, das Bewusstsein eines sittlichen Gesetzes; soweit er dem 'natürlichen' Menschen eignet...In Troeltschs Lutherdarstellung ist diese Vermischung des Seienden mit dem Seinsollenden geradezu ins Grelle gesteigert...Er redet ständig von dem 'stoischen Naturrecht'." Ges. Aufs. I, 243 n. 2f. See Brunner's short survey of the origins of the concept of natural law, especially its treatment by ancient humanists; this was characterized by three elements: 1. The rationalism of the *lex*. 2. The pantheism of the *natura*. 3. The natural immanence of the divine in man. Man in Revolt, 555ff. Luther would have little affinity with the view of natural law expressed here; "Auch gegen das rationale Gebilde des Naturrechts bewährte er diese Haltung. Es galt ihm sehr wenig." Evangelium, Kirche und Volk, 54-5. Scheel goes on to say that for Luther natural law was essentially a "praktisches Prinzip" for keeping order in the world.

On the other hand, one must say that it is questionable whether all medieval teaching on natural law was merely an elaboration of the views of ancient humanism. Natural law has an extremely involved history in Western civilization

and many diverse elements entered its make-up. The Fathers and Scholastic theologians appealed to the words of Paul in Rom. 2: 14-15 for justification to include natural law within their systems, as Luther himself did. William of Ockham appealed to it and that is probably from whom Luther first learned of it. Gierke discusses the controversy between the Nominalists and the Realists as to whether the essence of the law was God's will or God's reason: Political Theories, 173. "The influence exercised by that system of thought in the development of English, and generally, European social and political speculations could hardly be over-estimated. Schoolmen, theologians, statesmen, lawyers, revolutionists and poets based their reasonings and wove their imaginings on it...And yet, during all those centuries the concept of 'ius naturale' was practically always passing through divers changes and interpretations which all but obliterated its original traits." Beer, British Socialism I, 10-11. It should be remembered, therefore, that merely because Luther appealed to the concept of natural law, does not establish the fact that his views are identical with those generally held in the Middle Ages. His doctrine must be interpreted in the light of his general theological convictions, and in particular, it seems to me, in the context of his teaching on the relation of law and gospel.

112. Nygren, Agape and Eros II, 2, 421-2.
113. "Denn in allen Stadien seiner Entwicklung hielt der Reformator nachgewiesenermassen daran fest, dass das für alle Völker gleichmässig gültige Naturgesetz und Naturrecht die gemeinsame Quelle aller Rechte einschliesslich das mosaischen darstellt...die dargelegten Auffassungen des Reformators zeigen, vom völligen Fehlen der lex aeterna-Lehre abgesehen, in wesentlichen Punkten eine auffallende Übereinstimmung mit der thomistischen Theorie." Arnold, Zur Frage des Naturrechts bei Luther, 127-8. "Mit dieser beschränkung der Geltung des alt-testamentlichen Gesetzes auf das Judentum und seiner Begründung auf das Naturrecht folgt Luther nur dem Vorgang der Scholastik." Seeberg, Die Lehre Luthers, 203. This shows a trend among modern scholars, including Roman Catholics, to credit Luther with greater conformity with general medieval theological trends than had before been suspected. For the older view: Von Hugel, Essays and Addresses I, 250.
114. Eger, Die Anschauungen Luthers von Beruf, 95f. For the relation of law and gospel: Ibid. 95-107.
115. "Und das ist das beste fast ynn dem gantzen Mose wilchs da nicht naturlich ynn die hertzen der menschen geschrieben ist, sondern kombt von hymel herab." W. A. XXIV, 10.

116. H. A. X, 70.
117. W. A. XL, 1, 77.
118. Ibid. 79.
119. Ibid. 218.
120. Ibid.
- 120a. Ibid. 569-70.
121. W. A. LVI, 334.
122. "Nisi enim peccatum extitisset, illa lex peccatum prohibens etiam non extitisset, sicut supra dixi, Politia et legibus ceu cauterio et, ut Paulus vocat, pedagogo non fuisse opus in integra natura." W. A. XLII, 82.
123. "Ergo per contrarium non est ibi iustitia, benedictio, salus et vita, sed peccatum, maledictio, mors, diabolus et aeterna perditio. Sic ergo ipsis promissionibus Scriptura concludit omnes homines sub peccato et maledicto." W. A. XL, 1, 513-4. Even the promises shut all men underneath sin, but it is really the proper office of the law: "Hoc est, antequam veniret tempus Evangelii et gratiae, erat hoc legis officium, ut ea conclusi custodiremur, tanquam in carcere." Ibid. 518.
124. In doing this, the law is doing the work for which God ordained it: "Hic lex exercuit in eum omnia, quae in nobis exercuit, Accusavit autem et terruit nos, subiecit nos peccato, morti, irae Dei ac iudicio su condemnavit. Et hoc iure fecit, quia omnes peccavimus etc." Ibid. 564-5.
125. Ibid. 520, 429-30. W. A. XLVI, 657-60.
126. Vidler, Christ's Strange Work, 20ff., 35ff.
127. Ibid. 47ff. For the Formula of Concord see Schaff, Creeds of the Evangelical Protestant Churches III, 93ff.
128. Instit. II, 7, 12. For the other two uses of the law according to Calvin: Instit. II, 6ff. The work of sanctification is, according to Luther, the work of the Holy Spirit and not of the law; this may be seen, for instance, in his treatment of the Third Article of the Creed in his Larger Catechism. "Sic in diversa instrumenta transfunditur Spiritus qui non semel extinguit naturae vitia, sed per totam vitam purgat illud peccatum inhaerens." W. A. XL, 1, 312. Calvin shows a marked difference in his advocacy of using the law in the work of sanctification: "Deinde quia non sola doctrina, sed exhortatione quoque indigemus, hanc quoque utilitatem ex Lege capiet servus Dei, ut frequenti

eius meditatione excitetur ad obsequium, in eo roboretur, a delinquendi lubrico retrahatur." Instit. II, 7, 12. In contrast to this notice Luther's remarks: "Quare nullo modo sinamus eam dominari in conscientia, praesertim cum tanti constiterit Christo, ut legis tyrrannidem e conscientia auferret...Discat igitur pius Legem et Christum duo contraria esse, prorsus incompatibilia: praesente Christo lex nullo modo dominari, sed cedere debet e conscientia et relinquere cubile...soli Christo. Is solus dominetur in iustitia, securitate, laetitia et vita, ut conscientia laeta obdormiat in Christo sine ullo sensu legis, peccati et mortis." W. A. XL, 1, 558-9. Or as he concludes in Von der Freiheit: "Sihe das ist, die rechte, geystliche, Christliche freyhey, die das hertz frey macht, von allen sundenn, gesetzen, und gepotten, wilch alle andere freyhey unbertrifft, wie der hymell die erdenn, Wilch geb uns gott recht zuvorstehen und behaltenn, Amen." B. A. II, 27 (W. A. VII, 38). See Loofs, Dogmengeschichte, 777.

129. "Denn ob due wol auswendig das Gesetz mit Wercken haltest, aus Furcht der Strafe oder Liebe des Lohns: so thust du doch alles ohne freye Liebe und Lust zum Gesetz, sondern mit Unlust und Zwang, woltest lieber anders thun, wenn das Gesetz nicht ware...wiewohl auch das ausserliche Werck die Lange nicht nachbleibet bey solchen Heuchlern." H. A. X, 71.
130. Ibid. 72.
131. W. A. L, 600.
132. W. A. XL, 1, 520.
133. Hildebrandt gives a full discussion of Melanchthon's vacillating attitude toward the third use of the law: Melanchthon, 42ff.
134. "The three uses of the Law, introduced by Luther, raised to a fundamental principle by Calvin, and found among Anglicans even before him, require thorough examination in their application to the ideologies and problems of today." Ehrenberg, "The Authority and Relevance of the New Testament Ethos Today" in From the Bible to the Modern World, 16. Luther places great importance on knowing what the proper offices of the law are; if the law isn't kept within its proper limits the whole of theology is perverted: "Si definitio legem propria definitione et retineo in suo officio et usu, res optima est. Si vero transfero eam in alium usum et tribuo, quod non est tribuendum, non solum legem, sed totam Theologiam perverto." W. A. XL, 1, 476. "Hic sciendum est duplicem esse legis usum." Ibid. 479.
135. Ibid. 519. "Primus ergo intellectus et usus legum est cohercere impios. Diabolus namque regnat in toto orbe terrarum

- et impellit homines ad omnia flagitia. Ideo Deus ordinavit Magistratus, Parentes, praeceptores, leges, vincula et omnes ordinationes civiles, ut, si non possint amplius, revinciant saltem diabolo manus, ne pro libidine su saeviat etc." W. A. XL, 1, 479-80. W. A. XLII, 79.
136. W. A. XI, 248 (Von weltlicher Oberkeit, 1523). "Darumb sag ich die weil weltlich gewalt von got geordnet ist die bossen zustraffen, und die fromen zuschutzen, etc." W. A. VI, 409 (An den christlichen Adel, 1520).
137. "Alter legis usus est Theologicus seu Spiritualis, qui valet ad augendas transgressiones. Et is maxime quaeritur in lege Mosi, ut per eam crescat et multiplicetur peccatum, praesertim in conscientia. De hoc Paulus magnifice disputat ad Roma. 7. Itaque verum officium et principalis ac proprius usus legis est, quod revelat homini suum peccatum, caecitatem, miseriam, impietatem, ignorantiam, odium, contemptum Dei, mortem, infernum, iudicium et commeritam iram apud Deum." W. A. XL, 1, 480-1. "Cognitio peccati (ait Paulus) per legem, non ait: abolitio aut vitatio peccati. Tota ratio ut virtus legis est in sola cognitione." W. A. XVIII, 677.
138. Holl, Ges. Aufs. I, 19f., 25ff. Mackinnon, Luther and the Reformation I, 103f. Lindsay, Cambridge Modern History II, 115-6.
139. Mackinnon, Luther and the Reformation I, 139, 160, 162ff.
140. Loofs, Dogmengeschichte, 737-8. It must be added, however, that while this was true of Roman theology as Luther knew it, there were some variations between the various schools. According to Niebuhr, it was chiefly the Hellenistic schools (as represented by Origen, Clement of Alexandria, etc.) who tended to identify sin with sensuality. The Augustine tradition, and even the semi-Augustine as represented by Aquinas, held that sensuality and concupiscence is "derivative of the more primal sin of self-love." Nature and Destiny I, 242ff.
141. "Thou must be pure in heart; and only that heart is pure which has exterminated creaturehood." Meister Eckhardt quoted by Niebuhr, *Ibid.* 61. Niebuhr, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, 23, 70.
142. "Die deutsche Mystik hat die Sünderempfindung vertieft; etc." Holl, Ges. Aufs. I, 12. Bigelmair, "Zum Verhaltnis Luthers zur Mystik", Luther in Okumenischer Sicht, 239ff.
143. W. A. II, 731. "gott gericht mag kein sund leyden." *Ibid.* The influence of the mystic tradition is seen clearly in Luther's Tessaradecas of 1520: "si hominem in suum malum deduceret cognoscendum, mox in moment periret." W. A. VI, 107, 113.

144. W. A. XL, 1, 84.
145. Council of Trent, Session V, June 17, 1546 (on original sin): Bettenson, Documents of the Christian Church, 366.
146. Niebuhr, Nature and Destiny I, 247: "For Luther, as for St. Thomas, sin is essentially lust ('concupiscentia' or 'cupiditas') but he does not mean by this the natural desires and impulses of physical life. Lust is the consequence of man's turning from God, which results in the corruption of his heart and will with evil desire."
147. Flesh, according to Luther, is the whole natural man, including his reason, understanding, will, etc.: "Caro autem non significat in Paulo, ut Sophistae putant, crassa illa peccata; ea enim apertis nominibus solet appellare adulterium, fornicationem, immunditiam etc....Significat ergo Caro totam naturam hominis cum ratione et omnibus viribus suis...Quare Paulo significat Caro summum iustitiam, sapientiam, cultum, religionem, intellectum, voluntatem, quanta potest esse in mundo." W. A. XL, 1, 244. "Sin as pride and sin as concupiscence both "have their source in 'caro', which for Luther has the exact connotation of the Pauline ~~caro~~. It is not the 'body' as symbol of man's finiteness but 'flesh' as symbol of his sinfulness." Niebuhr, Nature and Destiny I, 199. Nygren, Agape and Eros II, 2, 471. Dodd says that Paul uses 'flesh' in two ways: 1. As a purely physical term. 2. "As a psychological and ethical term, for the sum of the instincts wrongly directed", and that he is "somewhat embarrassed" by the two-fold use he makes of the term. Dodd, The Epistle of Paul to the Romans, 119-20.
148. W. A. XVIII, 745.
149. Niebuhr, Nature and Destiny I, 195, 199, 212-3, 247.
150. W. A. XL, 1, 73, 223f., 257f.
151. "quod oculus cordis non satis purus est, quo videremus quanta sit ignominia et miseria hominis sub peccato iacentis, id est a deo separati et a diabolo possessi." W. A. VI, 114. The natural man tends to see only the sins of an obvious kind, such as those against the second table of the Decalogue; it is the work of the Holy Spirit to teach the inner meaning of the law: "Von solcher sünde weyss die welt nichts, der heylig Geyst muss sies aller ernst lernen. Denn die welt helt nur das für sünde, das in der andern Tafel Mosis verboten ist. Von Christo waiss sie nichts, vil weniger waiss sie, das es sünde sey, an jn nicht glauben...Denn predigen, Das der unglaub ein sünde sey, kan niemand denn der heilig Geist." W. A. LII, 291.

152. Holl says that Luther's doubts about the legitimacy of the distinction between venial and mortal sins was one of his earliest points of disagreement with the Roman confessional system: "Schon die für die Beichte so wichtige Unterscheidung von Todsünden und lässlichen Sünden bereitete ihm Qualen. Wo lief da eigentlich die Grenze?" Ges. Aufs. I, 23f. He may have been influenced by the mystics in this matter. Ibid. 12. In his Commentary on Romans Luther's position is clear: "Der Unterschied zwischen Todsünde und lässlicher Sünde ist nicht zu halten. Jede Sünde ist in Wahrheit Todsünde." Ibid. 115. O'Neil explains the Roman teaching on the distinction: "Venial sin is essentially different from mortal sin. It does not avert us from our true last end, it does not destroy charity, the principle of union with God, nor deprive the soul of sanctifying grace, and it is intrinsically reparable. It is called venial precisely because, considered in its own proper nature, it is pardonable; in itself meriting, not eternal, but temporal punishment." Catholic Encyclopedia XIV, 9. Moehler explains that venial sins are those which do not alienate a man "from God, and His holy law which he loves." Symbolism, 111.

O'Neil goes on to say that Luther taught that "all sins of unbelievers are mortal and all sins of the regenerate, with the exception of infidelity, are venial." Catholic Encyclopedia XIV, 9. Köstlin also thinks that Luther distinguishes between sins committed in ignorance, on sudden provocation, and deliberate sins with an evil desire, in the life of a regenerate believer; if Köstlin is right, this would be the reintroduction of the distinction between venial and mortal sins into the sanctified life after it had been rejected for the pre-justified life. Theology of Luther II, 465ff. Against these views, it seems to me that Luther is quite definite that all sins are mortal, whether in the life of an unbeliever or in the life of a believer. The only thing that distinguishes sins, he says, is not their essential nature but the relation between the person who commits them and Christ, Who has overcome sin. The believer's sins are forgiven and therefore harmless, even though the sins in themselves are worthy of death; the sins of the unbeliever are not covered and therefore any one of them is sufficient to bring death. Imputation versus non-imputation is the key distinction in Luther's teaching on sin, rather than that between mortal and venial sins. "Hoc ideo dico, ne quis putet peccatum post acceptam fidem non esse magnificiendum. Peccatum est vere peccatum, sive illud ante sive post Christum cognitum commiseris. Et Deus peccatum odit, Imo omne peccatum, quod ad substantiam facti attinet, est mortale. Quod autem credenti non est mortale, fit propter Christum Propiciatorem, qui peccatum sua morte expiavit. Non credent in Christum non solum omnia peccata mortalia sunt, sed etiam bona ipsius opera peccata sunt. ...Ideo Sophistae pernitiōse errant, qui peccata distinguunt penes substantiam facti, non penes personam." W. A. XL, 2, 95-6.

153. "Sunde heisset in der Schrifft, nicht allein das eusserliche werck am Leibe. Sondern alle das Gescheffte das sich mit reget und weget zu dem eusserlichen werck, nemlich, des hertzen grund mit allen krefften." W. A. DB VII, 9. Luther constantly maintained that the sins of the first table--the deeply hidden sins of the inner man--are those which are the most serious: "peccata et ea vera et gravissima, non ficta aut inania, ut est summa infidelitas, dubitatio, desperatio, quotidianus contemptus Dei, odium, ignorantia, Blasphemia dei, Ingratitudo, Abusus nominis Dei, Negligentia, fastidium, contemptus verbi Dei etc., Quae summa peccata sunt contra primam tabulam--Deinde etiam illa carnalia contra secundam, Qualia sunt: non habere honorem parentibus, Non obedire magistratui, appetere alterius res, uxorem, etc. (Quaquam ista levia sint respectu superiorum)." W. A. XL, 1, 88. The worst sins of all are those "virtues" which are acclaimed by the world, but which detract from the righteousness and wisdom of Christ; these are the blasphemous double-sins in which the devil pretends to be an angel of light: "Quare ista tua sapientia, si extra Christum es, duplex est insipientia, tua iustitia duplex peccatum et impietas est, Quia ignorat sapientiam et iustitiam Christi...In religionis, sapientibus et doctis hominibus mundus est optimus, et ibi vere dupliciter malus est. Praetereo iam carnalia vitia quibus mundus plenus est, qualia sunt Adulteria, scortationes, avaritia, furta, caedes, invidia, virulentia, Quae levia sunt, si conferas cum superioribus. Candidus diabolus transfigurans se in angelum lucis est vere diabolus." Ibid. 95-6. Luther called the third temptation of Christ the temptation by the "godly" devil: "ist nicht mehr ein schwartzer Teuffel wie der erste, auch nicht der ander kluge Teuffel, der aus der schrift disputirt, sondern ganz ein Gottlicher maiestetischer Teuffel, der da schlecht heraus fert, als sey er Gott selbs." W. A. XLV, 36-40 (Predigten des Jahres, 1537).
154. As Luther says in the proofs for the Heidelberg Disputation, no one can resist concupiscence and therefore all that we do is motivated by it: "Cur ergo concedimus concupiscentiam invincibilem? Fac quod est in te, et non concupisce. At non potes. Quare nec Legem naturaliter impleas." W. A. I, 374. According to the Roman teaching it is only when the will consents to the yearning of concupiscence that there is real sin: "Hence the distinction of concupiscence antecedent and concupiscence consequent to the consent of will; the latter is sinful, the former is not." Catholic Encyclopedia IV, 208. "He (Luther) pays no attention to the theology of the Church, which had hitherto seen in the 'Non concupisces' a prohibition of any voluntary consent to the concupiscence existing without actual sin." Grisar, Luther I, 203. In his exposition of the Fifty-first Psalm (1531) Luther points out that we do not become sinners by committing individual sins; we commit

- sins because we are already sinners. Hol. Ed. I, 76. As Murray points out, Luther by declaring that after sin came into the world free will was such in name only; "and that when a man has done the most he is capable of, he commits a mortal sin," undermined the whole theological basis of indulgences and of ecclesiastical power as well: "Even the saints cannot fulfil the commands of God, for all have sinned, all have come short...If the saints have not been able to carry out the law, obviously they have no merits to spare for mortals. The treasury of the Church is empty." Erasmus and Luther, 58. "Das ursprüngl. L. sieht in der Erbsünde das organische Lebenprinzip der gefallenen Menschheit, eine reale Wesenheit, eine eingefleischte böse Kraft, die nicht nur das Bild Gottes in der Seele ausgetilgt, sondern sich an seine Stelle gesetzt hat, die persönl. Sünden als Früchte aus sich her austreibt u. bewirkt, dass alles, was der Mensch tut, in seinem innersten Wesen Sünde ist." Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche VI, 733.
155. Niebuhr, Nature and Destiny I, 212-3. In an early letter to an Augustinian brother, Luther says that we must not aim at a purity which struggles against being classed with sinners: "Cave ne aliquando ad tantam puritatem aspires, ut peccator tibi videri nolis, imo esse. Christus enim non nisi in peccatoribus habitat...Sic enim nostris laboribus et afflictionibus ad conscientiae quietem pervenire oportet: ut quid ille mortuus est? Igitur non nisi in illo, per fiduciam desperationem tui et operum tuorum pacem invenies." De Wette, Briefe I, 17 (April 7, 1516). Luther fears that the devil is trying to make us righteous before Christ comes and Christ died only for sinners: "Du heiliger Teufel, vis me sanctum facere." W. A. XL, 1, 88 (1531). "Christus Dei filius traditus est Non pro iusticia et Sanctis, sed pro iniusticia et peccatoribus. Si iustus essem et peccatum non haberem, non indigerem Plactore Christo. Cur ergo, O perversum in modum, Sancte Satan, vis me facere Sanctum et a me exigere iustitias." Ibid.
156. "Nun seindt vil menschen, die sonnen unnd stern anbetten. Darumb wollen wir zuffarn und wollen die sonne und gesterne von hymmel werffen; wir werdens lassen...Ja wenn wir unser ergsten feindt vertreyben wolten, der uns an aller schedlichen ist, so musten wir uns selber todten, dann wir haben keynen schedlicher feindt weder unser hertz." W. A. X, 3, 33-4. Luther says that though he has not committed outward sins he has committed them in his heart: "commisi tantum corde. Quare sum transgressor omnium mandatorum Dei, tantaque est peccatorum meorum multitudo, ut bubalum corium ea complecti non possit, Imo non est numerus eorum; peccavi enim 'supra numerum arenae maris'." W. A. XL, 1, 88. Luther's conviction of the tenacity with which sin clung to man's innermost nature sprang out of the depths of his own religious

life. In a touching letter to Osiander (June 3, 1545) Luther speaks of even the closest human bonds of love as standing in the way of God's will: "I often marvel that I am unable to forget the loss of my Lenchen, although I know she is in the regions above, in the new life, saved and redeemed, and that God has thereby given me a true token of His love, in having, during my life, taken my flesh and blood to his Fatherly heart. But this love of which I speak is only natural love, which, although good and natural, must still be crucified with us, so that the gracious will of God may be done." Currie, Letters of Martin Luther, 456.

157. W. A. DB VII, 7, 9.

158. W. A. LII, 291-2. In this sermon Luther compares unbelief to a great tree which bears evil deeds and thoughts as fruit; only the Holy Ghost is able to stem its growth. According to Luther, the first sin of Eve was unbelief, which then resulted in disobedience, which then resulted in excuses, etc. Harnack describes Luther's view of the sequence of sins as follows: unbelief, disobedience, self-excuse, justification of the sins, damning of God, and finally accusing God of being the source of sin: "und ist dieses der letzte Grad der Sünden, nemlich Gott lästern und ihm zu-messen, dass die Sünde vor ihm herkomme." Luthers Theologie I, 553f. According to Niebuhr "Christian orthodoxy has consistently defined unbelief as the root of sin." Nature and Destiny I, 195.

159. "Also sol nu das erste gepot leuchten und sein glantz geben ynn die andern alle...ist nu die meinung dieses gepots, das es foddert rechten glauben und zuversicht des hertzens, welche den rechten einigen Gott treffe und an yhm alleine hange." W. A. XXX, 1, 133, 180. "Ein Gebot ergreift er als das Letzte, gerade das Gebot, das ihn richtet--denn in ersten Gebot fasst sich die ganze Verpflichtung gegen Gott zusammen, die Verpflichtung, der er nicht genügt hat: alle seine Sünde war ja als Ichsucht zuletzt Unglaube und Undank!" Holl, Ges. Aufs I, 74. When Luther says that sin is anything contrary to the law, this view in itself does not mark him off from the Scholastics. As has been pointed out, medieval religion as Luther knew it, tended to identify sin with physical, outward sins. The sophisticated Scholastic theologians, however, said that sin was anything not in conformity with the law of God: "Sin is nothing else than a morally bad act (St. Thomas, De Malo, Z. VII, a. 3.), an act not in accord with reason informed by the Divine law...(God)has made us subject to His law, which is known to us by the dictates of conscience, and our acts must conform with these dictates, otherwise we sin." Catholic Encyclopedia XIV, 4.

Despite this apparent similarity of viewpoints there is a fundamental difference between them. This is seen in two ways. First, there is a difference in the understanding of the effect of original sin on human nature. The orthodox Roman teaching on original sin discriminates between the original nature of man ("pura naturalia") and the additional gift bestowed on man by grace ("donum superadditum"); sin has taken away the "donum superadditum" but has left the original nature essentially unchanged. Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia X, 436. Seeberg, History of Doctrines II, 114ff. Against the idea that righteousness is a superadded gift, Luther anticipated the rest of the Reformers by saying that original righteousness ("justitia originalis") was part of the natural endowment of man. Sin, therefore, has affected the whole of man's nature and every part of him is alienated from God. This is also discussed on the basis of the distinction between the "imago" and "similitudo", Roman theology holding that only the latter is essentially distorted by sin and the Protestant theologians holding that the image itself was deformed: Lampert, The Divine Realm, 67ff. Luther's view is revealed in some detail in Vorlesungen über 1. Mose von 1535-45: "Ad hunc modum stulte disputant adversarii hodie: Imaginem et similitudinem Dei manere etiam in homine impio. Mihi multo rectius viderentur dicere, si dicerent: Imaginem Dei in homine ita post peccatum perierisse, sicut originalis mundus et Paradisus perierunt." W. A. XLII, 68, 45ff. It should be added, however, that according to Aquinas the effect of original sin was not only the loss of original righteousness but also the disordering and wounding of the soul; even though reason and freedom remain they are no longer inclined towards the good. Original sin results in the loss of original righteousness formally and in concupiscence materially. Seeberg, History of Doctrines II, 116-7. Furthermore, when the Scholastics were making this "strict line of discrimination between the original state of the first man and the additional endowment bestowed on him by grace," the motive was not in the desire "to minimize the distance separating the natural state from the state of sin. Such was an incidental result, but not the ground on which the argument was based." Ibid. 115. The fact remains, however, that even though Aquinas and other moderate theologians viewed sin in a deep and serious way, the general trend in medieval thought up to Luther's time had been Pelagian, however admirable may have been the motive of emphasizing human responsibility for sin. Luther was rejecting this trend towards Pelagianism. Today the official doctrine of the Roman church is probably to be considered as semi-Pelagian with some advocating a more semi-Augustinian position, if that distinction is not too fine.

In the second place, another fundamental difference between Luther's and the Roman doctrine of sin lies in his radical teaching of the nature of the demand of the law. Roman theology, as has been mentioned, held that sin is the trans-

gression of the law, as did Luther. They interpreted the law in such a way, however, that one could only transgress the law by a free and voluntary act of the reason and will: "sin, being the free and deliberate transgression of the law of God, can only be in the rational will." Catholic Encyclopedia IV, 208. They also held that only mortal and not venial sins were really trespasses of the law, since they alone are repugnant to the primary end of the law: Ibid. XIV, 9. Aquinas says that unbelief is the greatest of sins, and that faith is the first of the theological virtues, but the greatest of the virtues, to him, is "caritas", without which real virtue is impossible: Summa Theol. II, II, Q. 2, a. 3. McGiffert, History of Christian Thought II, 285. Even at its highest, Roman theology had a moralistic view of sin and law, which inevitably must reduce the demand of the law into an intricate hierarchy of grades and degrees of sins: "in contradistinction to the Protestant doctrine of an absolute corruption of man's nature, Trent speaks only of a wounding, weakening or clouding of human nature, thus admitting in its practical application a host of qualifications and adaptations." Schmitt, Necessity of Politics.

Luther, on the other hand, by reducing the absolute demand of the law to faith (and by refusing to include "caritas" as an integral part of a "complete" faith, which he felt would immediately introduce a subtle kind of legalism), defined sin in terms of the contrast between law and faith. Otto says that Paul's rejection of the flesh is at its highest plane the rejection of the law and the whole way of the law: "this meaning was rediscovered in its entirety and purity by Luther, and is the most profound and characteristic element in his teaching. Here all that does not proceed from Faith is sin and flesh." Religious Essays, 12. Elert summarizes Luther's view of sin: "Es gibt keinen Menschen ohne Sünde. Es gibt auch keine Neutralität zwischen Sünde und Gerechtigkeit. Und es gibt keine Sünde, die nicht Feindschaft wider Gott wäre." Morphologie des Luthertums I, 15. Holl thinks that Luther's view of sin is still a decisive point for or against him: "Und noch heute fällt die Entscheidung für oder wider Luther eben an dem Punkt, ob man den Begriff der Sünde ernsthaft anerkennt oder ihn freundlich unterdrückt." Ges. Aufs. I, 447.

160. W. A. XL, 1, 554.

161. Ibid. 496.

162. "Nu die erste prediget stehet am andern buch Mose, da sich Gott selber hat horen lassen von hymel herab mit grosser pracht und herlicher gewalt zu der zeit, da er denn volcke von Israel das gesetz gab, mit donnern und plixen, mit rauchdampff und seer starcken posauen, wilchs das volck alles horete und daruber zitterte und erschrack." W. A. XXIV, 3.

163. "Nunc legis usum significant terribilis ille aspectus et pompa qua Deus legem tulit in monte Syna...Hoc ergo officium lex habet quod in monte Syna habuit, cum primum lata est et audiebatur a lotis, iustis, purificatis et castis, et tamen redēgit illos Sanctos in agnitionem suae miseriae usque ad desperationem et mortem." W. A. XL, 1 483-4.
164. "Quia enim ratio humana opinione iustitiae insolescit et putat se propter eam placere Deo, Ideo oportet Deum mittere aliquem Herculem, scilicet Legem quae monstrum istud toto impetu adoriatur, prosternat et conficiat. Igitur lex hanc bestiam solam petit, non aliam...Quare magnum et horribile monstrum est Opinio iustitiae." Ibid. 481-2.
165. Ibid. 482.
166. "Non intrat in cor neque sapit praedicatio de gratuita et remissione peccatorum, quia ingens rupes et adamantinus murus, scilicet Opinio iustitiae, qua cor ipsum cinctum est, hoc impedit." Ibid.
167. Ibid. 489.
168. Ibid. 486.
169. Luther found many examples of this type of spiritual experience in the Bible, for instance, in the Psalms, in the lives of great saints such as Abraham, Jacob, Job, and Paul, and above all in Christ: Lunn, Martin Luther, 162-4. One of the first full treatments of Luther's special use of the term has recently appeared: Buhler, Anfechtung bei Martin Luther (Zürich University Diss., 1942). Holl has pointed out that "Anfechtung" was a characteristic element of Luther's whole spiritual experience: "So ziehen sich bei ihm, anders als bei Zwingli und Calvin, 'Anfechtungen' durch das ganze Leben hindurch." Ges. Aufs. I, 383. Luther's spelling has been retained in the use of the term in this paper.
170. Heiler has pointed out the similarities between Luther's deep spiritual tribulation: "diesen furchtbaren inneren Anfechtungen" and mystics' dark night of the soul: "dunkle Nacht der Seele"; "Luther hat die Schrecken dieser 'dunklen Nacht' durchschritten und in wundervoller Plastik beschrieben." Heiler, "Luthers Bedeutung für die christliche Kirche" in Luther in Ökumenischer Sicht, 149. Appel has treated this problem in some detail: Anfechtung und Trost im Spätmittelalter und bei Luther. He draws attention to two main groups of mystics in Germany: One group tended to develop their meditations on the thought of trust and dependence on God's goodness and mercy; the "Trostbücher" are the productions of this school. On the other hand, there were

those who dwelt on the contemplation of death; the "Ars moriendi", or "Todesanfechtung-" and "Sterbebüchlein" reflect this type of mysticism. Appel says that these mystics had a deep understanding of the law and identified it with the love commandment as did Luther: Ibid. 28-9. They also taught that the law and the doctrine of election are two of the main sources of "Anfechtung": "Gesetzanfechtung und Erwählungszweifel, die die Krise bei Luther herbeiführten, sind auch die entscheidenden Anfechtungen für die alten Trost- und Sterbebücher." There are some important differences between Luther and the mystics, however; the mystics distinguished between mortal and venial sins and felt that the wrath of God was directed against their baser self rather than against the whole man as with Luther: "gegen seine niederen 'Krafte', unter der der innere Mensch (zwar mit leidet', von der er aber im Grunde nicht selbst getroffen wird." Finally, the mystics emphasized the work of Christ as the Example for overcoming the law, while Luther looked to Him as the Victor over the law: Ibid. 129-31. Holl, Ges. Aufs. I, 12. Bühler, Die Anfechtung bei Martin Luther, 148-68. Luther had psychological affinities with the mystics but the whole theological interpretation which he gave to "Anfechtung" was an indication of the different ground which he stood upon: "The so-called German Mysticism, dogmatically considered, furnishes scarcely anything further than a popular rendering of the Scholastic, i. e. Thomistic ideas." Seeberg, History of Doctrines II, 178.

171. Reiter, Martin Luthers Umwelt, Character und Psychose (2 vol.) is one of the most notable attempts at making a psychoanalytic study of Luther; it has been written in a rather polemic style with a good deal of prejudice against Luther so that its views must be taken with a grain of salt. Reiter treats "Anfechtung" in the chapter: "Übersicht über Verlauf und Symptomatologie von Luthers psychischen Leiden": Ibid. II, 359ff.; he believes that Luther's obsession with the law was another of his psychoses. It does seem to be true that Luther was peculiarly subject to fits of melancholy and depression, and his confessors and teachers were often disturbed (as he was himself) at his chronic sinister experiences: Mackinnon, Luther and the Reformation I, 124. Mackinnon, nevertheless, rejects the idea that one can explain Luther's sense of dread purely by means of abnormal psychology and says that that was only one element in his religious experience. Holl also stresses the religious-theological context of the concept: Ges. Aufs. I, 447-8. Scheel says that even if the attacks of fear and morbid horror were related to an unhealthy body and had physical repercussions on Luther, the root of the fear was his deep sense of the righteous judgment of God: Die Entwicklung Luthers, 80. If one were to take Reiter's judgments too seriously, he could be led to make similar statements about many great saints.

172. W. A. XL, 1, 583. "was ist nu grosser anfectung denn die sundt und boss gewissen, das gottis zorn altzeyt furcht und nymmer ruge hatt?...solch vortzagen und unruge des gewissen nit anders ist, denn ein gesprechen des glaubens, die aller schwereste kranckheit, die der mensch mag haben an leyb und seele, und si nit auff ein mall odder eylend mag gesund werden." W. A. VI, 376-7 (Sermon v. d. neuen Testament, 1520).
173. "Ita haec verba: 'Christus factus est sub legem' etc., ut valde sunt significantia, ita diligenter ponderanda sunt, indicant enim filium Dei sub legem factum non unum atque alterum opus legis fecisse aut tantum civiliter sub ea fuisse, sed omnem legis tyrannidem passum fuisse. Lex enim in summo suo usu exercuit Christum, tam horribiliter perterrefecit eum, ut tantum angorem senserit, quantum nullus hominum anquam sensit." W. A. XL, 1, 567. Aulen says that Luther speaks of the law "in the same language as that in which Chrysostom spoke of the devil as attacking Christ, exceeding his rights and therefore losing them." Christus Victor, 127f. "er ward unter das Gesetz getan (Gal. 4,4) auf zwiefache Weise: zum ersten freiwillig unter die Werke des Gesetzes, sie zu erfüllen, zum andern unter die Strafe des Gesetzes, die ihre Bitterkeit von dem Erschrecken des Gewissens unter Gottes Zorn nimmt. Das Gesetz hat ihn der Sünde der ganzen Welt geschuldigt, erschreckt und geängstet --diese Angst was sein blutiger Schweiss in Gethsemane." Vogelsang, Der Angefochtene Christus bei Luther, 29. But how can the law be considered a tyrant when it is so intimately related to the will of God? Vogelsang gives a clue when he describes the second way in which Christ was under the law; when Christ took upon himself the sins of the world, the law as it rightly should condemned and attacked that sin. Christ, however, overcame the law because the sin which he bore was not really his. The law is a tyrant to Christ only when He identifies Himself with the sins of the world.
174. "Sic Christus, persona divina et humana, natur ex Deo aeternaliter, ex Virgine temporaliter, non venit ad concendas leges, sed tolerandas et tollendas. Non factus est Magister legis, sed discipulus obediens legi, ut hac sua obedientia redimeret eos, qui sub lege erant." W. A. XL, 1, 568, 566. In speaking of Christ's victory over the law, Luther includes the somewhat exotic idea of the law accusing and terrifying Christ by mistake and thereby sealing its own condemnation: "Hoc profecto mirabile duellum est, ubi Lex Creatura cum Creatore sic concreditur et praeter omne ius omnem tyrannidem suam in filio Dei exercet, quam in nobis filiis irae exercuit. Quia ergo lex tam horribiliter et impie peccavit in Deum suum, vocatur in ius et accusatur." Ibid. 565. Luther's justifies pictur-

ing the law in these personal terms on Biblical precedents. The Bible always uses this kind of figurative speech, he says: "Ad hunc modum Paulus de illo mirabili duello passim loquitur et, ut res iucundior et illustrior fiat, legem pingere solet per prosopopoeiam, quasi sit potentissima quaedam persona, quae Christum condemnauerit et occiderit, Quam ipse superata morte vicissim vicerit, condemnauerit et occiderit, Ephesios 2:...et Cap. 4 ex Psalmo 68:... Ea prosopopeia usus est etiam ad Roma., Corinth., Collos." W. A. XL, 1, 566. As Dodd has pointed out, however, Paul himself was ^{not} adverse to the use of anthropomorphisms in referring to God; also "he constantly uses 'wrath' or 'the Wrath' in a curiously impersonal way...Again, there are several passages where 'the Wrath' is used absolutely, almost as a proper noun, rightly represented by a capital letter in English." The Epistle of Paul to the Romans, 20ff. Luther here reveals his remarkable affinity with the Hebrew cast of mind, perhaps one of the reasons his commentaries and translations of the Bible have had such enduring value, and that he had such a deep understanding of Pauline theology.

175. The awful effect of the law upon the heart is an inevitable one, according to Luther, the law being what it is--good and holy, and our heart being what it is--sinful and fallen. As he puts it in Disputatio contra scholasticam theologiam (1517): "Lex et voluntas sunt adversarii duo sine gratia implacabiles. (Th. 71)...Lex facit abundare peccatum, quia irritat et retrahit voluntatem a seipsa (Th. 74)...lex sit bona...omnis voluntas naturalis est iniqua et mala...Necessaria est mediatrix gratia, quia conciliet legem voluntati (Th. 87-9)." W. A. I, 227-8. "Quare ista fuga indicat infinitum odium cordis humani contra legem et per consequens contra ipsum Deum." W. A. XL, 1, 496. Althaus says that Luther badly misrepresents Paul's thought at this point: "Das Unterschied von Paulus und Luther in der Anthropologie ist deutlich geworden...Das Bild des Menschen ohne Christus, wie Paulus es sah, findet sich bei Luther nicht." Paulus und Luther, 47, 41. Althaus has drawn up a table of differences between Paul's and Luther's theology, in one of which the difference lies in the fact that according to Paul the natural man has a real love of the law of God and desires to fulfil it: "hat als inwendiger Mensch Freude an Gottes Gesetz", while for Luther even the inner man hates the law: "hasst Gottes Gesetz." Ibid. 46. Althaus' main criticism of Luther is that he misinterprets Rom. 7:18, not realizing that "τὰς μὲν kann nicht bezeichnung des ganzen Ich sein." Ibid. 49 n. 1. Althaus' criticism really rests on a particular reading of the autobiographical passage in Romans in which Paul describes his own inner experience of what Luther would call "Anfechtung"; for Luther that experience is part of our Christian experience and the man outside of Christ is in a different situation,

for he simply hates the law . The Christian, on the other, hand, has a dynamic relation with the law for when he can realize that Christ has overcome the law, then he can appreciate the goodness and justice of it.

176. "Conscientia enim res est tenerrima; ideo, cum sic carcere legis concluditur, nusquam patet ei exitus, sed apparet ei istam angustiam subinde augeri usque in infinitum. Sentit enim tunc iram Dei qui infinitus est, cuius manum effugere non potest." W. A. XL, 1, 521-2. "legem Dei. Quae quanquam est summum omnium quae sunt in mundo, tamen tantum abest, ut conscientiam conterritam possit pacatam reddere, ut etiam plus contristet ac in desperationem adigat." Ibid. 42. The conscience is the organ of knowledge of both the natural and Biblical law: "Das Gewissen als Organ fürs Naturgesetz ist auch Organ für willige Anerkennung der sich mit diesem deckenden Gottesgebote." Meyer, Hist. Komm. zu Luthers Kleine Katechismus, 155-6. The natural conscience, however, must be enlightened by God: "Es wirkt aber nicht als rein autoritative Mitteilung (wie bei Augustin, vgl.) ...sondern durch Erleuchtung Gottes." Ibid. 157. The collaboration between the law and the natural conscience ultimately produces moralistic religion and finally despair: Jacob, Der Gewissensbegriff in der Theologie Luthers, 8-11. It is therefore necessary that the conscience should depend not only on the law for enlightenment but also upon the gospel for relief; the conscience must be bound to the Word of God as both gospel and law and as it is it becomes a good and profitable servant: "Luthers Gewissen war im Worte Gottes gefangen. Dies war da grosse Geheimnis seines Lebens und Wirkens und zugleich das Geheimnis und der innerste Kern der Reformation." Alanen, Das Gewissen bei Luther, 5.
177. Bühler, Die Anfechtung bei Martin Luther, 121ff. "Was Luther in solcher äussersten Bedrängnis noch aufrecht erhielt, war etwas überraschend Einfaches. Es war das erste Gebot. An dessen Anfangsworte, an das: 'Ich bin der Herr dein Gott', hat er sich immer in seiner Todesnot geklammert." Holl, Ges. Aufs. I, 73. Watson criticizes Holl for saying that Luther felt himself confronted by God without the mediation of Christ in the First Commandment and this brought on periods of "Anfechtung". According to Watson "In times of spiritual distress, Luther returns again and again to the First Commandment with its assurance: 'I am thy God'." Holl, therefore, "ignores the fact that he (Luther) could not have interpreted the First Commandment as he does, apart from his understanding of Christ. The Commandment has become for him one of the 'larvae Dei' which 'as it were contain Christ'." Let God Be God, 183 n. 92. Watson here seems to miss the distinction between law and gospel which he elsewhere brings out very clearly. The believer, secure in his faith and trust in God through Christ, can see the law as something

which no longer must be feared, but rather admired and praised as the holy and pure agent by which God drove him to the gospel. But it is only "in Christ" that it takes on such an aspect. When the faith of the believer becomes shaken or dimmed (as it does in the periods of "Anfechtung") then the law once again brings the dread and horror which it originally conveyed. The First Commandment is one of the "larvae Dei" but it can only be seen as such by those "in Christ". And being "in Christ" was never a mechanical or static thing for Luther. Furthermore, it is the First Commandment as gospel and as promise which gives Luther comfort; as law it continues to terrify him. Even though our conscience is liberated from the tyranny of the law, the law continues to reveal sin and bring terror: "Hac ergo victoria sua fugavit Christus e conscientia nostra Legem, ut amplius non possit nos confundere in conspectu Dei, in desperationem adigere et damnare. Non desinit quidem ostendere peccatum, accusare et peterrefacere, sed conscientia apprehendens hoc Apostoli verbum: 'Christus a lege nos redemit', fide erigitur et consolationem accipit." W. A. XL, 1, 566.

Luther's thought at this point is very difficult to set into a consistent pattern. Part of the difficulty arises from his distinction of the old and new man which exist at the same time within the Christian; the flesh, or old man, must be bound by the law, while the spirit, or new man, is free under the gospel: "Iustitia Christiana pertinet ad novum hominem, iustitia vero legis ad veterem qui natus est ex carne et sanguine." W. A. XL, 1, 45. Another complication is that Luther sometimes says of the First Commandment that it contains both law and gospel: "Das dritte stuck des Ersten gepots ist eine trostliche zusagung." W. A. XVI, 445. There has been a good bit of discussion recently as to whether Luther thought of the First Commandment as essentially a promise or command. Meyer, for instance, holds that Luther tended to teach that the whole Decalogue was essentially gospel or "promissio mit ihren ethischen Konsequenzen." This was in the period from 1530 to 1537; in the Antinomian controversy "der Dekalog wieder als 'lex' betont." Hist. Komm. zu Luthers Kleine Katechismus, 163ff. Gühloff has made a full study of this in his Gebieten und Schaffen Gottes in Luthers Auslegung des ersten Gebotes (Göttingen University Diss., 1939); it is his conclusion that the division of law and gospel within the First Commandment (which Thieme says Luther teaches) cannot be strictly defended; Luther, he believes, consistently held that the First Commandment is the summary of the whole law of God and only in a deeper sense can it be said to be gospel--perhaps as they were one in the garden of Eden so they may still be in the eyes of God. Bühler holds that Luther taught that both law and gospel are included in the

First Commandment: Die Anfechtung bei Martin Luther, 121ff., 124. The solution may be found in comparing Luther's treatment of the First Commandment with his understanding of the relation between Christ and the law. Christ's proper work ("opus proprium") is to bring the gospel, but he also has the strange work ("opus alienum") of expounding the law. So the First Commandment has the proper work of summarizing the law, but also the strange work of telling of the promise. This does not mean, however, that the law and gospel have become one; they continue to have their peculiar functions which must not be mingled: "Das Dritte stuck des Ersten gepots ist eine trestliche zusagung...denn Gott thut alles beydes ynn der schrift, drawet odder schrecket und troestet...er am ersten drawet, schrecket und das hertz verzagt macht, darnach troestet und richt das hertz widerumb auff." W. A. XVI, 445-6. Luther, of course, never maintained that there is an ultimate dualism between the law and gospel; both are part of God's Word and they have their ultimate unity in Him; but in Him alone, however.

178. "Evangelium neben dem Gesetz. Aber gerade dieses Nebeneinander ist der ständige Grund zur Anfechtung, weil das schreckliche Schweben zwischen Furcht und Hoffnung nicht überwunden werden kann, solange Gesetz und Evangelium gleichwertig nebeneinander stehen." Bühler, Die Anfechtung bei Martin Luther, 39-53, 111-21. Vogelsang comes to much the same conclusion: Der Angefochtene Christus, 33-4.
179. Holl, Ges. Aufs. I, 388. Niebuhr, Nature and Destiny I, 290.
180. "Quando deus incipit hominem iustificare prius eum damnat, et quem vult aedificare, destruit, quem vult sanare, percutit, quem vivificare, occidit...Hoc autem facit, quando hominem conterit et in sui suorumque peccatorum cognitionem humiliat ac tremefacit...In ista autem conturbatione incipit salus, Quia initium sapientiae timor domini." W. A. I, 540. "Deus certo promisit humiliatis, id est, deploratis et desperatis, gratiam suam. Humiliari vero penitus non potest homo, donec sciat, prorsus extra suas vires, consilia, studia, voluntatem, opera, omnino ex alterius arbitrio, consilio, voluntate opere suam pendere salutem, nempe Dei solius...Qui vero nihil dubitat, totum in voluntate Dei pendere, is prorsus de se desperat, nihil eligit, sed expectat operantem Deum, is proximus est gratiae, ut salvus fiat. Itaque propter electos ista vulgantur, ut isto modo humiliati et in nihilum redacti, salvi fiant." W. A. XVIII, 632-3. "den freyen, sichern geysten, die yhre sund nit beysset, die mess keyn nutz ist." W. A. VI, 377. "Den er (Gott) from machen wil, den macht er vorhyn zum sunder, Und wen er reich machen wil, den stost er vor ynn die helle." W. A. XVI, 445.

181. "Est et lex audienda, sed suo loco et tempore." W. A. XL, 1, 204. "Tempus legem audiendi, contemnendi, tempus Euangelii audiendi, tempus Euangelium nesciendi." Ibid. 209
182. "Quanquam ergo Lex occidit, tamen Deus utitur isto effectui legis, hoc est ista morte, in bonum usum, scilicet ad vitam." Ibid. 517.
183. "Quare lex non est contra promissa Dei, sed potius pro illis. Quanquam autem non implet promissionem et non affert iustitiam, tamen suo officio et usu humiliat nos atque ita reddit capaces gratiae et beneficii Christi." Ibid. 512, 509.
184. "Lex ergo cum cogit hoc modo agnoscere malitiam et ex animo peccatum confiteri, suum officium fecit et tempus eius completum est Tempusque gratiae adest, ut veniat benedictum Semen, quod conterritum et contusum lege iterum erigat ac consoletur." Ibid. 509.
185. "Quare sermo Evangelicus excellit legem, quia Lex est servorum vox, Evangelium est Domini vox." Ibid. 494.
186. "Post istas ergo confutationes et argumentationes satis prolixae et pulchre docet Paulus legem nihil aliud esse, si verum et optimum eius usum perspexeris, quam Paedagogian quandam ad iustitiam." Ibid. 512.
187. "Dulcia enim non meminit, qui non gustavit amara. Fames optimus cocus est. Ut ergo terra arida pluviam sitit, sic Lex perturbata corda facit sitire Christum. His Christus dulcissime sapit, iis est gaudium, solatium et vita. Ibi tum primum recte cognoscitur Christus et eius officium. Ille ergo usus legis optimus est, eatenus scilicet ea posse uti, quatenus humiliat et facit sitire Christum. Ipse met requirit sitientes animas...Libenter ergo potat et irrigat istas aridas terras. Non profundit aquas suas in terram impinguatam, incrassatam aut non sitientem." Ibid. 509. "Non profundit in terram impinguatam incrassatam, quia sua vita ist zu kostlich." Ibid. 509-10 (1531).
188. Ibid. 520.
189. The first danger is that we may be untouched by the voice of the law through the extreme hardness of our hearts. But even when we have heard the demand of the law, we may still be misled by the devil into misinterpreting the meaning of the "Anfechtung" into which the law has plunged us. It is in this way that the law may become the organ of the devil as well as an organ of God: Sormunen, Die Eigenart der Lutherischen Ethik, 40-1. In this way the devil may lead a man to misuse the Ten Commandments; Luther writes to Hieronymus

Weller, who is suffering from an over-scrupulous conscience, that we must sin and jest out of hatred for the devil, now and then, so that he cannot burden our conscience with mere trifles: "I tell you, we must put all the Ten Commandments with which the devil tempts and plagues us so greatly, out of sight and out of mind. If the devil upraids us with our sins and declares us to be deserving of death and hell, then we must say: 'I confess that I have merited death and hell', but what then? Are you for that reason to be damned eternally? By no means. 'I know One Who suffered and made satisfaction for me, viz. Jesus Christ, the Son of God. Where He is, There I also shall be'." Quoted by Grisar, Luther III, 175. Some critics have used such letters as these to show that Luther advocated libertinism! He is simply trying to show that obsession with sins is as bad as not being conscious of them. Christ is the Lord, even over sins is essentially what Luther is trying to say. In another letter to Weller this comes out: "Magister Veit tells me that at times you are a prey to a spirit of melancholy...A joyful heart is life to a man, and an unceasing fountain of health, and prolongs his years...be sure that these black thoughts proceed from the devil, for God is not a God of sadness, but of consolation and joy. Is not joy in the Lord real life? ...God takes no pleasure in such sorrow. Sorrow over our sins is very different. It is a sweet sorrow, in view of forgiveness; but that which proceeds from the devil has no promises annexed. It is of no avail." Currie, Letters of Martin Luther, 220-1.

190. "Solet enim diabolus in afflictione et pugna conscientiae per legem terrere nos et opponere conscientiam peccati, vitam nostram pessime transactam, iram et iudicium dei, infernum et aeternam mortem, ut sic nos in desperationem adigat, nos sibi subiiciat et a Christo abstrahat." W. A. XL, 1, 50.
191. The devil attacks us with accusations of sin all through our life, even to the very death bed: "Und gar auf dem Totenbett kommt der Teufel und hält die Sünde vor und will das Gewissen in Zweifel führen. Da ist's dann gut, dass man's nimmt, dass man da den Tyrannen, Tod und Teufel könnt trotzen und sagen: 'Siehe, du Tyrann, siehe, du Teufel fichtst mir an mein Leben und Gewissen; sieh, da hab ich ein Zeichen, das Christus sein Leib und Leben, Blut und Fleisch für mich gesetzt hat'." Vom heiligen Abendmahl, 34 (Ein Sermon am grünen Donnerstag, 1523) W. A. XII, 476ff. In a sermon on the confessional and the sacraments in 1534, Luther attacks the kind of confession which probes deeper into hearts which are already broken and penitent: Jacobs, Hol. Ed. I, 77. "Ita Theologice carcer est perturbatio et anxietas animi, qua conclusus privatur pace conscientiae et quiete cordis. Non tamen in aeternum, ut ratio iudicat." W. A. XL, 1, 522.

192. "Lege occideris, ut per Christum vivificeris, Quare ne desperes ut Cain, Saul et Iudas; qui conclusi in illo carcere nihil addiderunt, sed in illa ipsa conclusione manserunt, ideo coacti sunt desperare. Te aliter geras in istis conscientiae pavoribus oportet quam illi, nempe, ut scias benefactum esse, quod sic conclusus et confusus es, sed vide, ut ista conclusione recte utaris, scilicet in futuram fidem. " W. A. XL, 1, 522.
193. Ibid. 526.
194. "Qui ista extreme contraria in tentatione novit coniungere, hoc est, qui, ubi maxime lege terretur, novit finem legis et initium gratiae seu futurae fidei adesse, is recte utitur lege. Hanc artem ignorant omnes impii." Ibid. 521.
195. "Alterum infernus, alterum coelum est, et tamen ea oportet esse in corde coniunctissima. Speculative coniunguntur facillime, sed in practice ea coniungere est omnium difficillimum, Id quod propria experientia saepissime didici. Papistae et Sectarii de hac re prorsus nihil noverunt." Ibid. 523.
195. "Ideo et Paulus hanc luctam spiritualem describens utitur valde Emphaticis ac significantibus verbis, scilicet militandi, repugnandi et captivandi." Ibid. 524. Luther includes in the "luctam spiritualem" even such apparently speculative and abstract problems as the omnipotence and omniscience of God: "Ego ipse non semel offensus sum usque ad profundum et abyssum desperationis, ut optarem nunquam esse me creatum hominem, antequam scirem, quam salutaris illa esset desperatio et quam gratiae propinqua." W. A. XVIII, 719.
196. W. A. XL, 1, 525.
197. Ibid. 526.

Notes - II

1. Luther says that we should neither underestimate the gravity of sins, nor overestimate their greatness when compared to Christ; for He came to deliver us from the really great sins! "Itaque ne fingas ea esse parva quae tuis operibus oboleri possint; Neque desperes propter ipsorum magnitudinem, cum aliquando in vita vel in morte serio ea senseris, Sed disce hic ex Paulo credere Christum non pro fictis aut pictis, sed veris, Non pro parvis, sed maximis, Non pro uno atque altero, sed omnibus, Non pro invictis (Quia nullus homo, nullus etiam angelus vel minimum peccatum vincere potest), sed pro invictis peccatis traditum esse." W. A. XL, 1, 87. "The law and the works to which it prompts only confirm man in his self-righteousness and in his belief in his natural goodness or moral perfectability, or alternatively drive him to despair. The psychological situation of the world is consequently one of oscillation between pride and despair." Oldham, The Church and Its Function in Society, 136. Oldham ascribes this view to all of the Reformers. Luther says that the natural man throughout the world has constantly been worried about the problem of salvation; feeling his sin (through the law written in his heart) he thinks that by outward observances, by following the external injunctions of the Ten Commandments, all will be well. He then either falls into pride through believing that he has fulfilled the law, or into despair when he realizes that he cannot. W. A. LII, 347 (Hauspostille, 1532-34). Despair is nearer the gospel than pride because it is the necessary preparatory step for acceptance of the gospel; but it is only a step and unless the law eventually drives us to the gospel its work is hopeless and futile; fear of the law in itself is not enough. W. A. XIV, 421.
2. "Das ist nu die Donneraxt Gottes, da mit er beide die offentlichen Sunder und falschen Heiligen ynn ein hauffen schlegt, und lesst keinen recht haben, treibet sie alle sampt jnn das schrecken und verzagen. Das ist der Hamer (wie Jeremias spricht): Mein Wort ist ein Hamer der die Felsen zuschmettert." W. A. L, 225-6.
3. "Wo aber das Gesetze solch sein Ampt allein treibet on zuthun des Euangelij, da ist der Tod und die Helle, und mus der Mensch verzweueln, wie Saul und Judas." Ibid. 226. One might say there was a subtle element of pride in the despair which refuses to be delivered from its wretchedness. Luther recognizes this by emphasizing the "our" in Gal. 1: 4: "who gave himself for our sins". "Perpende autem diligenter singula verba Pauli, et imprimis bene nota et urge hoc pronomen: Nostri...Hinc hypocritae ignari Christi, etiamsi sentiant remorsum peccati, tamen cogitant se facile suis operibus et illud abolituros." W. A. XL, 1, 85-6. As Nygren points out

this desire of the natural man to gain a standing before God, in wishing to purify himself before taking refuge in God's "misericordia", is at its heart, according to Luther, a secret "praesumptio". Agape and Eros II, 2, 466. The fact that Christ died for our sins is the judgment of God--the heavenly thunder--against all self-righteousness based on the law: "Sed sind eitel tonitrua coelestia contra iusticiam legis, hominum." W. A. XL, 1, 83 (1531).

4. "Du heiliger Teufel, vis me sanctum facere...Postea sol Teufel peccatum machen ex bono opere." Ibid. 88. Those who have fallen into the hands of the devil, first have no real feeling of sin and only pretend to be sinners, feigning humility: "ut humiles fratres...fingunt quaedam peccata." The words "for our sins" mean nothing to them. Then, however, when in temptation they really do feel sin, they fall into despair: "Illis haec verbe Pauli ('Pro peccatis nostris') sunt plane inania et falsa. Ideo neque ea intelligunt, neque in tentatione, cum peccatum serio sentiunt, consolationem ex eis accipere possunt, Sed ibi simpliciter desperare coguntur." Ibid. 87. Obendiek seems to believe that Luther's view is that only the gospel is a means of combatting the devil and that the law plays no part here: "Nicht Gesetz und Vorschrift, sondern das Wort der Gnade tritt dem Teufel entgegen. Erst im Wort der Gnade ist Leben und Sieg...Die Bekämpfung des Teufels ist nur durch das Evangelium möglich." Der Teufel bei Martin Luther, 117, 120. This is a misrepresentation of Luther's thought. The law in its proper work of revealing sin is doing a work of God and is an enemy of the devil by destroying human presumption. It is only when the devil confirms a man in the despair to which he has been driven by the law (by insinuating an element of pride into the despair) that the work of the law is to the advantage of the devil. It is the work of the gospel to repair this damage. The gospel is the last enemy of the devil, but not the only one. The law and the gospel together form the two-edged sword by which the devil is destroyed.
5. "Darumb sein die zusagung gottis, wort des newen testaments und gehören auch yns newe testament." B. A. II, 14. Luther often uses the word "promise" in referring to the gospel, especially in reference to the gospel as found in the Old Testament.
6. W. A. XVIII, 692. "Nam in novo testamento praedicatur Euangelion, quod est aliud nihil, quam sermo, quo offertur spiritus et gratia in remissionem peccatorum per Christum crucifixum pro nobis impetratam, idque totum gratis solaque misericordia Dei patris nobis indignis et damnationem merentibus potius quam aliquid aliud, favente."

7. W. A. LVI, 169 (Schol., Rom. 1: 3,4).
8. B. A. II, 12 (W. A. VII, 22).
9. W. A. VI, 358 (Sermon von dem neuen Testament, 1520).
10. W. A. L, 240 (Schmalkaldische Artikel, 1538). These quotations should illustrate the point of A. Harnack: "Where Luther, undisturbed by any shibboleth, gave expression to what was really his own Christianity, he never reflected on the gospel 'in itself'--that was for him a Jewish or heathenish reflection, similar to the reflection on God 'in Himself', atonement 'in itself', faith 'in itself'--but he kept in view the gospel together with its effects." History of Dogma VII, 204-5. Loofs, Dogmengeschichte, 714.
11. "Fürwar wer Gottis gnaden nit also achtet, das sie yhn als eynen sunder dulden und selig machen werd, unnd alleyn seynem gericht entgegen geht, der wirt gottis nymmer frolich, mag yhn auch widder lieben noch loben. Aber sso wyr horen, das er yn der tauff bund uns sunder auffnympt, schonet und macht uns reyn von tag zu tag, un das festicklich glewbe muss das hertz frolich werde, gott lieben und loben." W. A. II, 737 (Ein Sermon von dem heiligen hochwürdigen Sakrament der Taufe, 1519).
12. "Hic est Ihesus Christus crucifixus, caput omnium sanctorum princeps omnium patientium...Huius agni sanguis in limine signatus arcet percussorem angelum...Hoc est lignum, quod Moses iussus est mittere in aquas Marath, id est amaras passionem, et dulces factae sunt. Nihil est quod haec passio non dulcoret, etiam mortem..." W. A. VI, 117 (Tessara-decas, 1520).
13. W. A. XVIII, 683 (De servo arbitrio, 1525).
14. "Ex his satis intelligi potest, quod sit discrimen inter Legem et Evangelium. Lex nunquam affert spiritum sanctum, ergo nec iustificat, quia solum docet, quid nos facere debeamus. Evangelium vero affert spiritum sanctum, quia docet, quid accipere debeamus. Ideo lex et Evangelium duae prorsus contrariae doctrinae sunt. Statuere ergo iustitiam in lege est simpliciter luctari contra Evangelium. Nam lex est exactor postulans, ut nos operemur et demus. In summa: vult a nobis habere. Contra Evangelium non exigit, sed donat gratis et iubet nos perrectis manibus oblata accipere. Differunt autem per contrarium exigere et donare, accipere et offerre, nec simul possunt existere. Nam quod datur, accipio; quod vero dono, non accipio, sed alteri offero. Itaque si Evangelium est donum et offert donum, ergo nihil exigit. Contra lex nihil donat, sed a nobis exigit, et quidem impossibilia etc." W. A. XL, 1, 336-7.

15. "Hoc est, lex facit nos peccatores, peccatum facit nos reos mortis. Quis haec duo vicit? Nostra iustitia? nostra vita? non, sed Ihesus Christus a morte resurgens, peccatum et mortem damnans, suam iustitiam nobis impartiens, sua merita nobis donans, suam manum super nos ponens, et bene habemus, et legem implemus, et peccatum mortemque superamus." W. A. VI, 133 (Tessaradecas, 1520). "Das geseetz gebeut und foddert von uns was wir thuen sollen...Das Euangelion aber prediget nicht was wir thuen odder lassen sollen, foddert nichts von uns, sondern wendet es umb, thut das widderspiel und saget nicht: thue dis, thue das, sondern heyst uns nur die schos her-halten und nemen und spricht: Sihe lieber mensch, das hat dir Gott gethan, etc." W. A. XXIV, 4 (Über das 1. Buch Mose. Predigten, 1527). "das Gesetz ist zwar ein Gesetz des lebens, Gerechtigkeit und alles guts, so durch Mosen gegeben ist, aber durch Christum ist etwas mehr geschehen, der komet und pullet den ledigen Beutel und leere Hand und bringet, was das Gesetze leret und von uns erfoddert...Derhalben so sollen wir diesen herrlichen unterschied des Gesetzes und gnade wol lernen, das wir von einander das ampt Christi und Mosi, Mosen und Christum recht erkennen, das man einem jglichen zueigene, was sein recht ampt und werck sey, auf das mans nicht in einander meng." W. A. XLVI, 661, 663 (Auslegung 1. und 2. Kapitels Johannis, 1537-38).
16. W. A. XXXVI, 14-3. (Predigten des Jahres, 1532).
17. W. A. XL, 1, 140. "Ipse plantaverat puram doctrinam Evangelii...Evangelium autem talis doctrina est quae quiddam sublimius docet...hanc salutis et vitae aeternae doctrinam." Ibid. 52-3.
18. Ibid. 141.
19. Harnack, History of Dogma VII, 175. Luther, of course, supported the ancient symbols but he did not look upon them as the means by which salvation comes; some of the later Lutheran dogmatists tended to fall into the error of saying that salvation comes by dogmatic consistency.
20. W. A. XL, 1, 142 (1531).
21. "Also ist das Evangelium Gottes und Neue Testament eine gute Mahre und Geschrey, in alle Welt erschollen durch die Apostel." Hamburg Auswahl X, 64-5.
22. Ibid. 64.
23. Ibid. 66.

24. "wenn ein sterbender Mann sein Gut bescheidet, nach seinem Tode den benannten Erben auszutheilen: also hat auch Christus vor seinem Sterben befohlen und beschieden, solches Evangelium nach seinem Tode auszurufen in alle Welt, und damit allen die da glauben, zu eigen gegeben alles sein Gut, das ist, sein Leben, damit er den Tod verschlungen, seine Gerechtigkeit, damit er die Sunde vertilget, und seine Seligkeit, damit er die ewige Verdammniss überwunden hat." H. A. X, 65. Christ alone has fulfilled the law and has thereby become Master over it: W. A. TR VI, 146. As Christ takes on our sin and subjection, so we take on his righteousness and dominion: "Therefore, dear brother, learn Christ and him crucified. Praise and laud His name, and despairing of self, say to him, 'Thou, Lord Jesus, art my righteousness, but I am Thy sin. Thou hast taken what is mine, and given me what is Thine. Thou hast assumed that which Thou wert not, and given me what I had not.' " Currie, Letters of Martin Luther, 5 (To George Spenlein, April 7, 1516). The gospel is the announcement of these facts and thereby itself becomes one agent by which the devil's kingdom is demolished: "Deinde per Evangelii doctrinam conculcatur quoque diabolus, destruitur eius Regnum, eripitur ei Lex, peccatum et mors (quibus ceu potentissimis et invictissimis Tyrannis universum genus humanum suo imperio subiugavit). Denique transferuntur sui captivi e Regno tenebrarum et servitutis in Regnum lucis et libertatis." W. A. XL, 1, 53.
25. H. A. X, 66.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid. 67. Luther is protesting the interpretation of the relation of Christ and the law made by Roman theology and still maintained in that tradition: "Christ is the author of the New Law...When the Gospel had been duly promulgated the civil and ceremonial precepts of the Law of Moses became not only useless, but false und superstitious, and thus forbidden. It was otherwise with the moral precepts of the Mosaic Law. The Master expressly taught that the observance of these, inasmuch as they are prescribed by nature herself, is necessary for salvation." Catholic Encyclopedia IX, 71. See also Adam, Spirit of Catholicism, 77ff., whose opinion is that Christ came to religiously deepen the demands of the Old Testament. In contrast to this position, C.H. Dodd (who cannot be suspected of holding a brief for Luther) says: "The Christian religion has its centre in the Gospel...This Gospel was embodied in the apostolic 'kerygma'...To men whose lives are spoiled and enslaved by sin, the divine 'agape' is known as power to forgive, heal and renew. Hence the Gospel of the glory of God comes to us as a Gospel of salvation." The Gospel and the Law of Christ, 5-7.

28. Heiler, "Luthers Bedeutung für die christliche Kirche" in Luther in Ökumenischer Sicht, 157.
29. W. A. I, 104-6. In his earlier writings Luther still maintains the official Roman position and speaks of the gospel as the new law of Christ: "Lex Christi, lex pacis, lex gratie, evangelium, vocatur multis nominibus aliis ut 'via domini'...Hoc videndum: Sine dubio ideo qui iudicet et iustificet credentem ei." W. A. III, 462 (Dictata super Psalterium, 1514-16). "Lex autem spiritualiter intellecta est idem cum evangelio." Ibid. 96 (Marg. Gloss, Ps. 10). But Luther's views were changing and in the sermon quoted above he says: "Multi enim vocant Euangelium praecepta vivendi in nova lege. Quibus fit impossibile, ut Apostolum Paulum intelligant, qui sicut et Christus proprie accipit 'Euangelium'." W. A. I, 105.
30. W. A. I, 113 (Sermo in die S. Thomae, Dec. 21, 1516). Watson presents this "double-office" of the gospel as Luther's mature view; this seems to me to be extremely doubtful. He used such terminology in his early theological writings but later he drew a sharper distinction between the office of the law and the office of the gospel. When Luther uses these terms in the strict sense which he later gave them, they do not overlap in their functions, even though they may be complementary. Watson, Let God Be God, 156ff.
31. "Ea quidem gloriosa ac divina opera et beneficia sunt, sed non propria Christi. Nam Prophetæ ducuerunt etiam legem, et miracula adiderunt. Christus vero est Deus et homo, qui pugnans cum lege passus est extremam ipsius saevitiam ac tyrannidem...Quare Christi verum et proprium officium est, luctari cum lege, peccato et morte totius mundi...Itaque particularia beneficia Christi sunt legem docere et miracula adere, propter quae praecipue non venit. Nam Prophetæ et praecipue Apostoli maiora miracula fecerunt quam Christus ipse." W. A. XL, 1, 569.
32. "Ob Gottes Zorn oder Gottes Güte sie hervorruft, macht keinen Unterschied. Alles (Dekalog oder Evangelium) was uns die Sünde zeigt, ist Gesetze...Christus als einer, der zur Busse der Sündenerkenntnis führt hat mit dem Evangelium noch nichts zu tun." Müller, Erfahrung und Glaube bei Luther, 52.
33. W.A. XL, 1, 568 (1531). "Haec prorsus aliena sunt a doctrina Papistarum, qui Christum fecerunt legislatorem, et Mose saeviores. Paulus hic omnino contrarium docet...Habuit ergo Christus se ad legem passive, non active. Non est igitur legislator et iudex secundum legem, sed in eo, dum fecit se servum legis, factus est noster redemptor a lege." Ibid.

The teaching of Christ as judge and the new lawgiver was one of the chief sources of Luther's "Anfechtung" in the monastery: "Und wir alle haben im Papstthumb also geblaubet, und auch also geprediget und gelehret und furgegeben: Wie, wenn Christus nicht mehr dein Heiland ware? Drumb suche einen andern, denn Christus ist nun dein Richter worden...In Kloostern hatten wir genung zu essen und zu trinken, aber do hatten wir Leiden und Marter am Herzen und Gewissen, und der Seelen Leiden ist das allergrosste. Ich bin cft fur dem Namen Jesu erschrocken, und wenn ich ihnen anblickte am Kreuz, so dunkte mich, er war mir als ein Blitz, und wenn sein Name genennet wurde, so hatte ich lieber den Teufel horen nennen, dann ich gedachte, ich musste so lange gute Werk thun, bis Christus mir dardurch zum Freunde und genadig gemacht wurde." Scheel, Dokumente, 24-5 (Aus den Predigten über Matth. 18-24, 1539). Luther testifies that it was through the discovery of the meaning of the gospel that he found relief from his spiritual tribulation: "Ego ipse nisi liberatus fuisset consolatione Christi per evangelium." Ibid. 22 (Enarr. in gen., ca. 1540). One may discount this somewhat to the failing memory of an elderly man but he could hardly have forgotten the central outlines of his spiritual experience in the monastery; one of the main elements in that experience apparently had been his sense of dread at the thought of Christ, the lawgiver, and the relief which he ultimately found through a new insight into the nature of the gospel. So deeply had his early religious training impressed him, however, that even in his Commentary on Galatians of 1535 he still refers to it, as though looking back on a bad dream that cannot be erased from the memory, and says that the doctrine has entered his bones like oil: "Adeo ista doctrina est pestilens opinio de Christo legislatore intravit ut oleum in ossa mea." W. A. XL, 1, 298.

34. W. A. XL, 1, 141-2: "Euangelium est nosse Iesum Christum... Christus est obiectum, ipsa res comprehensa per fidem, opus divinum mihi donatum quod mea fide apprehenditur, et hoc sol michi Euangelium leren. Hoc autem genus doctrinae non discitur, docetur, indicatur per hominem, legem, sed per deum, externo verbo; deinde intus revelat spiritus per suum donum."
35. "Hoc sane verum est, in omni promissione sua deus fere solitus est adiacere signum aliquod, ceu monumentum, ceu memoriale promissionis suae, quo fidelius servaretur, et efficacius moneret... Talia multa legimus signa promissionum dei in scripturis... Ex quibus intelligimus, in qualibet promissione dei duo proponi, verbum et signum, ut verbum intelligamus esse testamentum, signum vero esse sacramentum." W. A. VI, 517-8 (De captivitate Babylonica ecclesiae praeludium, 1520).
36. Ibid. 572. It is significant that in this same passage Luther says that the whole Scripture is divided into commandments and

and promises and that they together are to lead us to faith. This is the familiar division of law and gospel and his sacramental theory fits directly into that framework: "cum tota scriptura hoc agat, ut nos ad fidem provocet, hinc praeceptis et minis urgens, illinc promissionibus et consolationibus suis, promissa exaltant humiliatos remissionibus suis. Proprie tamen ea sacramenta vocari visum est, quae annexis signis promissa sunt. Caetera, qui signis alligata non sunt, nuda promissa sunt." W. A. VI, 572.

37. "Quo fit, ut, si rigide loqui volumus, tantum duo sunt in Ecclesia dei sacramenta, Baptismus et panis, cum in his solis et institutum divinitus signum et promissionem remissionis peccatorum videamus." Ibid. Speaking even more exactly, Luther says that there is really only one sacrament and three sacramental signs: "neganda mihi sunt septem sacramenta, et tantum tria pro tempore ponenda, Baptismus, Poenitentia, Panis...Quanquam, si usu scripturae loqui velim, non nisi unum sacramentum habeam, et tria signa sacramentalia." Ibid. 501. Here he includes Penance, though he later tends to exclude it as a sacrament proper.
38. "Nam poenitentiae sacramentum, quod ego his duobus accensui, signo visibili et divinitus instituto caret, et aliud non esse dixi, quam via ac reditum ad baptismum." Ibid. 572. "Und hie sihestu das die Tauffe beyde mit yhrer krafft und deutunge, begreiffet auch das dritte Sacrament, welche man gennet hat die Busse, als die eigentlich nicht anders ist, denn die Tauffe. Denn was heisset busse anders, den den alten menschen mit ernst angreifen, und yn ein neues leben treten?" W. A. XXX, 1, 221 (Der grosse Katechismus, 1529).
39. Anbeten des Sacraments des heiligen Leichnams Christi (1523) W. A. XI, 417ff. In this treatise Luther discusses the manner of the presence of Christ in the Lord's Supper; against the discussions of the Bohemian Brethren over the way in which the Trinity is found in the bread and wine, Luther says that such questions merely pry into the hidden mystery of God and should be avoided. In a letter to Speratus on the Waldensian views of "concomitance", Luther says that faith is satisfied with the knowledge of the body of Christ under the bread, and the blood under the wine, living and reigning: "Quomodo autem concomitanter ibi sanguis, humanitas, deitas, pili, ossa, cutis sint, cum non sint necessaria sciri, quid opus est fatigari? Fides ex his rebus et verbis neque docetur neque augetur, sed scrupuli seruntur, et dissensiones: fides non vult plus nosse, quam sub pane esse corpus Christi, sub vino sanguinem Christi viventis et regnantis: in hac simplicitate perseverat, contentis quaestionibus curiosis." As to the form of the presence, he can

only say it is there and not how: "corpus et sanguinem Christi ibi esse, qui adorandus est. Hoc sufficit concomitantiam dici. Qui vero scrutari volent quomodo deitas ibi comprehendatur concomitanter, hos argue et stulte curiosos et carnalibus phantasmatis in mysteria Dei ruentes, quo eos serves in simplicitate fidei et in pura sacramenti cognitione." Adoration of the presence may or may not be practiced by the believer in his worship: "dico: liberum esse, Christum adorari et invocari sub sacramento, neque enim peccat, qui non adorat, neque peccat, qui adorat." De Wette, Briefe II, 208ff. (June 13, 1522). In the Anbeten des Sakraments des heiligen Leichnams Christi and De captivitate Babylonica Luther stresses that the important thing in the sacrament is the word of promise; it is this that makes the sacrament a source of life and salvation. The presence of Christ in the elements makes the signs peculiarly exalted but the promise of the gospel is the real blessing, because it means forgiveness of sins and redemption: "Recte itaque dixi, totam virtutem Missae consistere in verbis Christi, quibus testatur, remissionem peccatorum donari omnibus, qui credunt, corpus eius tradi, et sanguinem eius fundi, pro se." W. A. VI, 517

40. "Nu sind sie so toll, das sie von ander scheiden, den glauben, und das ding, daran der glaube haftet und gebunden ist, ob es gleich eusserlich ist. Ja es sol und mus eusserlich sein, das mans mit synnen fassen und begreifen, und dadurch yns hertz bringen konne, wie denn das gantze Euangelion ein eusserliche mundliche predigt ist." W. A. XXX, 1, 215 (Der grosse Katechismus, 1529). Kostlin, Theology of Luther II, 503.
41. W. A. II, 745 (Ein Sermon von dem hochwürdigen Sakrament des heiligen wahren Leichnams Christi und von den Bruderschaften, 1519). "Sich das ist die frucht und prauch disses sacraments, davon das hertz muss frolich und starck werden." Ibid. "Der Teuffel kan dir bald einen pfeil jns hertz schiessen oder ein ander anfechtung dich treffen...Sihe, also solten wir lernen und uns gewennen diese trostung des Herrn Christi nutz zu machen durch tegliche ubung jm all unsern anfechtungen." W. A. XLV, 471 (Das XIV und XV Kapitels S. Johannis, 1537).
42. "Sicut vel unus locus comminationis ex scriptura omnes obruat et obnubilet consolationes adeoque omnia interiora nostra concutiat, ut plane obliviscamur causae iustificationis gratiae, Christi et Evangelii...Resistit insuper spiritui caro quae non potest certo statuere promissa Dei vera esse." W. A. XL, 1, 129. "Arduum est enim et divinae gratiae virtus, deum credere exaltorem capitis et coronatorem in media morte et inferis. Hic enim abscondita est exaltatio, et paret non

- nisi desperatio et nulla salus in deo." W. A. V, 84 (Operationes in Psalmos, 1519). "Iam duo sunt, quae solent nos tentare, ne fructus missae percipiamus. Alterum est, nos esse peccatores et indignos prae nimia vilitate rebus tantis. Alterum, etiam si digni essemus, magnitudo tamen rerum tanta est, ut natura pusillanimis non audeat, oportet, ut verbum Christi apprehendas, ipsumque multo fortius intuearis, quam has cogitationes infirmitatis tuae." W. A. VI, 519.
43. "Talis est enim uniuscuiusque pii conscientia, quantumlibet innocens, ibi culpam timere, ubi culpa non est. Timor dei facit hoc et iudicii eius inscrutabilis altitudo." W. A. V, 220.
44. W. A. LII, 378. "Sed difficillimum est, ut Tu qui indignum te iudicas hac Gratia, ex corde dicas et credas Christum traditum pro tuis multis et magnis peccatis." W. A. XL, 1, 86.
45. "sonst, im Herzen ist schon genug vor Gott, dass man dem Evangelium glaubt. Aber äusserlich zeigt mans an mit dem Zeichen." Vom heiligen Abendmal, 34 (Ein Sermon am grünen Donnerstag, 1523) W. A. XII, 476ff. "Nemlich, wo ein solcher mensch ist, der das Evangelium lieb hat und gerne wolt recht glauben und leben, Das er lerne dem Teuffel (so jn erschrecht und betrübt macht) widerstehen und sagen: Du leugst, du böser Teuffel..." W. A. XLV, 474.
46. Schneider, D. Martin Luthers kleiner Katechismus, 41. Kidd, Documents of the Continental Reformation, 215.
47. Schneider, Luthers kl. Katechismus, 42.
48. W. A. VI, 529. "Simul vides, quam periculosum immo falsum sit, opinari, poenitentiam esse secundam tabulam post naufragium, et quam perniciosus sit error, putare, per peccatum excidisse vim baptismi, et naven hanc esse illisam." The Council of Trent (Session XIV, November 1551) condemned and anathematized these propositions: "1. That penance is not truly and properly a sacrament of the Catholic Church, instituted for the faithful by Christ our Lord, for their reconciliation to God whenever they fall into sin after baptism. 2. That baptism itself is the sacrament of penance (as if there were not two distinct sacraments) and that therefore it is not right to call penance the 'second plank after shipwreck.'" Bettenson, Documents of the Christian Church, 369.
49. "Ita de missa contigit, quae impiorum hominum doctrina mutata est in opus bonum, quod ipsi vocant opus operatum...Inde processum est ad extremum insaniae, ut, quia Missam ex vi operis

operis operati valere mentiti sunt." W. A. VI, 520. The theory of "opus operatum" is that even without the faith of the recipient the blessing of the sacrament is bestowed. Jacobs, Hol. Ed. I, 53f. Luther strikes against this by saying that the Mass is not a "good work" but a promise or testament, which obviously can only be accepted as a gift and legacy: "Audisti enim, Missam aliud non esse, quam promissione, divinam seu testamentum Christi, sacramento corporis et sanguinis sui commendatum, quod⁹¹ verum est, intelligis, Non posse ipsum esse opus ullo modo, nec quicquam in ipso fieri, nec alio studio a quoquam tractari, quam sola fide; fides autem non est opus, sed magistra et vita operum. Quis enim est usquam tam insanus, ut promissionem acceptam, aut testamentum donatum, vocet opus bonum, quod suo testatori faciat accipiens?" W. A. VI, 520. In the same way, Baptism is simply a promise to be accepted by faith: "Primum itaque in Baptismo observanda est divina promissio...Quae promissio praeferenda est incomparabiliter universis pompis operum, votorum, religionum, et quicquid humanitus est introductum." Ibid. 527. It is not the sacrament, but faith in the sacrament which justifies: "Inde proverbium illud: non sacramentum, sed fides sacramenti iustificat. .Ita baptismus neminem iustificat, nec ulli prodest, sed fides in verbum promissionis, cui additur baptismus, haec enim iustificat, et implet id." Ibid. 532-3.

50. "Also sihestu klar, das da kein werck ist von uns gethan, sondern ein schatz den er uns gibt, und der glaube ergreiffet. So wol als der HERR Christus am creutz, nicht ein werck ist, sondern ein schatz ym wort gefasset und uns gewalt, das sie wider uns schreyen, als predigen wir widder den glauben. So wir doch alleine darauff treiben, als der so notig dazu ist, das on yhn nicht empfangen noch genossen, mag werden." W. A. XXX, 1, 216. The accusation against which Luther is defending himself, namely that he has abandoned his principle of the primacy of faith, is one that is still leveled against him by the theological descendants of the Free Spirit sects, but unfortunately with as little real understanding of his thought as his original antagonists showed. Coutts, for instance, accuses Luther of a "sacramentarianism which restored the formalism and mysterious opus operatum of the Middle Ages." Hans Denck, 138.
51. W. A. XXX, 1, 214-5.
52. Ibid. 214.
53. Ibid.
54. "Wo aber Gottes name ist, da mus auch leben und seligkeit sein, das es wol ein Gottlich, selig, fruchtbarlich und gnadenreich wasser heisset." Ibid. 215. Luther quotes

as partial justification for his position: "Darumb ist es nicht allein ein natürllich wasser, sondern ein Gotlich, hymnisch, heilig und selig wasser...Daher hat es auch sein wesen, das es ein Sacrament heisset, wie auch S. Augustinus geleret hat, Accedat verbum ad elementum, et fit sacramentum." W. A. XXX, 1, 214. This in itself might be taken as an indication that Luther was reverting to medieval dogma in reaction against the attacks of the Anabaptists. It is to be seen, however, that though he does hold to a mysterious union between the element and the Word (as in the Lord's Supper) he does not emphasize this but uses it as a defense of the validity of the signs; their efficacy still depends on the faith of the recipient.

55. Ibid. 216.
56. W. A. VI, 516-7. "Neque enim deus (ut dixi) aliter cum hominibus unquam egit aut agit, quam verbo promissionis. Rursus, nec nos cum deo unquam agere aliter possumus, quam fide in verbum promissionis eius..."
57. In his brief summary of his views in the Short Catechism, Luther stresses both the Word and faith: "Wie kan wasser solche grosse ding thun? Antwort: Wasser thut freilich nicht, Sondern das wort Gottes, so mit und by dem wasser ist, und der glaube, so solchem wort Gottes jm wasser trawet." Schneider, Luthers kl. Katechismus, 43. W. A. VI,
58. "Quis vero unquam fuit tam demens, ut baptismum duceret esse bonum opus?" W. A. VI, 527. "Benedictus deus et pater domini nostri Iesu Christi...eo scilicet consilio usus, quod parvulos, qui avaritiae et superstitionis capaces non sunt, eo voluit initiari, et simplicissima fide verbi sui sanctificari... Nam, si adultis et maioribus donandum esset hoc sacramentum." Ibid. 526. Nevertheless, every man must stand for himself where the promises of God are involved: "Stet ergo insuperabilis veritas: ubi promissio divina est, ibi unusquisque pro se stat, su fides exigitur, quisque pro se rationem reddet, et suum onus portabit." Ibid. 521. How does this then apply to infants who are baptized? On one side, Luther must defend himself against the charge that he is making the sacrament an "efficacious" work not needing faith and on the other, that he is destroying the foundations of infant Baptism: "Opponetur forsitan iis, quae dicta sunt, baptismus parvulorum, qui promissionem dei non capiant, nec fidem baptismi habere possunt, ideoque aut non requiri fidem, aut parvulos frustra baptisari." W. A. VI, 538. It has also been claimed that Luther defended infant Baptism "for the safeguarding of the State Church", and that "infant baptism became the opus operatum of regeneration." Coutts, Hans Denck, 193-5.

Luther uses various arguments to justify the practice of infant Baptism. In De captivitate Babylonica he maintains his view that faith is necessary to make Baptism efficacious; this qualification is met by infants, says Luther, through the faith of others--their sponsors' and the congregation's through its prayers: "Hic dico, quod omnes dicunt, fide aliena parvulus succurri, illorum, qui offerunt...ita per orationem Ecclesiae offerentis et credentis." W. A. VI, 538. In other writings Luther rejects the idea of the Bohemian Brethren that children are baptized on the basis of a future faith which they will reveal. He even appeals to the continuous tradition of the Church to justify the baptizing of infants. In a letter to Melanchthon (Jan. 13, 1522) Luther asks whether it can be proved that children do not have real faith; could it not be, he says, that God preserves the faith of children through their childhood as ours is preserved during a long sleep? "Quomodo enim probabunt, eos non credere? At quod non loquuntur et ostendunt fidem, pulchre. Hac ratione quot horis et nos Christiani erimus, dum dormimus et alia facimus? Annon ergo eodem modo potest Deus toto infantiae tempore, seu continuo somno, fidem in illis servare?" De Wette, Briefe II, 126. He brings out the further argument that an adult is able to have even less faith than an infant because human reason, wisdom and experience stand in the way: "Apud me nihil differt per verbum converti adultum et parvulum, imo in adulto plus est rebellionis contra verbum, puta rationem, sapientiam, experientiam, etc." Ibid. 202 (To Spalatin, May 29, 1522). In Der grosse Katechismus, appended to the section on Baptism, there is a discussion of infant Baptism; this, it seems to me, represents Luther's mature view on the subject, though he is stressing one side of the argument against the Anabaptists. His three points are:

1. The existence of the Christian Church shows that God has, in fact, bestowed the gift of the Holy Spirit on those who have been baptized as children: "Die ist fast die beste und sterckste beweisung fur die einfeltigen und ungelerten; Denn man wird uns diesen Artikel: Ich glaube eine heilige Christliche kyrche, die gemeine der heiligen etc., nicht nemen noch umbstossen." W. A. XXX, 1, 218. It will be seen that Luther is not reverting to the appeal to authority of tradition itself, but he is appealing to the empirical fact of the existence of the Church and the gifts of the Holy Spirit among its members, as a demonstration of the effectiveness of infant Baptism.
2. He makes the affirmation that children really do have faith (even if we are not able to verify the fact) and we bring them to Baptism confident that God will give them faith: "Also sihestu, das der Rotten-geister einrede nichts taug. Denn wie gesagt, wenn gleich die kinder nicht gleubten, welche doch nicht ist (als ist

beweiset)...Also thuen wir nu auch mit der Kindertauffe, das kind tragen wir erzu, der meinung und hoffnung, das es gleube, und bitten das yhm Gott den glauben gebe." W. A. XXX, 1, 219. 3. Finally, Luther simply appeals to the fact of the commandment of God as reason why infant Baptism should be practiced: "aber darauff teuffen wirs nicht, sondern allein darauff, das Gott befohlen hat." Ibid.

Most of Luther's writings on infant Baptism are polemical in nature, written against Anabaptist groups; they must be read with this fact in mind. Luther's general view of the sacraments, according to Troeltsch, is that they should be outward symbols of the pure gift of grace and the independence of the Christian gospel from all individualistic effort and achievement (as we have seen); the Anabaptists represented a legalistic theory: "Die Spät- und Wiedertaufe dagegen ist das Symbol der Gesetzlichkeit und der Sekte, die Gemeinschaft und Heil auf die personliche subjektive Leistung begründet." Ges. Schr. I, 455. In the heat of some of his disputes with the Sectarians, Luther sometimes did not step carefully enough not to throw some doubt as to whether he had repudiated his original principle that a sacrament is not in itself efficacious. Nevertheless, his insistence on proving the existence of real faith in the children who are baptized, shows that he still paid at least lip-service to his original views. That this is more than lip-service, however, is seen in some of his more irenic writings. For instance, in a letter to Nicolas Hausman (Feb. 8, 1534) he gives "a simple exposition of the subject. The prerogatives of baptism are these: The sacred water is administered according to God's Word, and is not of man's invention--that it is a fresh covenant between God and the nations, to their everlasting salvation, and is God's work, and therefore cannot be sullied by any sin on the part of the dispenser. That there is one baptism, which must be appropriated through faith to be efficacious, and dare not be repeated, except through a blasphemous denial of the first ceremony, cannot be denied. It must accompany us through life, adorning the walk with the fruits of faith, thus surpassing all vows and works of any kind, even preceding obedience to parents and guardians." Currie, Letters of Martin Luther, 296-7. This gives every indication that the central principles which he affirmed in 1520 as seen in De captivitate Babylonica, for instance, are still being maintained intact, in spite of the long years of violent controversy which had intervened.

59. "Fides enim est submersio veteris hominis et emersio novi hominis." W. A. VI, 533. "Significat itaque baptismus duo, mortem et resurrectionem, hoc est, plenariam consummatamque iustificationem." Ibid. 534.

60. W. A. VI, 534. "non quod necessarium arbiter, sed quod pulchrum foret, rei tam perfecta et plenae signum quoque plenum et perfectum dari." "Das fodert auch die bedeutung der tauff, dan sie bedeut, das der alte mensch und sundliche geputt von fleysch und blut soll gantz erseufft werden durch die gnad gottis, wie wir horen werden. Drumb solt man der bedeutung gnug thun und eyn rechts volkommens tzeychen geben." W. A. II, 727ff. (Eyn Sermon von dem heyligen Hochwurdigen Sacrament der Tauffe, 1519).
61. "Die bedeutung ist ein seliglich sterbenn der sund und auferstheung yn gnaden gottis, das der alt mensch, der yn sunden empfangen wirt und geporen, do erseufft wirt, und ein newer mensch erauss geht und auff steht, yn gnaden geporen... Die bedeutung und sterben odder ersauffen der sund, geschicht nit volnkomen, yn dissem leben, biss der mensch auch leylich sterb und gantz vorwesse zu pulver. Das sacrament odder tzeychen der tauff ist bald geschehen, wie wir vor augen sehen, aber die bedeutung, die geystliche tauff, die erseuffung, weret die weyl wir leben, und wirt aller erst ym tod volnbracht, da wirt der mensch recht yn die tauff geschenkt, unnd geschicht, was die tauff bedeut. Drumb ist diss gantz leben nit anders den eyn geystlich tauffen an unterlass biss yn denn todt." W. A. II, 727-8. "Quicquid enim vivimus, Baptismus esse debet, et signum seu sacramentum baptismi implere, cum a caeteris omnibus liberati uni tantum baptismo simus addicti, id est, morti et resurrectioni." W. A. VI, 535. "Darumb hat ein yglicher Christen sein lebenslang gnug zulernen und zu uben an der Tauffe, denn er hat ymmerdar zuschaffen, das er festiglich gleube, was sie zusagt und bringet, uberwindung des Teuffels und tods, vergebung der sunde, Gottes gnade, den gantzen Christum und Heiligen geist mit seinen gaben." W. A. XXX, 1, 217.
62. "die bedeutung die geystlich geburt, die mehrung der gnaden und gerechtigkeit, hebt woll an yn der tauff, weret aber auch biss yn den tod, ya biss an jungsten tag." W. A. II, 728. "ist also das sacraments ist noch nit gar geschehen, das ist, der todt und auferstheung am Jungsten tag ist noch vorhanden." Ibid. 730.
63. W. A. VI, 534.
64. "Hic iterum vides, Baptismi sacramentum, etiam quo ad signum non esse momentaneum aliquod negotium, sed perpetuum." Ibid. Some had been misled into thinking that Baptism was to release a Christian from all sins; this, however, says Luther, is not the promise. It is to release man from his sins completely but only sacramentally; in this world of sin even the Christian is still burdened by sins: "Eynn mensch, soo es auss der tauff

kompt, sey reyn und an sund gantz unschuldig, aber es wirt von vielen nit recht vorstanden; die meynen, es sey gar keyn sund mehr da, und werden faull und hynlessig, die sundlich natur zu todten, gleich wie auch etlich thun, wan sie peycht haben: Drumb, wie oben gesagt ist, soll mann es recht vorstehn und wissen, das unser fleysch, die weyl es yhe lebt, naturlich boss und sundhafftig ist." W. A. II, 729. Luther does believe, nevertheless, that a Christian will actually begin to grow in purity and innocence through the power of God: "angefangen, reyn und unschuldig zu werden." Ibid. 730. "Morimur inquam non tantum affectu et spiritualiter, quo peccatis et vanitatibus mundi renunciamus, sed revera, vitam hanc corporalem incipimus relinquere, et futuram vitam apprehendere, ut sit realis (quod dicunt) et corporalis quoque transitus ex hoc mundo ad patrem." W. A. VI, 534. Luther should not be accused, therefore, of completely separating our "actual" from our "sacramental" righteousness; the sacrament of Baptism confers righteousness and the power to become righteous.

65. W. A. VI, 535.
66. Baptism is not to be considered the fundamental sacrament merely because it is temporally the first one; its primacy is also due to its character of being a pure promise and gift representing the whole life in Christ: "Semper enim manet veritas promissionis semel factae, nos extenta manu susceptura reversos. Atque id, ni fallor, volunt, qui obscure dicunt, Baptismum esse primum et fundamentum omnium sacramentorum, sine quo nullum queat aliorum obtineri." W. A. VI, 528.
67. Schneider, Luthers kl. Katechismus, 44. Coutts, for instance, has apparently interpreted Luther in this way: "Luther...gave them...a legalism which found expression in his Shorter Catechism, and constituted a Code of Morals which had all the authority of Divine Law." Hans Denck, 138.
68. Dodd, The Epistle of Paul to the Romans, 89. If Dodd's interpretation of Paul's teaching on Baptism in Romans 6: 1-14 is correct, Luther has been remarkably true to Paul's thought in developing his own sacramental theory--a fact of which Luther himself was quite confident.
69. Schneider, Luthers kl. Katechismus, 44.
70. Ibid. 56-7.
71. W. A. XXX, 1, 224. "Denn umb der person odder unglaubens willen, wird das wort nicht falsch, dadurch es sein Sacrament worden und eingesetzt ist...Denn auff den Worten stehet alle unser grund;

schutz und wehre widder alle yrthumb und verfurung, so yhe komen sind, odder noch komen mogen." W. A. XXX, 1, 224.

72. W. A. XXX, 1, 226.
73. W. A. VI, 517. "Wer empfehet denn solch Sacrament wirdiglich? Antwort: Fasten, und leiblich sich bereiten, ist wol eine feine eusserliche zucht; Aber der ist recht wirdig und wol geschickt, Wer den glauben hat, an diese wort. 'Fur euch gegeben und vergossen zu vergebung der sunden.' Wer aber diesen worten nicht gleubt odder zweiffelt, der ist unwirdig und ungeschickt, Denn das wort ('Fur euch') foddert eitel gleubige hertzen." Schneider, Luthers kl. Katechismus, 57-8. W. A. XXX, 1, 226: "Fasten und beten ect. mag wol ein eusserliche bereitung un kinder ubung sein..."
74. Ibid. 230.
75. W. A. VI, 377 (Sermon von dem neuen Testament, 1520). "Dan das Evangelium ist nit anders, den eyn vorkundigung gottlicher gnaden und vorgebung aller sund, durch Christus leyden und geben." Ibid. "den die prediget sol nat anders sein, den vorclerung d' wort Christi da er sagt un die mess einsetzt, dz ist mein leyb, dz ist mein blut etc. Was ist das gantz Euangelii anders, den ein vorclerung dises testaments? Christus hatt das gantz Euangelii, ynn eyner kutzen summa begriffen, mit den worten dises testaments oder sacraments." W. A. VI, 374.
76. W. A. VI, 525.
77. Luther is speaking against the Roman doctrine that the Mass is a real sacrifice of the Lamb of God, and, therefore, a good work irrespective of the faith of the dispenser or the recipient. "As often as the commemoration of this victim is celebrated, the work of our Redemption is performed." Roman Missal: Secret, IX Sunday after Pentecost; Pope Pius XII, Christian Worship (Encyclical Letter: Mediator Dei), 40. This is opposed by Luther in De captivitate Babylonica, for instance: "Ita de missa contigit, quae impiorum hominum doctrina mutata est in opus bonum, quod ipsi vocant opus operatum." W. A. VI, 520. He also discusses it in "von dem dritten gepot" in Von den guten Werken (1520): W. A. VI, 229ff.
78. W. A. XXX, 1, 225.
79. Ibid. "Auss dem allen ists nu clar, das syss heylig sacrament, sey nit anders, dan eyn gottlich tzeychen, darynne zu gesagt, gebe, un zu geeygent wirt Christ un alle heyiligen mit allen

yhren wercken leyden, vordiensten, gnaden un guttern zu trost und sterck allen, die yn engsten und betrubniss seyn, vorvolget, vom teuffell, sunden, welt, fleysch und allen ubell, und das sacrament empfangen, sey nit anders, dan dasselben alle begeren und glauben festiglich, es gescheh also." W. A. II, 749. "Der ein ein solchen glauben stat, der gehort hieher und nimpt das sacrament als zu einer sicherung oder sigel oder verzeichnung, das er der gotliche versprechung und zusagung gewiss sey." W. A. X, 3, 51-2 (Predigten, 1522).

80. W. A. XXX, 1, 225.
81. It is only those who are convinced of their sins (those in whom the law has done its proper work) who are properly prepared for the Mass: "Concludimus ex omnibus his, quibus nam Missa sit parata, et qui dignè communicent. Nempe, soli ii, qui tristes, afflictas, perturbas, confusas et erroneas habent conscientias. Nam, verbum divinae promissionis huius sacramenti cum exhibeat peccatorum suorum vexatur sive morsu, sive titillatione." W. A. VI, 526.
82. Goutts, Hans Denck, 192-3.
83. W. A. II, 749-50 (Ein Sermon von dem hochwurdigen Sakrament des heiligen wahren Leichnams Christi, 1519). "Alle religiöse Spekulation ist für Luther theologia gloriae...Das Kreuz Christi macht deutlich, das es für den Menschen eine direkte Gottes-erkenntnis nicht gibt." Loewenich, Luthers Theologia crucis, 21. See note 39.
84. W. A. XXX, 1, 223.
85. "donec in profundum venerint, et de transubstantiatione, aliisque infinitis metaphysicis nugis." W. A. VI, 518. Luther points to Aristotelian philosophy as the source of the doctrine: "Sed et Ecclesia ultra mille ducentos annos recte credidit, nec usquam nec unquam de ista transubstantiatione (portentoso scilicet vocabulo et somnio) meminerunt sancti patres, donec cepit Aristotelis simulata philosophia in Ecclesia grassari." W. A. VI, 509. Luther was not far off the mark in this analysis: "In its technical sense transubstantiation denotes a doctrine which is based on the Aristotelean philosophy as taught by the schoolmen, according to which a physical object consists of 'accidents', the properties perceptible to the senses, and an underlying 'substance' in which the accidents inhere, and which gives to the object its essential nature. According to the doctrine of transubstantiation, the accidents of bread and wine remain after consecration, but their substance is changed into that of

the body and blood of Christ." Bettenson, Documents of the Christian Church, 207. Bettenson gives an excellent summary of the history of the doctrine: Ibid. 205f. See also Gavin, Liturgy and Worship, 113ff. Even in medieval times the doctrine was suspect by certain groups, who "followed in the main the earlier views of St. Augustine and the theology of the primitive Roman Liturgy." Ibid. 121.

86. W. A. XXX, 1, 223. "Cur autem non possit Christus corpus suum intra substantiam panis continere, sicut in accidentibus? Ecce ignis et ferrum, duae substantiae, sic miscentur in ferro ignitio, ut quaelibet pars sit ferrum et ignis. Cur non multo magis corpus gloriosum Christi sic in omni parte substantiae panis esse possit?" W. A. VI, 510.

87. After arguing some of the subtleties of Aristotelian philosophy on the relation of accidents and substance, Luther rejoices that the common people aren't touched by this kind of disputation: "Et plane gaudeo, saltem apud vulgum relictam esse simplicem fidem sacramenti huius. Nam, ut non capiunt, ita nec disputant, an accidentia ibi sint sine substantia, sed simplici fide Christi corpus et sanguinem veraciter ibi contineri credunt, dato ociosis illis negotio, de eo, quod continet, disputandi...Quid hic dicemus? quando Aristotelem et humanas doctrinas facimus tam sublimium et divinarum rerum censores? Cur non explosa ista curiositate, in verbis Christi simpliciter haeremus, parati ignorare, quicquid ibi fiat, contentique verum corpus Christi virtute verborum illic adesse? An est necesse, modos operationis divinae omnino comprehendere?" W. A. VI, 510. The reasons for Luther's dislike of the doctrine of transubstantiation should be kept in mind when one is trying to understand his position in the later sacramentarian controversies on the question of the real presence. Both the Sacramentarians and the Roman Catholics tried to explain--or explain away--the real presence in terms of philosophical reasoning; both attempts were equally obnoxious to Luther, who felt that this was a matter which could only be rightly apprehended by faith, just as the other mysteries of the Christian faith such as predestination, the Incarnation, the attributes of God, etc. "Das Sacrament ist nur als Wunder Gottes zu erfassen." Dietz in Vom heiligen Abendmahl, 85.

88. W. A. XV, 394 (Dec. 17, 1524). Mackinnon, Luther and the Reformation III, 309-10.

89. "Hier will vonndten sein, dass ihr euer Herz und Gewissen wohl verständiget und einen grossen Unterschied machet zwischen dem äusserlichen Empfang und dem innerlichen und geistlichen Empfang. Der leibliche und äusserliche Empfang ist der, wenn

ein Mensch den Leichnam Christi und sein Blut mit seinem Munde empfanget; und solcher Empfang kann wohl ohn Glauben und Liebe geschehen von allen Menschen. Das macht aber keinen Christenmenschen nit. Ja, wenn das einen Christen machte, so wäre die Maus auch ein Christ; denn sie kann das Brot auch essen, kann auch wohl aus dem Kelch trinken. Ei, das ist ein schlecht Ding. Aber der innerliche, geistliche, rechte Empfang ist ganz ein ander Ding; denn er steht in der Übung, Gebrauch und Früchten." Vom heiligen Abendmahl, 20 (Sermon, gepredigt am Freitag nach Invocavit, 1522). W. A. X, 3, 48ff.

90. W. A. XXIII, 38ff. Lunn, Martin Luther, 250f. Luther is attacking the ideas of God which would think of Him in a "local" heaven. God is indeed everywhere, says Luther, and Christ as part of the God-head is everywhere. Why then not partake of His body in a wine-house? God is omnipresent but He is where He chooses to be: W. A. XXIII, 135f., 149, 151f. Brilioth says of this "doctrine of Ubiquity" that it "was to become the corner-stone of Luther's eucharistic teaching." Combining the immanence emphasis of German mysticism with a Christocentric view of revelation, Luther brought forth his view that "Ubiquity is the omnipresence of the Incarnate God." In so doing, says Brilioth, he moved the doctrine of the real presence from mythology to religion. Eucharist Faith and Practice Evangelical and Catholic, 103ff.

91. For a full exposition of Luther's thought on the Lord's Supper as the "Incarnation of the Word": Sommerlath, Der Sinn des Abendmahls nach Luthers Gedanken über das Abendmahl 1527-29, 117ff. "wir sehen in im tunckeln wort oder bild verhullet, nemlich ynn dem wort und Sacramenten, Das sind gleich als seine larven oder kleid, darunter er sich verbirgt." W. A. XLV, 522. The Incarnation played a tremendously important part in Luther's whole devotional life; this may be seen in some of his verses and songs:

"Merk auf, mein Herz, und sieh dort hin,
Was liegt doch in dem Krippelin,
Wes ist das schöne Kindelin?
Es ist das liebe Jesulin
.....
Ach Herr, du Schöpfer aller Ding,
Wie bist du worden so gering,
Dass du da liegst auf dürrem Gras,
Davon ein Rind und Esel ass."

Martin Luthers Geistliche Lieder, 42f. (Ein Kinderlied auf die Weihnacht Christi, 1535). Luther's combination of wonder and joy at the mystery of Christmas is shown in The Martin Luther Christmas Book, translated and arranged by R. H. Bainton. This same sense of joy and wonder Luther brought with him to the

Holy Communion, which is again revealed in some of his songs:

"Gott sei gelobet und gebenedeiet,
Der uns selber hat gespeiset
Mit seinem Fleische und mit seinem Blute,
Das gib uns, Herr Gott, zu Gute.
Kyrieleison.
Herr, durch deinen heiligen Leichnam,
Der von deiner Mutter Maria kam,
Und das heilige Blut
Hilf uns, Herr, aus aller Not.
Kyrieleison."

Martin Luthers Geistliche Lieder, 30 (Der Gesang: Gott sei gelobet, 1524).

"Dass wir nimmer des vergessen,
Gab er uns sein Leib zu essen,
Verborgen im Brot so klein,
Und zu trinken sein Blut im Wein."

Ibid. 29 (Das Lied S. Johannis Huss, gebessert, 1524).

It is Sommerlath's belief that Luther did not clarify his position on the relation between the Word and the Sacrament until 1527-29. Before that time, he seemed to view the Sacrament as a "help"--the staff of Jacob by which he crossed the Jordan, a lantern in the darkness of "Anfechtung": "Das Wort ist alles, das Sakrament erscheint nur als eine besondere Form des Wortes." In this early theology, according to Sommerlath, the relationship between the Word and Sacrament is primarily a psychological one: "Es ist nicht Gnadenmittel sondern nur Erkenntnis mittel. Es ist selbst leer und es hat Wert nur im Hindeuten auf das, was es selbst nicht hat. Es ist fremder Wert, von dem es lebt, den es nur bekräftigt." Luthers Lehre von der Realpräsenz, 103ff. Sommerlath says that only in later years did Luther stress the Incarnation of the Word in the sacrament. The reason for this should be kept in mind, however; in his early theology he also spoke of the intimate relation of the Word and sacrament, even though he was loath to discuss the exact nature of the relation: "Ist es den von noten, dass wir die Art und Weise, wie Gott wirkt, völlig begreifen? Ich wenigsten, wenn ich nit begreifen kann, wie das Brot Christi Leib ist, bleibe einfältig bei seinen Worten stehen und gläube festiglich nit allein, dass Christi Leib im Brot sei, sondern dass das Brot Christi Leib sei. Der hl. Geist ist grösser als Aristoteles!" Vom heiligen Abendmahl, 85. W. A. II, 201f.

92. "Das ist unsere Lehre, dass Brot und Wein nicht helfe, ja auch Leib und Blut in Brot und Wein nicht helfe. Ich will noch weiter reden: Christus am Kreuz mit all seinem Leiden und Tod hilft nichts, wenn's auch aufs brünstigste, hitzigste, herzlichste erkannt und bedacht wird. Es muss alles noch ein

Anderes da sein. Was denn? Das Wort, das Wort, das Wort tut! Denn ob Christus tausendmal für uns gegeben und gekreuzigt würde, wäre es alles umsonst, wenn nicht das Wort Gottes käme und teilte es aus und schenkte mirs und spräche: Das soll dein sein, nimm und habe dies!" Thiel, Luther II, 129. In the Sacramentarian controversy, however, Mackinnon thinks that Luther lapsed towards a "medieval materialism" and reverted "to the idea of inherent sacramental grace". Luther and the Reformation III, 312-3. This may have been the result of the exigency of the moment; certainly his later writings indicate that he never repudiated his position that faith is necessary to make the sacrament efficacious. Once again, Luther may be caught up on points which are not of fundamental importance to his central principles; Christ is really present but how we cannot know. Faith apprehends the benefits of the sacrament but how that benefit works within us is not of essential importance, nor should it become the subject of abstract speculations.

93. Schneider, Luthers kl. Katechismus, 57. Brillioth points out that Luther gave the term "Vergebung der sunden" a far wider and deeper meaning than it commonly has today. Eucharist Faith and Practice Evangelical and Catholic, 102-3.
94. Sommerlath shows the close harmony between Luther's view on the sacraments and the rest of his theology; for instance: "im Abendmahl wird die Schöpferkraft Gottes und seines Wortes eindrucklich und immer aufs neue erfahren." Luthers Lehre von der Realpräsenz, 320, 326ff. God is able to do as He wishes, says Luther: W. A. XXIII, 117. We men are not in a position to say what God may or may not be able to do!
95. Luther accuses Zwingli of tending towards Manichaeism: W. A. XXIII, 173. Brillioth speaks of Zwingli's position as characterized by a "harsh transcendence" and Lunn notes his "austere rationalism". Luther's deep appreciation for the mystery of the Incarnation influenced his whole sacramental theory. It also showed itself in his views of revelation. See for instance Baillie's discussion of "A Mediated Immediacy" in Our Knowledge of God and Luther's understanding of the relation between "Deus revelatus...Deus velatus...Deus absconditus," etc.: 189ff. The real presence is immediate but veiled in the sacrament; Zwingli had little sense of the "mystery", either in regard to the sacraments or to the Incarnation. As Baillie points out the terms "Deus absconditus" and "Deus revelatus" are not antithetical terms in Luther's thought, but correlative: Our Knowledge of God, 191; for this sort of paradox Zwingli had little taste. See, for instance, Luther's repudiation of the words of Philip in John 14: 8ff. as a typical example of a false theology which seeks to fly

directly to the divine majesty: W. A. XLV (Das XIV und XV Kapitel S. Johannis, 1537-38). Christ does indeed have all the attributes of God within Him: Gennrich, Die Christologie Luthers, 23-4; therefore, when we know Him we know both the "Deus absconditus" and the "Deus revelatus"--they are One in the "Deus incarnatus": Kugelgen, Luthers Auffassung der Gottheit Christi, 13-4. "Es ist ein Missverständnis, wenn man den verborgenen Gott bei Luther als einen fremden, zornigen dem in Christo geoffenbarten Gott der Liebe entgegensetzt. Denn der Deus revelatus (Offenbarte Gott) in Christo ist ja zugleich selber Deus absconditus." Die Religion in Gesch. und Gegenw. III, 1767-8. See also: Nygren, Agape and Eros II, 2, 484-5, 490-1. Hendry, God the Creator, 123. Aulen in Revelation, 308. Blanke, Der Verborgene Gott bei Luther.

96. Zwingli accuses Luther of saying that sins are forgiven merely by the eating of the true body of Christ: "Auch wenn der wahre Leib gegessen wird, kann das nie den Glauben stärken und die Sünden vergeben, denn Geistiges muss eine geistige Ursache haben. Es ist klar, dass das heil nicht im Essen steckt. Es ist irreligiös, dass Sünden durchs Essen vergeben werden." Luther responds with a typically sharp remonstrance: "Sagt mir, Herr Lügengeist, wann haben wir jemals gelehrt, dass ein Stück Brot die Sünden vergebe?...Das aber ist unsere Lehre: Wer ein böses Gewissen hat von Sünden, der soll zum Abendmahl gehen und Trost holen, nicht am Brot und Wein, nicht am Leib und Blut, sondern am Wort, das wir im Sakrament Leib und Blut Christi, als für mich gegeben und vergossen, darbietet, schenkt und gibt. Ist das nicht klar genug?" Thiel, Luther II, 159, 161. Such exchanges vividly illustrate the deep separation of "spirit" which divided the two men. This is certainly intimately related to Luther's deep sense of sin and "Anfechtung" which we have described previously. After the meeting at Marburg Zwingli expressed views which seemed to justify Luther's suspicion of him: "He not only substitutes the merely spiritual presence of the body of Christ for the bodily, but he persists, also, in locating the essential character of the celebration in the act of confession and thanksgiving upon the part of the communicant, instead of in the reception of the gift from above. The communicants should give thanks while they themselves, in their devout contemplation, set before themselves as present the flesh which Christ assumed and in which He suffered." Köstlin, Theology of Luther II, 155. See Zwingli's Fidei ratio ad Carolum imperator (1530), Articles VII, VIII.

For Luther, on the other hand, a sense of sin and "Anfechtung" were the prerequisites of the invitation to the Lord's Table: "Gibt es noch einen Zweifel, dass hier zwei grundverschiedene Charaktere sprechen? Martin Luther nimmt in tieffter

Demut, als ein kranker glaubenschwacher Sünder das überschwänglich reiche Testament des Heilands zu sich--Ulrich Zwingli kommt mit unerschütterlichen Sinn zu dem Gedächtnismahl des Herrn, um seinen starken, selbstgewissen Glauben zu verschönern." Thiel, Luther II, 141. Thiel's conclusions may be somewhat overstated in favor of Luther but the fact remains that there was a deep-seated difference of attitude and approach between Luther and Zwingli, not only on the question of the real presence, but in many other fields of thought as well. Brilioth traces their differences, for instance, to a fundamentally different doctrine of God; Zwingli favoring a transcendent view and Luther an immanent one. Zwingli's strong humanistic and intellectualistic predilections and his political activities are other examples. Kidd's view is also that Luther's cogent expression was a "just appreciation, at parting, of the gulf between his opponents' position and his own." The Continental Reformation, 53-4.

Luther's attitude to Zwingli was not a peculiar one. Long before he had expressed himself on the necessity of a sense of sin as proper preparation for the Mass: "So ist gewiss, das den freyen, sichern geysten, die yhre sund nit beyset, die mess keyn nutz ist, dan sie haben noch keynen hunger zu disser speys, seyn noch zu wol, die mess wil und muss ein hungerige seel haben, die vorlangen hab noch vorgebung der sund unnd gottlicher huld." W. A. VI, 376 (Sermon von dem neuen Testament, 1520). His views on the adoration of the sacrament mark him off from both the Roman Catholic and Zwinglian attitude toward the Lord's Supper: "Summa, wo nicht ist das hertzlich vertrauen und tzuversicht des rechten lebendigen glawbens, davon ich soo oft geredt habe, da kan solch anbeten nicht geschehen, denn gott wirtt da selbs nicht erkandt hertzlich mit glewbiger tzuversicht." W. A. XI, 446 (Von Anbeten des Sakraments des heiligen Leichnams Christi, 1523). An insight into Luther's moderation and an insight into the spirit which was motivating him is revealed by the concessions which he was willing to grant the Zwinglians at Marburg: "Luther drew up a formula which, while asserting that 'the body of Christ is truly', i. e. essentially and substantially ('essentialiter et substantive'), 'present in the Sacrament and not merely in the remembrance of the partaker,' waives further discussion on the question as to the mode of its presence, i.e. 'whether bodily or spiritually, naturally or supernaturally, spatially or non-spatially.' On this understanding he and his colleagues were prepared to recognise their opponents as brethren." Mackinnon, Luther and the Reformation III, 325. From the little he knew of it, Luther seems to have approved of Calvin's teaching on the subject and it is reported that he was pleased with Calvin's pamphlet on the Lord's Supper. Kostlin, Theo-

logy of Luther II, 183, 191. This is further evidence of Luther's moderate position in regard to the real presence and the extent to which he was willing to see his interpretation modified by one with whom he felt a certain communion of "Geist".

97. Beard, Martin Luther, 390.
98. W. A. L, 240-1.
99. Ibid. 228-9.
100. Ibid. 229-30: "Wer nicht kundte Contritionem, das ist, rew haben, der solte Attritionem haben, welchs ich mag eine halbe oder anfang der Rewe nennen...Solche Attritio ward denn Contritio gerechent, wenn man zu Beicht gieng." "Alexander of Hales and Bonaventura, and, later, Scotus and the Nominalists discriminated between contrition and attrition, between real repentance and the mere fear of the consequences of sin. According to this theory, the penitent, who may be actuated only by the fear of hell, may nevertheless receive the benefit of the sacrament, which by the infusion of grace changes attrition into contrition, and thus becomes valid in his case for the remission of guilt." Mackinnon, Luther and the Reformation I, 87.
101. "Das ist nicht activa contritio, eine gemachte Rew; Sondern passiva contritio, das rechte hertzleid, leiden und fulen des todes." W. A. L, 226. To Luther the idea of forced penitence and contrition is simply another form of Pelagianism: Muller, Christian Doctrine of Sin I, 214. He says in the Fourteenth Article of Grund und Ursach aller Artikel (1521) that only God knows whether our contrition is genuine or not; for a man to say, or be required to say, he is really contrite is pure presumption: W. A. VII, 385f. "There is no final guarantee against the spiritual pride of man. Even the recognition in the sight of God that he is a sinner can be used as a vehicle of that very sin." Niebuhr, Nature and Destiny I, 215.
102. W. A. VI, 543.
103. Ibid. 544.
104. "Contritionem sic ducerunt, et eam fide promissionis priorem facerent, et longe viliorem, ut quae non esset fidei opus, sed meritum, immo non memorantur eam...His audatiores et peiores finxerunt quandam attritionem, quae virtute clavium (quam ignorant) fieret contritio, eam donant impiis et incredulis, ut sic universa contritio aboleretur." Ibid.

105. W. A. VI, 545.
106. "Non est dubium, confessionem peccatorum esse necessariam et divinitus mandatam Matt. iii." Ibid. 546.
107. "Occulta autem confessio, quae modo celebratur, et si probari ex scriptura non possit, miro modo tamen placet, et utilis imo necessaria est, nec vellem eam non esse, immo gaudeo eam esse in Ecclesia Christi, cum sit ipsa afflictis conscientiae unicum remedium. Siquidem, detecta fratri nostro conscientia et malo, quod latebat, familiariter revelato, verbum solacii recipimus ex ore fratris a deo prolatum, quod fide suscipientes, pacatos nos facimus in misericordia dei per fratrem nobis loquentis. Hoc solum detestor, Esse eam confessionem in tyrannidem et exactionem pontificum redactam." Ibid.
108. Ibid. 548. For an elaboration of his views on this subject: Ein Sermon von dem Sakrament der Busse (1519), W. A. II, 710ff. Ein Sermon von dem Bann (1520), W. A. VI, 61ff. K stlin, Theology of Luther II, 521ff. Seeberg, History of Doctrines II, 235. Watson, Let God Be God, 17. Seeberg thinks that Luther's reactions to this sacrament had extended influence on his thought: "All seine Gedanken  ber Reue und Glauben, Glauben und Werke, S nde und Gnade, Gesetz und Evangelium, Gott und Christus sowie das neue Lebensideal sind nicht anderes als ein Komplex religi ser Vorstellungen, der erwachsen ist unter dem Druck des Buss sakraments und im Gegensatz zu demselben." Die Lehre Luthers, 76.
109. W. A. XXX, 2, 456-7.
110. Ibid. 441.
111. Luther's main point here is that no one can possibly confess all his sins; if a man really seeks to do this with his whole heart and woul it will be the death of him. Luther knew this from his own experience in the monastery. He became renowned both in his own and in nearby monasteries for his constant use of the sacrament of Penance and the desperate zeal with which he sought to release himself from the feeling of being "gallows-ripe". Lindsay, History of the Reformation I, 199-205. "As to the method of administration of Penance, both in the Roman and Eastern Churches, a necessary element, and therefore a necessary condition of receiving sacramental Absolution, is that, in all ordinary cases, there should be a detailed confession of sins to a priest." Stone, Outlines of Christian Dogma, 199. The Roman church, recognizing the fact that a literally complete confession is impossible, made the distinction between mortal and venial sins; "This came to

be stereotyped into the later distinction that Absolution is necessary for the forgiveness of mortal sin, but not necessary for the forgiveness of venial sin." Stone, Outlines of Christian Dogma, 199. One of the earliest points of disagreement of Luther with the Roman system had been over the distinction between mortal and venial sins and this grew as the years went by: "Die schlüssel sind ein Ampt und gewalt der Kirchen von Christo gegeben, zu binden und zu lösen die sunde. Nicht allein die groben und wolbekandten munde, sondern auch die subtilen heimlichen, die Gott allein erkennen...Denn es stehet nicht by uns, sondern bey Gott allein, zu urteilen, welche, wie gros und wie viel die sunde sind...Weil die Absolutio, oder krafft des Schlüssels auch ein hulffe und trost ist, wider die sunde und böse gewissen, im Evangelio durch Christum gestiftet...Die erzehlung aber der sunden, sol frey sein eim jedern, was er erzelen oder nicht erzelen wil. Den so lang wir im fleisch sind, werden wir nicht liegen, wenn wir sagen, Ich bin ein armer Mensch voller sunde." W. A. L, 243-4.

112. "denn wo die rew recht angaht, durch gottis gnadenn, da wirt zugleich der mensch gewandelt ynn eyn ander mensch, hertz, mut, synn und lebenn." W. A. VII, 361.
113. "wie solt den unsrer rew soo wirdig seyn, das umb yrend willen, got die sund und nit umb seynet willen vorgebe...wen nu umb unsrer rew willen die sund vorgebe wurde, soo were die ehre unsrer und nit gottes." Ibid. 377. "Ja die weil, alle heyligen noch bosssund sund ynn sich habenn, ist nit muglich das yemand rew hab, die fur gottes gericht gnug sey." Ibid. 385.
114. Ibid. 355. Luther says this contrition is that of the natural man, while real contrition is followed by grace and means a new life: "Soo muss er gewyslich sage, das die Judas rew un galgen rew, die peste puss sey, wilch on gotlich gnade auss lautter natur vormuge gemacht, ym grud falsch ist, un nit macht ei new leben, auch nit auffhoret zu sundige, ernster un hertzlicher meinug, wie drobe gnugsam erweyset ist, das on gnad kein guttis nit ist ym meschen, soo auch die ynn d' gnaden leben, boss un sund ynn sich streyttend habe." Ibid. 363. Luther goes on to tell how this new life and beginning of grace starts with the terrifying of conscience and "Anfectung", after which comes the comfort and end of despair: "Wol ist war, das ein new wessen unnd einfluss der gnaden anhebt, mit einer grossen anfectung unnd erschrecken des gewissens." Ibid.
115. W. A. L, 227.

116. W. A. XXX, 2, 456.
117. W. A. L, 244.
118. "Das wort Christi zu Petro, was du auffpindest auff erde, soll loss sein ym himel, erstreckt sich nit weitter, denn auff die, die Peter gepunden hat. Wie gern were der Bapst ein got, das er mocht pinden, was got loset, und losen was got pindet, auff das er Christus wort umbkeret, und also setzet, was ich bynd unnd losse ym hymell, solt du lassen und byndenn auff erden, das unsser got vortrieben hinfurt nichts mehr thun kund, den was der Bapst wolt." W. A. VII, 421. Luther's argument in this article (Twenty-six) is that the Pope is subject to the Keys (the Word of God) and not the Keys to the Pope. As he goes on to say, Christ did not give Peter the Keys that he might do anything with them but that he might be a servant of them for the forgiveness of sins: "Christ hat sie nit geben, das S. Peter solt gewalt damit habe etwas zu thun, ssondern unsserm glawbe sein sie gebe, d' selb sol sich dra halte, dz yhm die sund vorgebe werde, un S. Peter ist ein knecht darynnen." Ibid. 421-3.
119. "Es ist bisscher gnug beweisset, das nit des priesters werck, ssondern der glawb, des pussers, vorgebung der sund wirckt, den sso der Bapst un alle priester auff einen hauffen vrsamlet, ein absolutio uber einen ssunder sprechen, sso gilt und hilfft sie nichts, wo er der selben nicht glewbt...Aber die vergebug d' schuld ist eygentlich d' schlussel un sacrament d' puss, die foddert de glawbe, die vorgebug d' pein, fodder nit glawben, un gehoret nit eigentlich zum sacrament der schlussell." Ibid. 383-5.
120. Ibid. 325.
121. Ibid. 323.
122. W. A. L, 632. "Die schlussel sind nicht des Bapsts (wie er leuget), sonder der Kirchen, das ist des volcks Christi, des volcks Gottes oder des heiligen Christlichen volcks, so weit die gantze welt ist, oder wo Christen sind." Ibid. "In de sacramet d' puss un vorgebug d' schult, thut der Bapst ad' bisschoff nit mehr, den d' geringst priester, ja wo ein priester nit vorhande were, thut ebe sso viel, eyn yglicher Christen mensch, ob er gleich eyn weib odder kind were...Seyntemal die schlussell nit anderes, den zum sacrament der puss geben seinn, wilchs alle Christe gleich gemein ist." W. A. VII, 381-3.
123. Ibid. 421. "So ist Christus in dem, das er von binden und losen der sunden redet, weil es Schlusssel sind zum Himmelreich,

dahin niemand kompt on durch vergebung der sunden, und niemand davon ausgeschlossen wird, denn dem sie umb sein unbussfertigs leben willen gebunden werden. Das also die wort nicht S. Petrus gewalt, sondern die notturfft der elenden sunder oder der stoltzen sunder angehet." W. A. L, 548.

124. "Sihe also gauckelt un furet d' Bapst die ganzt welt, nympt auss dem gotliche wort was er will, ob es wol yderma gleich un gemein ist, yn gibt fur auss de fass malmasier trincken, da and' leut kaemet wasser ausstrincken." W. A. VII, 421.
125. W. A. VII, 423. Luther's view of the Keys as a dispenser of the gospel, and which, therefore, depends upon God for its power and upon our faith for its effectiveness, is brought out in the Thirteenth Article; here he says that even were God Himself to pronounce absolution it would be of no effect unless it were accepted by us through faith. And, he continues, God does do exactly this when He preaches and does His works among men every day, but it helps no one except those who believe in Him: "Ja wie solt des Bapst und aller priester absolution helffen on glawben, wen sie Christ auch got selber sprech, hulfft sie dennoch nichts, on den glawbe. Iste nit also? das got teglich prediget und wund' wirck fur den mensche, und hilfft doch nit, denn allein die yhm glewben?" Ibid. 381.
126. "Da da, der artickell hat den rechten blutschweren troffen, hie ist not gewessen zu weren, un vordammen, denn der artickel solt machen, das de abtgot zu Rom, die schlussel auss de schild fielen." Ibid. 381.
127. W. A. II, 745. Brilioth says of this sermon: "The rediscovery of the idea of communion is the greatest positive contribution of the Reformation in regard to the eucharist; it is of more value than all the criticisms of the mass." Eucharist Faith and Practice Evangelical and Catholic, 97. The idea of communion is, however, an implicit criticism of the Roman view of the Mass; for instance, one of the most recent papal pronouncements on Holy Communion says: "Therefore it is a false doctrine that would lead a priest to refuse to celebrate unless the faithful come to Communion; and it is still worse to ground this view--that the faithful must necessarily communicate together with the priest--on the sophistical contention that the Mass besides being a Sacrifice is also the banquet of a community of brethren; and that the general Communion of the faithful is to be regarded as the culminating point of the whole celebration. It must be emphasized again and again that the Eucharistic Sacrifice is essentially the unbloody immolation of the divine victim, etc." Pope Pius XII, Christian Worship (Encyclical Letter: Mediator Dei), 51-2.

Brilioth seems to feel that Luther's positive ideas about the communion of brethren became distorted in the controversial writings. In the face of the Roman attitude, however, it was necessary that Luther's writings should be controversial but in their essence they maintain the positive teachings of the earlier treatments. This can be clearly seen in Luther's views on the Keys; even in his most violent polemic writings he maintains and even deepens his emphasis on the Church as the community of brethren, using the gifts of God for mutual comfort and enrichment.

128. B. A. II, 27 (W. A. VII, 37-8).
129. W. A. VI, 546f. Christ has given the power of absolution to all believers and therewith the right to hear confessions: "Proinde, ego non dubito eum esse a peccatis suis occultis absolutum, quisquis sive sponte confessus, sive correptus, veniam petierit et emendaverit, coram quovis privatim fratre, quicquid contra haec insanierit pontificum violentia, quando Christus et manifesta dedit absolvere cuilibet suo fideli." Ibid. 547. Luther's inclusion of a section on how to say one's confession in the Shorter Catechism is an indication of the high value he placed on it. Though the practice died out in most of the German Lutheran churches, it persisted in the Scandinavian countries and is showing signs of revival there. Jarrett-Kerr, Our Trespasses, 99-100. Jarrett-Kerr's book, incidentally, which bears the sub-title of A Study in Christian Penitence, concludes with a chapter on "The Exchange of Penitence"; this is an Anglican treatment of the same problem with which Luther was so concerned. Jarrett-Kerr speaks of the need for members of the congregation to bear one another's sins, though he does not bring out as strongly as Luther the need for mutual comfort through confessing to one's brother in the Church and receiving from him the assurance and consolation of God's promises. The book is a very suggestive one, indicating a renewed desire to develop a constructive theology of repentance, and showing a remarkable similarity of views (as coming from the Anglican tradition) with those of Luther, for instance, in the criticism of the distinction between mortal and venial sins, etc. Ibid. 77ff.
130. Hughes, History of the Church III, 436-8. Flick in Decline of the Medieval Church describes, for instance, the results of the Babylonian Captivity of the Roman church as being extremely subversive for the whole stability of the Roman curia. It gave an opportunity and occasion for the keenest minds in Europe to attack the abuses in the church, the Pope's claim to temporal authority, and the claim of spiritual authority of the whole Roman hierarchy. There was a

general demand by scholars, priests and laity for reformation and purification. The whole period was one of ferment and revolution. Marsiglio of Padua, for instance, made criticisms of the papacy which in many points are almost identical with those of Luther: Emerton, The Defensor Pacis of Marsiglio of Padua. Luther's work and writings must always be interpreted with this background in mind.

131. Once again it must be evident what a large part theological factors played in Luther's reforming work; this treatment of his sacramental theory in the light of law and gospel should have shown this in part at least. Nevertheless, some still continue to discount the originality of his theological insights. Whitney in his Reformation Essays is one who has been rather misled here and unfortunately he is not an isolated example. He quotes Denifle to prove that Luther's claim to original exegesis of "Justitia" in the passive sense breaks down in the light of the fact that many medieval theologians interpreted it in the same way. Murray in Erasmus and Luther points this out as well: 61. Whitney believes, therefore, that the most solid part of Denifle's work is on justification: "Denifle has shown that this interpretation (of Rom. 1: 17) so far from being novel was traditional;...the special truth which stands out, and which must be admitted in any future estimates of Luther, is that here, where his cardinal doctrine of 'justification by faith' was concerned, he was more medieval than we are apt to think...no great revolution, although there was a change in proportion and a shifting of emphasis." Reformation Essays, 12. Denifle believes that Luther really knew of the earlier interpretations and is therefore a deliberate liar; Whitney would only go so far as to call it a "defensive illusion".

Even though Luther may have been ignorant of, or ignored, the patristic and medieval interpretation of Rom. 1: 17, it does not mean that his exegesis of it was not novel. To say that Luther's interpretation of it in the light of law and gospel (see note 46, part I) is the same as that of medieval theology is a misrepresentation of either one party of the other. It is true that medieval theology generally held that a man could not merit grace, nor naturally acquire it; the Augustinian influence remained sufficiently strong to insure that that basic premise would not be ignored: Williams, The Grace of God, 55ff. Seeberg, History of Doctrines II, 209 illustrates the extent to which the "pre-reformers" such as Goch, Wesel, etc. adhered to the medieval teaching on grace. "Theology in the West found its centre and principle of organization in the doctrine of Grace...the tendency of Western theology finds its representative and embodiment in St. Augustine, the Doctor of Grace, whose influence dominates

the whole medieval development." Dawson, Medieval Religion, 36. Nevertheless, medieval theology gave a large place to the idea of merit in the work of salvation; though there may be no merit without grace, neither is there blessedness without merit: "Grace makes it possible to win blessedness but merit must win it." Nygren, Agape and Eros II, 2, 403ff. Nor is the concept of merit entirely absent from Augustine himself: Hamel, Der junge Luther I, 129-31. Mackinnon, Luther and the Reformation I, 59ff. Nygren, Agape and Eros, II, 2, 236-7. "The idea of merit and the idea of virtue as a way to God are no alien additions to Augustine's thought, but belong organically to it." Ibid. 296, 309-10.

The key place which the concept of merit took in medieval theology is seen in such doctrines as "meritum de congruo" and "meritum de condigno", and "fides charitate formata". By willing not to sin a man is able to merit the first gift of grace: "meritum de congruo"; Aquinas uses the term but does not credit the human will with the freedom which the Nominalists posited. Furthermore, with the aid of grace one may attain to more merit: "meritum de condigno". Also, when it is said that medieval theology taught that justification is by faith alone, it must be remembered that it is faith formed by love: "fides charitate formata". This is taught by Aquinas: "the faith through which we are cleansed from sin, is not the unliving faith ('fides informis'), which can co-exist with sin, but faith living through love ('fides formata')." Moehler, Symbolism, 123. "Charity is a virtue, through which man's salvation is operated by man's action too. Sanctifying grace--the grace which, making man pleasing to God, justifies man--is a real vital principle, whence acts proceed that really are man's acts; man's merit before God is a reality, as man's freedom to posit these acts is a reality, and as the supernatural efficacy of those acts when posited is real." Hughes, History of the Church III, 460. The Franciscan divines generally tended toward a modified synergism and "the milder doctrine of grace continued to gain ground in the theological schools of Europe all through the Middle Ages; on the eve of the Reformation Gabriel Biel... defended without challenge the theory of 'congruous merit', which, as we have pointed out, contains by implication the whole of Synergism." Williams, The Grace of God, 68. Luther was a student of Biel's writings and was less well acquainted with Aquinas who represents a more Augustinian tendency.

Luther's reaction against this general development must be considered in interpreting his view of "passive righteousness;" one could hardly say that his "discovery" of a passive meaning in Rom. 1: 17 is a "defensive illusion". He understood it in terms of the relation between law and gospel. For

Roman theology law is one of the standards of attainment, the moral and meritorious fulfilment of which is necessary for salvation; for Luther, the law is not only fulfilled by Christ, but in a far deeper way, abolished by Christ: "The Latin doctrine involved the idea of law and justice as the typical expression of God's relation to man; but this is just what Luther tears to pieces, raising God's claim to a higher level, and therefore treating Law as, in one aspect, a tyrant from which man needs to be delivered." Aulen, Christus Victor, 137. Luther's break with medieval legalism becomes radical at this point. For the extent to which Luther was conscious of his differences with medieval theological views such as have been mentioned, see his expert analysis and criticism of "meritum de congruo" and "meritum de condigno" in his Commentary on Galatians: W. A. XL, 1, 220; and his attack against the idea of "fides formata": "Haec est Sophistarum opinio et eorum qui optimi sunt. Alii non sunt tam boni, ut Scotus et Occam qui dixerunt non opus esse acquirenda gratia Dei charitate illa divinitus donata, sed hominem posse ex naturalibus viribus elicere charitatem Dei super omnia... Sic fides est corpus, siliqua, color, charitas vero est vita, nucleus, forma. Haec sunt Scholasticorum somnia." Ibid. 226ff.

132. Fairbairn, The Place of Christ in Modern Theology, 138-9.
133. "Zum andern sag ich, das der Bapst un alle sein wissentliche forwandten ynn diessen stuck ketzer, abtrinnige, vorpannet, und vormaldeiet sein. Darumb das sie anders leren, denn das Euangelium ynnen hat, un folgen ihrem eigen kopff, widder den gemeinen prauch der gantzen Christenheit. Denn das heissen ketzer und abtrinniger, wilch ubertretten die lere yhrer vetter, und ssondern sich selb, von gemeiner weisse un masse auss lautter mutwillen, on ursach, widder das heylig Euangelium, das thut der Endchrist zu Rom, ynn diessen und viel mehr stuckenn, noch erhebt er sein unvorschampts laster maul ynn den hymel, un lastert die kriechechen kirchenn, das sie zwispaltig und abtrinnig sey. Sso er der erst un allein ist aller abtrinnug und parteyen heubt ursach un anheber, wie das am tag ist, und alle historien be weissenn." W. A. VII, 395-7. Luther's combination of sorrow and wrath with which he attacked Roman theology and practices was based on the depth of his conviction that the papacy and Scholastic theology were deviations from the true faith and order of Christ's Church: "Horrendissimum autem est Papam hoc potuisse officere in Ecclesia, quod Christus negatus, conculcatus, consputus et blasphematus sit, et hoc per Evangelium et Sacramenta quae ita obscuravit et in tam detestabilem abusum vertit, ut sibi contra Christum ser-

vierint pro statuendis et corroporandis suis diabolicis abominationibus. O tenebras et infinitam iram Dei! " W. A. XL, 1, 238. It was as a deeply consecrated son of the Church that Luther accused the Pope of being "anti-Christ". Luther is essentially the Reformer in spirit, not the Revolutionary.

134. Ward, Counter-Reformation, 2ff. Flick, Decline of the Medieval Church.
135. Hamburg Auswahl X, 5ff. (D. Martin Luthers Vorreden über die einzelnen biblischen Bücher und vermischte Aufsätze.).
136. Ibid. 5. "So wenig nun des Neuen Testaments Grund und Beweisung zu verachten ist, so theuer ist auch das Alte Testament zu achten."
137. "zweifele nicht daran, wie schlecht es immer sich ansehen lasset, es seyn eitel Worte, Wercke, Gerichte und Geschichte der hohen gottlichen Majestat und Weisheit. Denn diess ist die Schrift, die alle Weisen und Klugen zu Narren macht und allein den Kleinen und Albernern offen stehet...Hier wirst du die Windeln und die Krippen finden, da Christus inne liegt, dahin auch der Engel die Hirten weiset, Luc. 2, 11. Schlecht und geringe Windeln sind es, aber theuer ist der Schatz, Christus, der darinnen liegt." Ibid. 5-6. "Tenues quidem et viles sunt fasciae, verum thesaurus involutus magni est pretii, Christum scilicet." W. A. DB V, 2f. (Praefatio M. L. in Vetus Testamentum, 1529)
138. H. A. X, 6.
139. " (das seines Schreibens meiste Ursache ist) wo die Sunde und der Tod herkommen sey...lehret er, woher die Hülfe wieder kommen sollte, die Sunde und den Tod zu vertreiben, nemlich nicht durch Gesetz noch eigen Werck, weil noch kein Gesetz war, sondern durch des Weibes Saamen, Christum." H. A. X, 6.
140. "Das ist das erste Euangelion und verheyssung von Christo geschehen auff erden, das er solt sunde, tod und helle überwinden und uns von der schlangen gewalt selig machen...(Gen. 22: 18) Das war das andere Euangelion von Christo, das durch den alle menschen sollen gesegnet und selig werden." W. A. XXIV, 11. He says that the whole of the Old Testament is filled with such gospel preachings: "Der spruche sind vil ym alten Testament." Ibid. See, for instance, the examples of the gospel in the Old Testament in his Vorrede auf das Neue Testament: H. A. X, 65f. In Vorlesungen über 1. Mose von 1535-45, he continues to emphasize that the gospel began in

Genesis: W. A. XLIII, 583ff. (Gen. 28: 14b-15). Also W. A. VI, 356f.; W. A. XVIII, 772-3; W. A. XL, 1, 464ff. W. A. XLVI, 670.

141. "der Glaube von Anfang der Schrift durch und durch gepreiset werde über alle Wercke, Gesetz und Verdienst. Also hat das erste Buch Mosis fast eitel Exempel des Glaubens und Unglaubens, und was Glaube und Unglaube vor Frucht tragen, und ist fast ein evangelisch Buch." H. A. X, 6-7.
142. "Darnach im andern Buch, da die Welt nun voll und in der Blindheit versunken war, das man schier nicht wusste, was Sünde war, oder wo Tod herkommen sey, bringet Gott Mosen hervor mit dem gesetz." Ibid. 7.
143. Ibid. 7. "Sacerdotes igitur officium non est aliud quam peccata et peccatores curare." W. A. DB V, 4.
144. "dies Buch ein merklich Exempel ist, wie gar es nichts ist, mit Gesetzen die Leute fromm zu machen, sondern, wie St. Paulus sagt, das Gesetz nur Sünde und Zorn anrichte." H. A. X, 7. "gott dem volck Israel mancherley gesetz, weyss und ubungen gab, nur darumb, das menschlich natur solt erkennen wie gar nichts hulff vil gesetz, frum leuth zu machen." W. A. VI, 353.
145. H. A. X, 8.
146. In both church order and civil government, faith and love are to stand supreme over strict law; the whole Old Testament, says Luther, is full of examples of how priests and kings modified the laws in respect to the ultimate standards of faith and love: "Aus diesen und dergleichen Geschichten siehet man wohl dass die Konige, Priester und Obersten haben oft frisch ins Gesetz gegriffen, wo es der Glaube und die Liebe haben gefordert: dass also der Glaube und die Liebe soll aller Gesetze Meisterin seyn, und sie alle in ihrer Macht haben." H. A. X, 9. See also the Eight Wittenberg Sermons of 1522: W. A. X, 3, 2ff. In Ob Kriegsleute auch in seligem Stande sein können (1526) Luther discusses the whole problem of administering law in the secular order as tempered by "Billlichkeit" or "Equitas": W. A. XIX, 630ff. This is one of the key concepts in Luther's political theory.
147. "Also sehen wir, dass solche und so mancherley Gesetze Mosis nicht allein darum gegeben sind, dass niemand etwas eigenes durfte erwählen, Gutes zu thun und wohl zu leben, wie droben gesagt ist, sondern vielmehr darum, dass der Sunden nur viel wurden, und sich über die Maassen haufeten, das Gewissen zu

beschweren, auf dass die verstockte Blindheit sich erkennen musste und ihr eigen Unvermogen und Nichtigkeit zum Guten musste fühlen, und also durch das Gesetz genothiget und gedrungen wurde, etwas weiteres zu suchen, denn das Gesetz und eigen Vermogen, nemlich Gottes Gnade, im kunftigen Christo verheissen." H. A. X, 13.

148. "Denn es sind dreyerley Schuler des Gesetzes: Die ersten, die das Gesetz horen und verachten, fuhren ein ruchlos Leben, ohne Furcht." Ibid. 14.
149. "Die andern, die es angreifen, mit eigener Kraft zu erfullen, ohne Gnade." Ibid.
150. "Aber doch ist solch Sundenamt und Todesamt gut und fast vonnothen. Denn wo Gottes Gesetz nicht ist, da ist alle menschliche Vernunft so blind, dass sie die Sunde nicht mag erkennen, Rom. 3, 20; 7, 7.8. Denn keine menschliche Vernunft weiss, dass Unglaube und an Gott verzweifeln Sunde sey; ja sie weiss nichts davon, dass man Gott glauben und trauen soll: gehet also dahin in ihrer Blindheit verstockt, und fuhlet solche Sunde nimmermehr, thut dieweil sonst etwa gute Wercke und fuhret ein ausserlich ehrbar Leben." Ibid. 11.
151. Ibid. 14.
152. Ibid. 15. In Vorrede auf die Propheten Luther enlarges his discussion of the work of the prophets in expounding the law and preaching the promise of the gospel: H. A. X, 32.
153. Ibid. 21.
154. W. A. VII, 327. "Error enim est, sacramenta novae legis differri a sacramentis veteris legis, penes efficaciam significationis, utraque aequaliter significabant. Idem enim deus, qui nos nunc per baptismum et panem salvat, salvavit Abel per sacrificium, Noe per arcum, Abraham per circumcisionem, et alios omnes per sua signa... At nostra et patrum signa seu sacramenta habent annexum verbum promissionis, quod fidem exigit, et nullo opere alio impleri potest." W. A. VI, 532.
155. Seeberg, Revelation and Inspiration, 18-9. Preuss, Die Entwicklung des Schriftprinzips bei Luther.
156. H. A. X, 99 (Vorrede auf die Epistel St. Jacobi und St. Juda). For Luther's appraisal of the contrast between John and James: Loewenich, Luther und das Johanneische Christentum, 29. Both Seeberg and Mackinnon describe some of Luther's Biblical criticism: Revelation and Inspiration, 19. Luther and the Reformation IV, 300ff.

157. H. A. X, 108.
158. "Nicht historische Interessen führen ihn auf die Schrift, sondern Heilsinteressen. So unterscheidet sich seine Stellung zur Schrift nicht nur von derjenigen der Humanisten, sondern auch von der des späteren Mittelalters." Scheel, Luthers Stellung zur heiligen Schrift, 17. Schlink, Theologie der lutherischen Bekenntnisschriften, 105ff., 187ff. Thiel gives an excellent insight into the spirit in which Luther expounded, translated and used the Bible: Luther II, 314ff.
159. Mackinnon, Luther and the Reformation IV, 302-3. When Luther argues against the "Schwarmgeister", who are justifying their positions on the basis of Old Testament precedents, etc., he says that it is not enough to simply appeal to the Bible; one must understand the context of the words in the Bible, to whom they were spoken and why, before they can be interpreted rightly. It is against the perversion of this critical activity that Luther is protesting when he speaks to the Humanists.
160. W. A. L, 659 (Vorrede zum 1. Bande der Wittenberger Ausgabe der deutschen Schriften, 1539). In the light of what has been said about "Anfechtung", it is interesting to note Luther's inclusion of it as one of the means of insight into the Bible; this again illustrates his strong personal and religious approach to the study of Scripture: "Zum dritten ist da Tentatio, anfechtung. Die ist der Pruffestein, die leret dich nicht allein wissen und verstehen, sondern auch erfahren, wie recht, wie warhafftig, wie susse, wie lieblich, wie mechtig, wie trostlich Gottes wort sey, weisheit uber alle weisheit." Ibid. 660.
161. "We see then, that in his personal life, both religious and secular, in his family life, in his ecclesiastical life, and in his political life each man must unreservedly and in every detail submit himself wholly to the Word of God, to be found within the pages of the Bible...We finally conclude, therefore, that Luther set up the totalitarian, omniscient Word of God in place of the totalitarian, omniscient Church of the Middle Ages." Davies, The Problem of Authority, 53, 55. There has been considerable difference of opinion among scholars over Luther's interpretation of the Bible. On one side are those who hold that Luther's interpretation was a radical departure from the previous times and that he laid the foundations for modern historical Biblical criticism; Loofs, for instance, maintains this view: Dogmengeschichte, 745. Seeberg also believes that Luther made a great advance from the medieval interpretations of the authority of Scripture: Revelation and Inspiration, 16ff. On the other side are those who

hold that Luther merely continued the medieval views and identified the Word of God with the Bible; Harnack interprets his position in this way: History of Dogma VII, 246-7. Herrmann says that Luther "came to place reliance on an obedience to the Scripture as a sort of law. In this, of course, he and his Roman Catholic opponents were at one." Communion with God, 49-50. Other writings on Luther as a Biblical critic are listed in a bibliographical footnote in Bainton, "Luther's Attitude to Religious Liberty", Harvard Theological Review XXII, 2, 135f. Bainton's own position is that Luther, while strongly influenced by the humanists in his early career, later became much more conservative in his attitude towards the Bible.

Davies has presented one of the most recent studies of Luther's Biblical interpretation; he says that it is "quite true that Luther did not substitute an infallible Bible for an infallible Church." The Problem of Authority, 39. Nevertheless, for Luther the Word of God is infallible; "Its writers, though they remained free personalities when they wrote, were nevertheless preserved by the Spirit from writing what was false." Ibid. 40. Davies fails to appreciate that the Word is infallible to Luther, not as it is written down by men, but as it is the Incarnate Word. The relation of the Word to the Bible is like that of the elements to the presence of Christ in the sacraments. Furthermore, as Seeberg says: "his view of Scripture was entirely different from that of the Middle Ages. When Luther refers to Scripture, he is thinking of the Gospel of Christ and His kingdom, of sin and grace, in short, of the religious content of Scripture, of 'Christ and the Christian faith'." Revelation and Inspiration, 16ff. It is true that Luther's views on the authority of the Bible are particularly difficult to determine since, as Beard points out, the problem of authority, as such, was never raised for him: Martin Luther, 394ff. There is no excuse, however, to make ~~the~~ statement that Luther's theory of interpretation is "stark and inflexible", as Davies does: The Problem of Authority, 54. Law and gospel is the central doctrine in Luther's Biblical theology; Davies quotes Schemp's Luthers Stellung zur Heiligen Schrift but he shows little evidence that he has taken Schemp's conclusions seriously, namely as to the importance of law and gospel in Luther's teaching on the subject: "Diese Thesen können hier nur den Zweck haben, die Einheit, die zeitlich unaufhebbare Gegensatzlichkeit und die aktuelle Dynamik in der Stellung Luthers zur Schrift aufzuzeigen: Die Schrift ist als ganze Gottes Wort, aber sie enthält zwei Arten von Gottes Wort, die nicht vermischt werden dürfen, das Gesetz und das Evangelium." Ibid. 75. If Davies had taken this fully into consideration Luther's interpretation of the Psalms and the Epistle to the Romans would not seem so incongruous to him: "In his study of it he was constantly looking for the Gospel of justification, and finding it, too, in the most

unlikely places, such as the Book of Psalms." The Problem of Authority, 32. He also mentions Luther's "naive view that the Epistle to the Romans preaches Christ better than any other book in the Bible." Ibid. 56. If Luther's view is as "naive" as Davies seems to think it, so must be the rest of his theology which is the foundation for such statements as these. Davies gives further evidence of failing to understand Luther's position: "The distinction between the Law and the Gospel, which had worked well enough in the Old Testament, would not here meet the case, for the New Testament had no right to concern itself with the Law." Ibid. 33. If critics such as Davies were to take Luther's concept of "Anfektung" and see how it was for Luther one of the prerequisites for a proper understanding of Scripture, they might be able to interpret Luther's views far more correctly.

162. "Dass es wol mochte eine kleine Biblia heissen...wer die gantze Biblia nicht lesen konnte, hatte hierinnen doch fast die gantze Summa verfasset in ein klein Bucklein." H. A. X, 21.
163. "Diese Epistel ist das rechte Hauptstucke des Neuen Testaments und das aller lauterste Evangelium, welche wol wurdig und werth ist, dass sie ein Christenmensch nicht allein von Wort zu Wort auswendig wisse, sondern taglich damit umgehe, als mit taglichen Brod der Seele. Denn sie nimmer kann zuviel und zu wohl gelesen und betrachtet werden, und je mehr sie gehandelt wird, je kostlicher sie wird und dass schmecket." H. A. X, 70. Luther has been accused of reading the Bible solely through the eyes of Paul. Loewenich has shown that even though Luther had more in common with Paul, and found the relation of faith and love in Johannine thought difficult to grasp, nevertheless he showed a real understanding and appreciation of Johannine theology: Luther und das Johannische Christentum, 12ff.
164. W. A. XL, 1, 550-1.
165. Ibid. 36.
166. Ibid. Luther's opposition to the Anabaptists (a term he often applied loosely to the left-wing sects of his day) was consistently sharp, and his attitude grew more hostile as the years passed. He was especially repelled by their legalistic tendencies; as Grisar points out, one of Luther's chief criticisms against the Anabaptists and Thomas Munzer in particular, one of their chiefs, was that they failed to distinguish between law and gospel: Luther II, 375. Troeltsch has also indicated the dominant place which the law took in the theology of the sects and Luther's opposition to them because of this: Ges. Schr. I, 382, 453-4.

Moehler has given remarkable substantiation for Luther's analysis when he admits (as a Roman Catholic theologian still highly considered within his communion: Adam, Spirit of Catholicism, 17): "in more than one respect these newsprung sects approximated to the Catholic Church, from which they appeared to be still further removed than even the Lutheran and the Calvinistic communities. It was almost always in the doctrine of justification, which, though they made use of unwonted forms of expression, they mostly conceived in the spirit of Christ's Church, this approximation was perceptible." Symbolism, 364. It is interesting to note that: "The Lutherans and Zwinglians never converted the Anabaptists. Those who yielded to stress of persecution fell back into Papalism and went to swell the tide of the Catholic reaction." Conybeare, Encyclopedia Britannica I, 904-5. Conybeare believes there is some relation between some of the Roman sects and the Anabaptists; among these Roman sects the legalistic spirit was often quite strong with the emphasis on the "law of Jesus": Troeltsch, Ges. Schr. I, 382. There are notable exceptions to this, of course; Luther often paid tribute to such monastic saints as Bernhard, who he thought showed a true evangelical spirit. He was critical of the Manicheans for the opposite reason: Schäfer, Luther als Kirchenhistoriker, 27lf. To Luther, both the Anabaptists and the Roman monks, each having distinctive dress, are the wolves in sheeps' clothing described in the New Testament: "Also heist das auch ein Schaffbeltz, Das die falschen Propheten eusserlich einen schonen schein und gleissendes leben furen, Wie man an den Widertaufern sihet, da horet man nit ein fluchlin von, kleider, essen und trincken ist auff das schlechtest, einer setz dan andern für, die gehn vil mit Gottes wort umb, betten vil, sind im leiden gedultig, nit rachgirig. Solchs ist an jm selb nit unrecht, und wer zu wünschen, das solcher stuck halben alle menschen werden wie sie. Aber das man darumb jr lehr für recht halten und jnen folgen solt, da sagt Christus: Hute dich für. Denn unter dem schaffbeltz wirstu auch wol einen Wolff finden, Das sie wie die Munchen jren trost auff jr eigene gerechtigkeit setzen." W. A. LII, 424 (Hauspostille, 1532-34). He brings out the same idea when he says that the ungodly hide behind the sheeps' clothing of ceremonial-work righteousness: W. A. V, 30-1 (Operationes in Psalmos, 1519-21). So all human laws, through the work of the devil, become tyrannical and there is an implacable discord between them and the Word of God: "Princeps mundi Papam et Pontifices suos non sinit eorum leges libere servari, sed conscientias captare et ligare in animo habet, Hoc Deus verus ferre non potest, Ita implacabili discordia verbum Dei et traditiones hominum pugnant." W. A. XVIII, 627.

167. "Was thut aber der Bapst, Die widertaufer, Die Juden, Turken und der gleichen? Sie lassen Christum und sein wort faren und

gehen die weyl mit menschen satzungen umb." W. A. LII, 325.
 "Papa, Turcae, Iudaei et omnes sectarii hunc canonem non observant...Alias extra hunc locum Iustificationis si quando disputandum est cum Iudaeis, Turcis, Sectariis." W. A. XL, 1, 76, 78.

168. W. A. XL, 1, 36-7.
169. They should not be confused with the libertines against whom Luther speaks in the earlier edition: "Et hodie multi ex nostris etiam idem faciunt qui erepti doctrina Evangelii ex tyrannide Papae somniant libertatem Christianam carnalem esse licentiam faciendi quidvis." W. A. XL, 1, 528. Luther is probably referring to the Anabaptist libertinism at Munster: "ut Sectarii tentabant et illa occasione seditionem rusticorum movebant." Ibid.
170. Ibid. 65.
171. Ibid. 235.
172. "Aber das Gesetze nur zorn anrichtet, und man dadurch nur zu erkenntnis der Sunde komet so fraget man denn weiter: wozu dienet das Gesetz? aus an galgen mit Mose und dem Gesetze, wie jtzt die Gesetzsturmer auch lestern." W. A. XLVI, 657.
173. Grisar, Luther V, 15. Moehler, Symbolism, 185ff.
174. Mackinnon, Luther and the Reformation IV, 175.
175. Mackinnon, Luther and the Reformation IV, 161ff. Thiel, Luther II, 235ff. Kawerau, "Agricola" in Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia I, 91ff. Kawerau, Johann Agricola. Funck-Brentano tells of the disappointment and sadness with which Luther took up his pen against his "nearest and dearest": "Lo! I am forced to fight the children of my own blood!" Luther, 213-4.
176. Newman draws up a list of the "acknowledged articles" of Agricola and then adds to it statements of "doubtful authenticity which Agricola was supposed to have made" credited to him by Luther: Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia I, 199 n. 1. "Agricola disowned the most manifestly immoral of these propositions, and there is no reason to believe that he practiced or approved the immorality that seems to be involved in his teachings." Ibid. Hildebrandt gives Agricola even further benefit of the doubt: "the simple 'abolition' of the Law is out of the question--and in practice, despite the de-

nunciations of his enemies, Agricola never doubted that." Melanchthon, 36. Agricola's form of Antinomianism is certainly not to be considered of the objectionable kind that would transform the gospel into uninhibited license but his views must have left room for that sort of interpretation, just as he tended to misinterpret Luther.

177. W. A. XLV, 102ff.
178. Ibid. 145ff.
179. Luther drew up five sets of Theses, but the third and fourth set were never formally disputed as a result of the agreement reached on January 12. Mackinnon, Luther and the Reformation IV, 171 n. 36. The Theses and disputations are found in W. A. XXXIX, part 1.
180. W. A. XXXIX, 1, 345 (Th. 17). "Poenitentia docenda est non ex Decalogo, aut ulla lege Mosi, sed ex violatione filii per Evangelium." Ibid. 342 (Th. 1). "Ergo lex Mosi non est necessari ut doceatur, neque pro principio, neque medio, neque fine iustificationis." Ibid. (Th. 9). "Qui enim affingunt verbis Christi improprium hunc sermonem et docent, primum legem, deinde Evangelium docendum esse, hi sunt verborum Christi contortores, non enim consistunt in simplicitate verborum Christi." Ibid. (Th. 14). Agricola appealed to certain statements of Luther in which he had said that the gospel may drive men to repentance; but as has been pointed out before, this was for Luther always the "strange work" of the gospel and when Christ expounded the law this was not to be taken as a part of the work of the gospel. See note 183.
181. W. A. XXXIX, 1, 345-7 (Th. 4, 7). "Poenitentia omnium testimonio et vero est dolor de peccato cum adiuncto proposito melioris vitae." Ibid. (Th. 1). Luther is reiterating his view that real repentance includes the whole life of a man and comes from the working of both law and gospel: "Hic dolor proprie aliud nihil est, nec esse potest, quam ipse tactus seu sensus legis in corde seu conscientia." Ibid. (Th. 2).
182. W. A. L, 473.
183. Ibid. "Denn an dem Son Gottes sehe ich, als jnn der that, den zorn Gottes, den mir das Gesetze mit worten und geringern wercken zeigt."
184. W. A. XXXIX, 1, 346. "Poenitentia solum ex lege ist dimidium vel initium poenitentiae seu per synecdochen poenitentia, qui caret bono proposito." (Th. 8). The inadequacy of the

Scholastic view of the nature and purpose of the law had long been one of Luther's main points of criticism and even in this Antinomian controversy he does not forget his antipathy to the "Nomians." Kurz, Die Heilsgewissheit bei Luther, 71.

185. W. A. XXXIX, 1, 346-7 (Th. 28, 30). This does not contradict his view that the gospel came before the law in Genesis; it was only as men gradually became less and less able to know what sin was (as a result of the Fall) that it became necessary for God to send the law: "Darnach im andern Buch, da die Welt nun voll und in der Blindheit versunken war, dass man schier nicht wusste, was Sunde war, oder wo Tod herkommen sey, bringet Gott Mosen hervor mit dem Gesetz." H. A. X, 7. Adam lost much of his original righteousness and powers by the Fall, but the full results have only come by degrees to his descendants: "Quantum mare cognitionis et sapientiae in hoc uno homine fuit! Etsi autem de hac cognitione quoque multum amisit Adam per peccatum, tamen credo, quicquid adhuc in omnium sapientum libris est, qui tot seculis ab eo tempore, quo literae primum natae sunt, scripserunt, id totum eam sapientiam non dum potuit equare, quae tamen postea in Adam haesit, sed paulatim in posteris obscurata, et pene extincta est." W. A. XLII, 90-1 (Vorlesungen über 1. Mose, 1535-45).
186. W. A. XXXIX, 1, 347 (Th. 31).
187. Ibid. 416-7. "Nec miranda haec eorum ignorantia, cum scriptura posthabita nec quid lex, nec quid Evangelion esset nosse potuerint." Ibid. 346 (Th. 19). Hildebrandt, Melanchthon, 34.
188. Mackinnon, Luther and the Reformation IV, 178.
189. "docendam esse poenitentiam (quam vocat timorem et tremorem) ex memoria Christi, non ex lege...At datus olim, et datur perpetuo Spiritus sanctus, et iustificantur homines sine lege, per solum Evangelium de Christo...Ergo lex Mosi non est necessari ut doceatur, neque pro principio, neque medio, neque fine iustificationis...Quare pro conservanda puritate doctrinae resistendum est iis, qui docent, Evangelium non praedicandum, nisi animus prius quassatis et contritis per legem...Nam Evangelium Christi docet iram Dei et coelo, et simul iustitiam Dei." W. A. XXXIX, 1, 342-5 (Th. 5, 8, 9, 13, 18).
190. Ibid. 347-50 (Th. 7, 8). "Neque enim data est lex, ut iustificet aut vivificet aut quidquam iuvet ad iustitiam...Sed ut peccatum ostendat et iram operetur, hoc est conscientiam ream faciat." Ibid. (Th. 4, 5).

191. W. A. XXXIX, 1, 347-50 (Th. 9).
192. Ibid. (Th. 10).
193. Ibid. 350-2 (Disput. III, Th. 8). Luther's view of sin is more radical than that of either the legalists or the Antinomians; the Antinomians do not see that sin is so deep that the harsh and forceful teaching of the law is necessary to show its reality, while the legalists do not understand that such radical sin can only be done away with by the gospel of Christ, not through man's efforts.
194. Ibid. 354-7 (Disput. V, Th. 7).
195. Ibid. (Th. 10).
196. Ibid. (Th. 40, 41).
197. "Quatenus igitur mors adhuc est in homine, eatenus peccatum et lex est in homine." Ibid. (Th. 8).
198. Ibid. (Th. 42, 43, 44).
199. Ibid. 352-4 (Disput. IV, Th. 38, 39).
200. "Quare et ipsa oratio Dominica docet legem esse ante, sub et post Evangelion et ab ipsa inchoandum esse poenitentiam." Ibid. 350-2 (Disput. III, Th. 27).
201. H. A. X, 6.
202. W. A. XXX, 1, 222.
203. W. A. LVI, 347 (Schol. Rom. 7: 25).
204. "Disse zwo widderstendige rede, der freyheytt unn dienstparkeytt zuvornehmen, sollen wir gedencken, das eyn ygliche Christed mensch ist zweyerley natur, geystlicher un leyplicher. Nach der seelen wirt er eyn geystlich, new, ynnerlich mensch genennet, nach dem fleysch und blut wirt er eyn leyplich allt und eusserlich mensch genennet." B. A. II, 11 (W. A. VI, 21).
It is to be remembered that for Luther "flesh" and "spirit" are primarily religious terms; the nature of a man--his spirit, soul and body--can be a combination of "flesh" and "spirit" in all three parts: "Und ein igliches diesser dreier, sagt de gatze mesche, wirt auch geteylet auff ein and' weiss yn zwey stuck, die da heissen, geist un fleisch, wilch teilung nit d' natur, ssondern d' eygeschaff ist, dz ist, die natur hat drey stuck, geist, seel, leip, un muge alle sampt gut od' boss sein, dz heist den geist un fleysch sein." W. A. VII, 550 (Das magnificat verdeutschet und ausgelegt, 1520-21).

205. W. A. XL, 1, 368.
206. "It is not necessary to point out the discrepancies and contradictions in the above train of thought...Here, even more plainly than elsewhere, we see both his lack of system and the irreconcilable contradictions lying in the very core of his ethics and theology." Grisar, Luther V, 10. "however clearly we can see what Luther ultimately wished with his distinction between law and gospel--the Reformer's expositions are not found when we go into detail to be harmonious." Harnack, History of Dogma VII, 206. Carlson in Luther in Modern Swedish Theology describes how the various "types" (as taken from Wolff, Die Haupttypen der neueren Lutherdeutung) of Luther scholars have interpreted the dualism in Luther's thought: Ritschl looks at it as a remnant of medievalism, T. Harnack as an epistemological dualism, Seeberg as a psychological dualism, Holl does not explain it away but makes little positive use of it. It is the modern Luther students of Sweden, according to Carlson, who have made positive use of Luther's dualism: "Swedish research interprets all of Luther against the dualistic background. It is unwilling to grant that this element in his theology is merely a reflection of the mythology of his time." Luther in Modern Swedish Theology, 11. Carlson cites Bring's Dualismen hos Luther as one of the best examples of this approach to Luther. Since few will read Swedish, one may get an insight into this new interpretation in Aulen's Christus Victor, for instance in his treatment of "simul iustus et peccator"; Ibid. 172; or in his discussion of the wrath of God in which he points out that Luther never "rationalizes" the duality: Ibid. 129ff. Pinomaa has written on the relation between the "Zorn Gottes" and the "Lob Gottes" in Luther's theology, also stressing the positive significance of this paradoxical dualism: Der Zorn Gottes in der Theologie Luthers.
207. W. A. LVI, 347.
208. W. A. XL, 1, 209.
209. Ibid. 526.
210. W. A. XXXIX, 1, 474.
211. Harnack, Luthers Theologie I, 577-8. Schlink has put the same thought in another way: "Die Wiedergeborenen leben nicht mehr unter dem Gesetz, sondern in dem Gesetz." Theologie der lutherischen Bekenntnisschriften, 161. One must tread carefully here, however, so that Luther's insight is not lost; these statements might indicate that the Christian has a love of the law through

grace, so that the law becomes a "new law" through the gospel. Such a position is maintained by Luther only in his early theology when he was still strongly under the influence of Nominalist teaching; his mature position is something far different: "Er sagt zwar in der disput. Ilc. Antin., 'lex est jam valde mitigata per justificationem': aber er meint nichts anderes als dies, dass bei dem justificatus neben das 'sum peccator' nun das 'non sum peccator' tritt." Loofs, Dogmengeschichte, 776-7, 777 n. 1. Luther's most important contribution to the understanding of the relation between the ethical life and the law is his affirmation that only when a man is freed from the law is he able to fulfil the law. As he puts it in reference to sin, only that man who is righteous can really desire the end of sin: "Sso ists nit muglich das widd' un von den sunde bitte odd' begere, denn die do schon frum seinn. Der angehabende geist, un das erste stuck der gnaden, hat allein die art, das es widd' die ubrige sunde erbeitet, und wolt gern allein durch und durch frum sein, un vormag doch nit, fur dem widderspanst des fleisches. Den wilche nit angefangen habe frum zu sein, die streitte nit, klagen nit, bitten nit widder yhr fleisch un sund, ia sie fulen nichts widderspenstiges, faren und folgen, wie das fleisch wil." W. A. VII, 337. The Christian life is the life of "becoming": "Denn dies Leben ist nichts anders denn ein Leben des Glaubens, der Liebe und des heiligen Kreuzes. Aber diese drei werden nimmer in uns vollkommen, weil wir auf Erden leben...Denn dies Leben ist ein solcher Wandel, darinnen man immerdar fortfuhret von Glauben in Glauben, von Liebe in Liebe, von Geduld in Geduld oder von Kreuz in Kreuz. Es ist nit Gerechtigkeit, sondern Rechtfertigung, nit Reinigkeit, sondern Reinigung. Wir sind noch nit kommen, dahin wir sollen, wir sind aber alle auf der Bahn und dem Weg; darauf sind etliche weiter und weiter." Vom heiligen Abendmahl, 43 (Predigt am Grûndonnerstag, 1524). Hermann, who has made a full study of Luther's thought on this subject, says that for Luther the Christian life of constant struggle between sin and the Spirit is analogous to the experience in sickness in which the patient is already well in the eyes of the doctor but the cure and convalescence take time: Luthers These 'Gerecht und Sunder zugleich', 10-14, 16.

212. "Ita Angeli et beati in coelo non debent esse, sed sunt sine lege iusti, et pura creatura Dei." W. A. XXXIX, 1, 203. The angels, as messengers of God, are not "free" to follow their own wills but neither are they under a legal "compulsion" from God; their obedience is spontaneous. This is further evidence that Luther thinks that the legal relationship between God and His creatures is not the natural one in God's original plan.

213. W. A. XLII, 110.
214. Ibid. 83.
215. Ibid.
216. Ibid.
217. Ibid. 80-1
218. W. A. XL, 1, 550. Even after the Antinomian controversy the only "legal" concession which Luther would make in his teaching of the work of the gospel in the sanctified life was that it was blasphemy and the word of the devil to say that the gospel gave "license" to commit evil: "Euangelium non concedat licentiam usurarum, rapinarum, luxus, aleae etc." W. A. XLIII, 436. His more characteristic affirmation is that the Christian man is released from the law: "Summa ars Christianorum ignoscere totam iusticiam activam et ignorare legem, Sicut extra populum dei est Summa sapientia nosse et inspicere legem." W. A. XL, 1, 43. Luther is afraid of the entering wedge of the law in the sanctified life; one law is the beginning of thousands more: "Darnach kamen die Bepste, die wolten auch etwas darzu thun und macheten Gesetze, da erwuckse aus des einigen Gesetzes abethun viel Tausenterlay Gesetz, so das sie uns mit Gesetzen nu haben uberschuttet." W. A. X, 3, 20 (Predigten, 1522). All experience and history teaches that the less law the more justice, and the fewer commands, the more good works: "Das leret uns die erfahrung, alle cronicken, dartzu die heyligen schrift, das, yhe weniger gesetz, yhe besser recht, yhe weniger gepott, yhe mehr gutter werck." W. A. VI, 353 (Ein Sermon von dem neuen Testament, 1520). One of the most important reasons for Luther's distrust in the law is his conviction that the law may drive men to outwardly "good" works but since these are done unwillingly they only lead to hypocrisy and cannot be pleasing in God's eyes: "dan ob wol das gesetz treybt und zwinget zu guten wercken von den bossen, ist doch nit muglich, das der mensch dasselb willig und gerne thu, sondern befindet sich altzeyt ungunstig dem gesetz und wolt lieber frey seyn. Die weil den unwill da ist, soo ist nymmer keyn gutt werck da, dan was nit willig geschicht, ist nit gut und gleyssset nur als were es gut. Darumb mugen alle gesetz niemant grundlich frum machen on die gnad gottis, sondern es müssen eytel gleyssner, heuchler, eusserliche, hoffertige heylige drauss werden, die hie yhren lohn empfangen und gott nymmer gefallen." Ibid. "Ergo omnis lex lata est ad impedienda peccata. Ergo lex, cum coercet peccata, iustificat? Nihil minus. Quod enim non occido, non committo adulterium, furtum non facio, quod ad aliis peccatis abstineo, non volens aut virtutis amore

facio, sed gladium et carnificem metuo." W. A. XL, 1, 479. As Nygren points out, Luther looks at the law as demanding a free surrender to God but because it demands a free surrender it renders it impossible; it would be a contradiction in terms to think of it succeeding: Agape and Eros II, 2, 509f. Seeberg's view, therefore, that the law remains as a "Lebens-norm" in the Christian life but the "du sollst" is gone is hardly adequate to explain Luther's full view: Grundzüge der Theologie Luthers, 110, 132. Lammers is closer to the spirit of Luther's teaching when he says that the "Erfüllung" of the law is lifted beyond being a moralistic problem by Luther: Luthers Anschauung vom Willen, 20ff. Luther's true teaching is of a doctrine which stands above the law; the transcending of the law is Luther's key to the Christian life: "Haec ideo dico, nequis putet nos bona opera relicere aut prohibere, ut papistae nos falso accusant, non intelligentes, neque quid ipsi loquantur, neque quid nos doceamus. Nihil enim noverunt nisi solam iustitiam legis, et tamen volunt iudicare de doctrina, quae posita est longe supra et ultra legem." W. A. XL, 1, 46.

219. "Und sind wol feine Oster prediger, aber schendliche Pfingst prediger." W. A. L, 599.
220. Ibid. "Itaque pii non sunt sub lege, scilicet Spiritu...Docet ergo Paulus in summa, hac disputatione de lucta Carnis et Spiritus, quod reconciliati seu Sancti non possint perficere hoc, quod Spiritus vult. Libenter enim Spiritus vellet totus esse purus, sed Caro coniuncta illa non permittit. Salvi tamen sunt et fiunt per remissionem peccatorum quae est in Christo. Deinde quia etiam ambulant et ducuntur Spiritu, non sunt sub lege, hoc est, Lex non potest accusare et perterrefacere eos, etc. aut sie etiam hoc tentet, tamen non potest adigere eos ad desperationem." W. A. XL, 2, 97, 99. According to Luther, the Holy Spirit preaches both the law and the gospel; He both convicts of sin and saves: W. A. LII, 353. Mayer, "The Una Sancta in Luther's Theology", Christendom XII, 326. Seeberg, Die Lehre Luthers, 206. The special work of the Holy Spirit is as "der Geber der Freiheit": Otto, Anschauung vom heiligen Geiste bei Luther, 15. The office and functions of the Holy Spirit can best be seen in relation to the other Persons of the Trinity; the Father and Son have created (and re-created through Christ's death and resurrection) and it is the work of the Holy Spirit to give life to that which has been created: "Et magnus Ecclesiae consensus est de mysterio Trinitatis hic prodito. Pater per Filium, quem verbum Mose vocat, creat coelum et terram ex nihilo. His Spiritus sanctus incubat...Nam Spiritus sancti officium est vivificare." W. A. XLII, 8.

The relation between the Holy Spirit and the justified Christian is determined by this division of work within the Trinity. When a man is baptized as a Christian--when he "puts

on Christ"--he is a new creation: "Induere vero Christum Evangelice non est imitationis, sed nativitatis et creationis novae, Quod videlicet ego induor ipso Christo, hoc est, ipsius innocentia, iustitia, sapientia, potentia, salute, vita, Spiritu etc." W. A. XL, 1, 540. It is the work of the Holy Spirit to vivify this new creation: "Also richtet der heilige geist die heiligung aus durch die folgende stücke das ist durch die gemeine der heiligen odder Christliche kyrche vergebung der sunden auferstehung des fleische und das ewige leben...Ynn des aber weil die heilickeit angefangen ist und teglich zunimmt...Denn itzt bleiben wir halb und halb reine und heilig auff das der Heilig geist ymer an uns erbeite durch das wort und teglich vergebung austeilte bis ynn ihenes leben da nicht mehr vergebung wird sein...Sihe das alles sol des heiligen geists ampt und werck sein das er auff erden die heilickeit anfahe und teglich mere durch die zwey stuck Christliche kyrche und vergebung der sunde." W. A. XXX, 1, 188, 190-1. Good works are, therefore, fruits of the Spirit; one must distinguish between "active" and "passive" love, for the latter is the true love which is the "work" of faith and the Holy Spirit: Müller, Das Lob Gottes bei Luther, 15, 102ff.

Niebuhr, among others, has accused Luther of a "defeatism" which originates from a subordination of sanctification to justification. Pauck has severely criticized Niebuhr's interpretation of Luther: "He takes frequent occasions to suggest inadequancies in Luther's teachings, but these criticisms do not seem to be founded on a careful study of Luther's work...Luther's faith certainly was that in Christ sinful man had not only the assurance but the actual gift of forgiveness, sanctification, renewal. This confidence was the citadel of the freedom of the Christian man, because it was the trust that the Gospel really was good news." Pauck, "Luther and the Reformation", Theology Today III, 3, 323ff. This is a slight misrepresentation of Niebuhr for he says of Luther: "He does not deny, in other words, that the new life is capable of a new righteousness." Nature and Destiny II, 193; Niebuhr is primarily critical of Luther's social ethic. Nevertheless, Pauck has drawn attention to an emphasis in Luther's theology which is often ignored; that is, that the gospel is for Luther the good news of the working of the whole of the Trinity: "Dem Vater gibt man die schöpfung, dem Son die erlösung und den heyligen Geyst die krafft der heiligung...Solches sind alles werck des einigen Gottes. Aber bey der unterschied der werck soll man auch die unterschied der personen fassen...Das ist ein sehr trostliche predig, die uns ye solt ein fröliches hertz gegen Gott machen, sintemal wir sehen, das alle drey personen, die gantze Gottheit, sich dahin wendet und damit umbgehet, das den armen, ellenden menschen wider die sünde, den tod und teuffel zur

gerechtigkeyt, ewigen leben und dem Reich Gottes geholffen Werd." W. A. LII, 344, 346. It is in this context that Luther speaks of the Christian being freed from the law; it is this "doctrina" of the gospel which is truly "longe supra et ultra legem."

221. The legalism is not to be considered only a Roman or sectarian attribute. Such tendencies were already beginning to be seen within Luther's own "family". Hildebrandt describes the "Concessions to Law" which some of Luther's colleagues were tempted to make. He points out that Melanchthon's Articuli de quibus egerunt per visitatores (1527) so strongly emphasized the work of the law that it offended others of Luther's friends, among whom was Agricola, who appealed to the "real" Luther in protest. Hildebrandt, Melanchthon, 34-5. Kawerau gives a brief account of these early strained relations between Melanchthon and Agricola and the conference at Torgau (Nov. 26-28, 1527) which theoretically resolved their differences. Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia I, 198-200. Under these circumstances, Hildebrandt believes that: "To have pressed this point was at any rate the relative right of Agricola's protest." Melanchthon, 43. Melanchthon showed other tendencies which would indicate his difference of temperament and outlook from Luther. Whitney, Reformation Essays, 29. One wonders whether Luther's strong personal affection for Melanchthon didn't often blind him to the divergence of their viewpoints. There is an interesting disputation between Luther and Melanchthon in the Table-talk on the whole question of justification: good works, the work of the law, etc. which was supposed to have taken place in 1536; from what has been said it may well be authentic, at least in outline, and it gives a vivid insight into the different approaches of the two men: Michelet, The Life of Martin Luther, 425ff. This is an important issue in the history of later Lutheranism. Aulen has described the Osiandrian controversy which ultimately led to a victory of "rational nomism", as represented by Mörlin, Flacius, etc.: "The result was that Law now came to be taken as the essential basis of man's relation to God...Luther's fundamental thought, that Law is in one respect a tyrant and an enemy from whose power Christ came to set men free, is altogether lost." Christus Victor, 139ff. Aulen's verdict on Melanchthon is: "The inner tensions within Luther's theology, the vigour and force of his thoughts, and his sharply paradoxical language, Melanchthon wholly lacked the power to understand." Ibid. 140. The Antinomian controversy vividly illustrates the difficulty Luther faced in trying to maintain a middle position; it also reveals the depth and creativeness of his views which made them so difficult to be passed on to and grasped by his followers: "The tragedy of the debate on Justifi-

cation between Osiander on the one side, and Melanchthon, Mörlin, and others on the other, was that both sides could claim to appeal to Luther, but that neither side had grasped anything like his whole width of view." Aulen, Christus Victor, 142.

222. "Beide, Romanismus and Antinomismus, habe also dies miteinander gemeinsam, dass sie Gottes Willen nur als einheitlich zu denken vermögen, und sie unterscheiden sich nur dadurch von einander, dass sie diesen einheitlichen Willen Gottes entweder im Gesetz oder im Evangelium finden." Stange, Studien zur Theologie Luthers I, 55-6. Husfeldt discusses the relation of the law to the Christian life in Studien zum Problem des Gesetzes in der Theologie Luthers and comes to the conclusion that Luther gives law an important place in Christian ethics; 61ff.; his conclusions seem to me to be highly questionable, largely because he has failed to take into consideration Luther's understanding of the work of the Holy Spirit in the "new creation".
223. "Dazu kommt noch ein anderes: der alte Luther steht dem jungen Luther sehr nah. Die grosse Konzeption aus der Jugend ist geblieben; sie ist verschärft, aber nicht verändert worden." Seeberg, Studien zu Luthers Genesisvorlesung, 105f. For law and gospel: Ibid. 77ff.

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